Can an appeal be filed against mutual consent divorce for setting it aside?

Tilak Marg

Question: Is it possible to file an appeal against a decree of divorce on the basis of mutual consent passed under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act? Can such decree of mutual consent divorce be set aside by the appellate court?

Answer: It is pertinent to point out that Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act specifically provides that: “All decrees made by the court in any proceeding under this Act shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be appealable as decrees of the court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, and every such appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decision of the court given in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.”

Since the decree of divorce on the basis of mutual consent is passed under the above Act under the provisions of Section 13-B, therefore a decree of mutual consent divorce should also be appealable. This should be quite clear.

However, sometimes, a doubt is raised on this issue in view of provisions of Section 96(3) of the Civil Procedure Code which lays down that “No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties”.

In this regard, it may be noted that Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act lays down that after the second motion is moved by both the parties, “…the court shall, on being satisfied, after hearing the parties and after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a marriage has been solemnized and that the averments in the petition are true, pass a decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved with effect from the date of the decree”.

Thus, even in the case of mutual consent divorce, the court had to be satisfied after hearing the parties and making appropriate enquiries that the averments in the petition are true. Since petition for mutual consent divorce necessarily implies consent of both the parties, therefore averments in the petition being true means that the court has to satisfy itself that both the parties have given their free consent.

Further, Section 23(1)(bb) of the Hindu Marriage Act requires that in any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not, the court should be satisfied that “when a divorce is sought on the ground of mutual consent, such consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or under influence”. This clearly implies that the court must be satisfied that in the case of a divorce being sought on the ground of mutual consent, consent of the parties has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. If consent of one or both of the parties has been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence, then such mutual consent cannot be said to be a willing consent.

In view of these reasons, there should be a remedy available to the parties if these requirements of mutual consent divorce have not been fulfilled.

In this regard, it may be noted that in the case of Krishna Khetarpal v. Satish Lal, AIR 1987 P&H 191, it was held by a division bench of the Punjab & Haryana high court held that:

“An appeal against the decree of divorce by mutual consent distinctly is not merely on consent of the parties, for the matrimonial Court is involved in decision making so that it accords not only with the provisions of section