Security Cheques and the surrounding anomaly : the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Cheque

INTRODUCTION:

Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the N.I. Act) defines a cheque as a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand and it includes the electronic image of a truncated cheque and a cheque in the electronic form. It is important to bear in mind that all cheques are bills of exchange, but all bills of exchange are not cheques. It is a settled law that a cheque does not become invalid merely because of the reason that it is ante-dated or post-dated. A post-dated cheque is only a ‘bill of exchange’ till the date scribed on the face of the cheque however it becomes a ‘cheque’ on the date scribed on the face of the cheque.[1] Thus, the essential purpose of issuing a post-dated cheque is to prevent the drawee-bank from paying the amount written on the face of the cheque to the payee or a holder before the date scribed on the face of the cheque.[2]

According to the Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition; Volume: 3(1); p.143- “Post-dated cheques are not invalid, but the banker should not pay such a cheque if presented before the date it bears. If, therefore, a cheque dated on a Sunday is presented on the previous business day, it should be returned with the answer ‘post-dated’. A post-dated cheque, however, if presented at or after its ostensible date, it should be paid though the banker knows it to be post-dated, and even if it has been presented before the date and refused payment.

Chapter XVII of the N.I. Act deals with the offence of dishonour of cheque(s) and is tiled as “OF PENALTIES IN CASE OF DISHONOUR OF CERTAIN CHEQUES FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNTS”.[3] This chapter runs from Section 138 to Section 142 of the N.I. Act. Penal provisions contained in Section 138 to Section 142 of the N.I. Act were enacted to ensure that the obligations undertaken by issuing cheques as a mode of payment are honoured.[4] To invoke Section 138 of the N.I. Act and to thereby to make a person liable for the offence of dishonour cheque, the following three conditions are required to be fulfilled: (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within the period of six (6) months from the date on which it was drawn, or, within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier[5]; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, formulates a demand for the payment of the cheque amount by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen (15) days[6] of the receipt of the information by him from the bank as regards the dishonour of the cheque; and (c) the drawer of the cheque fails to make payment of the cheque amount to the payee or the holder in due course, as the case may be, within fifteen (15) days of the receipt of the demand notice.[7]

PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTION 118(a) AND SECTION 139 OF THE N.I. ACT:

To bring home an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, following ingredients must be fulfilled: (i) that there should be a legally enforceable debt; (ii) that the cheque is drawn up from the account of bank for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which pre-supposes the legally enforceable debt; and (iii) that the cheques so issued had been returned due to insufficiency of funds.[8]

Section 118(a) of the N.I Act holds that, until the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed that, every negotiable instrument was made or was drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, for consideration. However, Section 139 of the N.I. Act merely raises a presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque that the same has been issued for discharge of any debt or other liability. It is important to bear in mind that, the existence of a legally recoverable debt is not presumed under Section 139 of the N.I. Act.[9]

The standard of proof in a criminal trial for establishing the guilt of an accused by the prosecution is that of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, however, the standard of proof as regards an accused to establish his innocence is ‘preponderance of probabilities’. The onus on the accused in a criminal case is not as heavy as that of the prosecution and the accused may be compared with defendant in a civil case.[10] It worth noting that, Section 138 of the N.I. Act specifies a strong criminal remedy against the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a device to prevent undue delay in the matter of litigation, that is, if an accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a “legally enforceable debt or other liability”, the prosecution can fail. If two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case- one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted.[11] Section 139 of the N.I. Act categorically states that, it shall be presumed, “unless the contrary is proved”, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature specified under Section 138 of the N.I. Act for discharge in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability; thus, Section 139 of the N.I. Act introduces that which may be called as the doctrine of ‘reverse burden’; the privilege given by this doctrine must be delicately balanced.[12]

SECURITY CHEQUE:

The language and purport of the N.I. Act illustrates the intent of the law-makers to the effect that, wherever there is a default on the part one in favour of another and in the event a ‘cheque’ is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability, then, there cannot be any restriction or embargo in the matter of application of the provisions of Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881.[13]

In the case of, M/s Collage Culture & Ors v. Apparel Export Promotion Council & Anr[14], the Hon’ble Single Judge Bench of the High Court of Delhi categorically observed as follows:

  1. A post-dated cheque may be issued under two (2) circumstances: (1) It may be issued for a debt in presenti, payable in future; and, (2) It may be issued for a debt which may become payable in future upon the occurrence of a contingent event;
  2. A post-dated cheque issued for a debt in presenti, payable in future is not in the nature of a “security cheque”; however, a post-dated cheque issued for a debt which may become payable in future upon the occurrence of a contingent event is in the nature of a “security cheque”; and,
  3. The word “due” means “outstanding at the relevant date”. The debt has to be in existence as a crystallised demand analogous to a liquidated demand which may or may not come into existence; coming into existence being contingent upon the happening of an event.
  4. A post-dated cheque for a debt due but payment postponed to future date would attract Section 138 of the N.I. Act; however, a cheque issued not against an existing debt due but rather by way of a ‘security’ would not attract Section 138 of the N.I. Act, for it has not been issued for a debt which has come into existence.

The decision rendered in M/s Collage Culture (Supra) was set aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 29.07.2015 rendered in Apparel Export Promotion Council & Anr v. M/s Collage Culture & Ors, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 1678/2012 (Coram: V. Gopala Gowda & A.K. Goel, JJ.).[15] Posthumously, in the case of Credential Leasing & Credits Ltd. v. Shruti Investments & Anr[16], the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi observed that, even a security cheque could form the basis of a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, if on the date of deposit of the post-dated security cheque, the debt apropos the accused stood crystallised.

DICTUM IN INDUS AIRWAYS PRIVATE LIMITED V/s MAGNUM AVIATION PRIVATE LIMITED:

In the case of, Indus Airways Private Limited v. Magnum Aviation Private Limited[17], the question that arose for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was this: Whether dishonour of a post-dated cheque issued as an advancement payment against a purchase order will invite prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, if the purchase order was cancelled and no goods or services were supplied to the purchaser, but the cheque issued by him was presented for payment before the bank and the same was returned as dishonoured with the remarks ‘stop payment’?

The court opined as follows:

  1. The purchaser can, at best, be held liable for the tort of breach of contract, but proceedings cannot be launched against him under Section 138 of the N.I. Act;
  2. If a cheque has been drawn as an advance payment for purchase of goods and thereafter, for any reason the purchase order is not carried out to its logical conclusion, either because of its cancellation or otherwise, and the materials/goods for which purchase order was placed were not supplied, then, the cheque cannot be held to have been drawn for an existing debt or other liability; and
  3. The payment of the cheque in the nature of an advance payment indicates that, at the time of the drawal of the cheque, there was no existing debt or other liability.   

DICTUM IN SAMPELLY SATYANARAYANA RAO V/s INDIAN RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AGENCY LIMITED:

In the case of, Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited[18], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was of the opinion that, to determine the applicability of Section 138 of the N.I. Act in a given case the test to be employed should be following: ‘Whether the cheque represents discharge of existing enforceable debt or liability, or, whether it represents advance payment without there being subsisting debt or liability?’.

The Hon’ble Supreme court in this case held as follows:

  1. Issuance of cheque towards advance payment could not be considered as discharge of any subsisting liability;
  2. Whether a post-dated cheque is for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, then Section 138 of the N.I. Act stands attracted and not otherwise;
  3. In case ‘loan’ has already been disbursed by the bank and the ‘instalment’ has fallen due on the date mentioned on the face of the cheque, then, dishonour of such a cheque falls under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, as such a cheque undoubtedly represents an ‘outstanding liability’.

EXCURUS:

From the above discussion, following conclusions can be drawn:

  1. A post-dated cheque is a well recognised mode of payment;
  2. If on the date the cheque is presented for encashment to the bank, ascertained and/or crystallised debt or other liability relatable to the dishonoured cheque exists, then, the dishonour of the cheque would invite prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act;
  3. The expression “security cheque” is not a statutorily defined expression in the N.I. Act; the N.I. Act does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a security cheque[19];
  4. Once the issuance of the cheque and the signatures scribed thereon are admitted, then, the presumption of a legally enforceable debt or other liability in favour of the holder of the cheque or payee arises, therefore, it will be for the accused to rebut the said presumption, although the accused need not adduce his own evidence, he can rely upon the material submitted by the complainant. Mere statement of the accused perhaps may not be sufficient to rebut the said presumption[20];
  5. The explanation appended to Section 138 of the N.I. Act leaves no manner of doubt that to attract an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, there should be legally enforceable debt or other liability subsisting on the date of drawal of the cheque; and,
  6. Drawal of cheque in discharge of an existing debt or past adjudicated liability is essential for brining an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.

 

[1] See: Anil K. Sawhney v. Gulshan Rai, (1993) 4 SCC 424; Ashok Yeshwant Badave v. Surendra Madhavrao Nighojakar, (2001) 3 SCC 726

[2] See: Chalmers & Guest on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes, 15th Edition, p.74

[3] The Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988 inserted in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a new Chapter XVII comprising of Section 138 to Section 142. 

[4] See: Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D’souza, AIR 2003 SC 2035

[5] The period of six (6) months has been reduced to a period of three (3) months vide RBI Notification No. RBI/2011-12/251, DBOD.AML BC No. 47/14.01.001/2011-12, dated 04.11.2011 (With Effect From: 01.04.2012)

[6] The period of fifteen (15) days, now, stands increased to thirty (30) days by virtue of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002.

[7] See: Sharda Finance Corporation v. L. Laxman Goud, 2004 (4) CRJ 245

[8] See: Wilson Mathew v. The State NCT of Delhi & Ors, 224 (2015) DLT 291

[9] Ibid, Para 33

[10] See: M.S. Narayana Menon @Mani v. State of Kerala, 2006 (3) CTC 730

[11] See: Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhu Nath Jha & Ors, AIR 2004 SC 1053

[12] See: A. Thayalan v. S.S. Mani, 2014 (4) MLJ (Crl.) 493

[13] See: ICDS Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer & Anr, (2002) 6 SCC 426

[14] 2007 (4) JCC (NI) 388

[15] In Apparel Export Promotion Council & Anr v. M/s Collage Culture & Ors, Criminal Appeal No. 1678/2012, Decided on: 29.07.2015, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India setting aside the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, remanded the matter to the Trial Court to ascertain as to whether or not, on the date of deposit of the cheque the liability had been quantified. The disputing parties were granted liberty to adduce oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective claim and counter-claim.

[16] 223 (2015) DLT 343

[17] (2014) 12 SCC 539

[18] Criminal Appeal No. 867 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 5410 of 2014); Decision Dated: 19.09.2016; Coram: Dipak Misra & Adarsh Kumar Goel, JJ.

[19] See: Suresh Chandra Goyal v. Amit Singhal, 2015 (3) DCR 362

[20] See: Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441

The myth of Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) manipulation

Electronic Voting Machine

There are allegations being made by certain sore losers that the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) were manipulated in the recently held 2017 Assembly Elections in 5 states. Certain sections of the media, for their own vested interests, are further instigating such rumours. The allegation of manipulating the EVMs are made against the Central Government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

State Sentence Review Board and some pertinent issues

Jail

“Hate the sin and not the sinner”.

— Mahatma Gandhi

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 prescribes punishments for different crimes committed by individuals. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 not only lays down the procedure but also defines the humane side of the law holding out possibilities of remission, suspension or commutation of sentence of the deserving prisoners with or without their consent.  While Sections 432 and 433 are enabling provisions, Section 433A was added to the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 later imposing certain restrictions on the powers of remission or commutation by the appropriate government in certain circumstances and cases.

Demonetisation issue will have to be referred to 7-judge bench to succeed

Supreme Court

There are media reports that today (16 December 2016), the Supreme Court has referred the PILs on demonetisation issue to a Constitution bench of the court. The order referring these large number of PILs to a Constitution Bench was passed by a 3-judge bench comprising Chief Justice of India TS Thakur and Justices AM Khanwilkar and DY Chandrachud. The Supreme Court also passed order to transfer all the cases pending on demonetisation issue in various High Courts to itself and restrained all courts from entertaining any case relating to demonetisation.

An overt act is not always strict requirement for culpability of member of unlawful assembly, says SC

Supreme Court

An overt act is not always an inflexible requirement of rule of law to establish culpability of a member of an unlawful assembly. The crucial question is whether the assembly entertained a common unlawful object and whether the accused was one of the members of such an assembly by intentionally joining it or by continuing in it being aware of the facts which rendered the assembly unlawful. Without unlawful object no assembly becomes an unlawful assembly. These observations were made in the case of Muthuramalingam & Ors. v. State Represented By Inspector Of Police [Criminal Appeal Nos. 231-233 OF 2009] by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose and Justice Amitava Roy on 9 December 2016.

National Anthem in cinema halls – SC modifies order for physically handicapped persons

National Anthem

On 30 November 2016, the Supreme Court had passed an order directing that all the cinema halls in India shall play the National Anthem before the feature film starts and all persons present in the hall are obliged to stand up to show respect to the National Anthem. Now, by an order dated 9 December 2016, the Supreme Court has modified the above order by observing that if a physically challenged person or physically handicapped person goes to the Cinema hall to watch a film, he need not stand up, if he is incapable to stand, but must show such conduct which is commensurate with respect for the National Anthem. This order has been issued by the same two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, comprising Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Amitava Roy, in the case of Shyam Narayan Chouksey [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 855/2016].

Do not frame policies while exercising powers of judicial review, Supreme Court tells Allahabad HC

Supreme Court

In a case where the Allahabad high court had issued detailed directions relating to police investigation, the Supreme Court while setting aside those directions, observed that the High Court had crossed the boundaries of the controversy that was before it, and that some of the directions, as we perceive, are in the sphere of policy. The Supreme Court advised the high court that the courts are required to exercise the power of judicial review regard being had to the controversy before it, and that a court cannot take steps for framing a policy. This order was issued by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, comprising Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Amitava Roy, on 29 November 2016, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Subhash Chandra Jaiswal and Others [CIVIL APPEAL NO.11381OF 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.26961 of 2016)].

Compensation for escalation in construction cost set aside by SC where construction intentionally delayed

Consumer Protection

In a case where the possession of plot was delayed by development agency, it was held that the purchaser suffered an injury due to the delay in handing over the possession as there was definitely escalation in the cost of construction; however, it was held that at the same time the purchaser had surely benefited by the increase in the cost of plot during the period of delay; and that since the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission had itself criticized the conduct of the purchaser in intentionally delaying the construction for 6 years but still proceeded to award compensation, it was held that award of interest would have been sufficient to compensate the purchaser for the loss suffered by him due to the delay in handing over the possession of the plot, and that the compensation of Rs. 15 lakhs awarded by the State Commission was excessive. This order was passed by a Supreme Court bench comprising the Chief Justice of India T.S. Thakur, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice L. Nageswara Rao, in the case of Chief Administrator, H.U.D.A. & Anr. v. Shakuntla Devi [Civil Appeal No. 7335 of 2008, decided on 8 December, 2016].

7th Jamia National Moot Court Competition, 2017

Moot Court

7th Jamia National Moot Court Competition, 2017 is organised by the Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi- 110025 from 17th to 19th of March, 2017.

The teams can register latest by 31st of January, 2017 through an email sent to jmcc.jmi@gmail.com along with their registration forms.

The teams further need to submit their memorials by 20th of February, 2017 for evaluation and on the basis of its scores, top 32 teams will be selected which will finally appear for the National Rounds.

There are attractive cash prizes to be won:

  1. a) The winning team will receive a cash prize of Rs. 30,000/-.
  2. b) The runners up team will receive a cash prize of Rs. 15,000/-
  3. c) Best Male Advocate shall receive a cash prize of Rs. 5,000/-.
  4. d) Best Female Advocate shall receive a cash prize of Rs. 5,000/-.
  5. e) Best Researcher shall receive a cash prize of Rs. 5,000/-.
  6. f) The team with the Best Memorial will receive a cash prize of Rs. 5000/-

Any clarifications regarding the competition can be sought from:

  • Prof. (Dr.) Asad Malik, Subject Advisor, Ph. No. +91-9891999938
  • Shoaib Khan, Convener, Moot Court Committee, Ph. No. +91-9899986912
  • Huma Nasir, Co-convener, Moot Court Committee, Ph. No. +91-9873626358

Triple talaq is unconstitutional and it violates rights of Muslim women: Allahabad High Court [read order]

Muslim Women

The Allahabad high court has observed that triple talaq is unconstitutional and that it violates the fundamental rights of Muslim women. The high court has also said that no Personal Law (such as the Muslim Personal Law) is above the law and constitution.

To deny gratuity, termination must be for misconduct making an offence involving moral turpitude: SC

Supreme Court

In order to deny gratuity to an employee, it is not enough that the alleged misconduct of the employee constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude as per the report of the domestic inquiry. There must be termination on account of the alleged misconduct, which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude. This has been held by a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman in the case of Jorsingh Govind Vanjari v. Divisional Controller Maharashtra, State Road Transport Corporation, Jalgaon Division, Jalgaon [Civil Appeal No. 11807 Of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 26366 of 2016), decided on 6 December 2016].

Supreme Court again asks Govt about delay in Lokpal appointment, lame excuses the answer

Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013

The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, came into force with effect from 16 January 2014. Now, we are in December 2016. So, almost 3 years are over. However, despite the above Act having come into force, Lokpal Chairperson and members are yet to be appointed. So, yesterday (7 December 2016), the Supreme Court yet again asked the Central Government as to why there is delay in appointment of Lokpal. The bench headed by the Chief Justice of India T.S. Thakur and also comprising Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice L. Nageswara Rao, pointedly asked the Government as to why Lokpal cannot be appointed. This happened in Common Cause A Registered Society vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) NO. 245/2014]. However, only lame excuses came from the Government to such question, because the Government cannot have a justifiable answer to this question.

Income Tax raids after demonetisation: 400 cases, Rs. 130 crore seized, Rs. 2000 Crore undisclosed income

After the Central Government headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the demonetization of Old High Denomination currency notes of Rs. 1000 and 500, on 8 November, 2016, the Income Tax Department has carried-out swift investigations in more than 400 cases. More than Rs. 130 Crore in cash and jewellery has been seized and approximately Rs. 2000 Crore of undisclosed income has been admitted by the taxpayers. These figures were released by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, in a press release on 6 December 2016.

Regularise services of workers working for more than five years in BRO and GREF: Uttarakhand HC

Uttarakhand High Court

Uttarakhand high court has directed the Government of India to frame a Scheme to regularize the services of workers who have worked for more than five years’ continuously in Border Road Organization (BRO) and General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF). It also directed the Government to pay them the minimum of the pay scale being paid to the corresponding regular Group ‘D’ employee, including D.A., H.R.A. and C.C.A. Several other directions meant to ensure welfare of workers were also issued. These directions were issued by a division bench of Uttarakhand high court, comprising Justices Rajiv Sharma and Alok Singh on 5 December 2016 in the case of Union of India & others v. All India Trade Union Congress & others [Special Appeal No.485 of 2015].

Part payment after notice in cheque dishonour case does not absolve from legal liability: Calcutta HC

Cheque

Calcutta high court has held that simply because a part payment was received by the complainant after issuance of statutory notice in a cheque bounce case is not enough to deviate from the cause of action. Merely because the accused has paid some amount of the cheque after receiving statutory notice, that will not absolve him from the legal enforceable liability. These directions were issued by a single-judge bench of Justice Indrajit Chatterjee on 6 December 2016 in the case of Hazi Jahangir Molla. Vs. Md. Alim Mallick & Anr [C.R.R. 856 of 2013 with C.R.A.N. 1728 of 2016].

Delhi high court has jurisdiction where mercy petition of accused of another state rejected by President

Delhi High Court

Delhi high court has today held that it has territorial jurisdiction to hear a writ petition challenging the rejection of the mercy petition of a death-convict by the President even though the crime was committed in the state of Chhattisgarh. The State of Chhattisgarh had taken a strong objection to the writ petition against rejection of mercy petition being heard by Delhi high court, contending that such a petition can be heard only by the Chhattisgarh high court since the crime was committed in Chhattisgarh and the convict was also presently jailed in Chhattisgarh. However, a division bench of Delhi high court, comprising Justices G.S. Sistani and Vinod Goel rejected the objection of the State of Chhattisgarh and held that it has the jurisdiction to hear the said petition challenging the rejection of mercy petition. This order was issued in the case of Sonu Sardar v. Union of India & Anr. [W.P. (CRL) 441/2015, decided on 6 December 2016].

Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar to be the next Chief Justice of India

Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar

Justice Jagdish Singh Khehar, judge of the Supreme Court, will be the next Chief Justice of India. He would be taking oath as CJI on 4 January 2016. The swearing in ceremony takes place in Rashtrapati Bhawan. He will be the 44th Chief Justice of India. However, he will have a short tenure of about 8 months only, since he will be retiring on 27 August 2017.

Wrong case of converting conviction under S. 302 to 304 IPC by Supreme Court

Supreme Court

Recently, the Supreme Court converted the conviction of an accused from offences under Sections 302 and 307 Indian Penal Code (IPC) to offences under Section 304 Part 1 and 307 IPC, and the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone from the sentence of life imprisonment. On a careful study of the said judgment, I am of the honest opinion that the said judgment is wrong and that the change of conviction from under Section 302 to under Section 304 was unwarranted in the facts of the case. Moreover, unfortunately, the reasons given by the Supreme Court do not justify such conversion of sections under which the accused was convicted. Let me analyse the reasons.

61 MPs submit impeachment notice to Rajya Sabha Chairman against Justice C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy

Parliament of India

As per media reports, 61 MPs of the Rajya Sabha have on 5 December 2016 submitted a petition to the Rajya Sabha Chairman Shri Hamid Ansari for initiating an impeachment proceeding against Justice C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy, who is a judge in the Telangana and Andhra Pradesh high court at Hyderabad, for alleged victimisation of a Dalit district court judge and for alleged possession of assets which are disproportionate to his known sources of income. Reports suggest that among others, prominent Rajya Sabha Members such as Sitaram Yechury (CPI-M), D Raja (CPI), Digvijaya Singh, Oscar Fernandes, Kumari Selja, P L Punia, Shantaram Naik (Congress), Sharad Yadav (JD-U), Naresh Agarwal and Neeraj Shekhar (Samajwadi Party) have signed this petition.

Delay of 10 years in filing appeal condoned by Delhi High Court

Delhi High Court

In a case, the Delhi high court allowed condonation of delay of about 10 years (3628 days, to be precise) in filing appeal before the high court against the order of the lower court. Usually, such long delay is not condoned. This order of condoning such long delay of about ten years was passed by a division bench of the high court, comprising Justices Pradeep Nandrajog and Yogesh Khanna in the case of Manju Barjatya Uma Singh (Since Deceased) Through LRs & Anr [RFA(OS) 5/2016, decided on 25 November 2016].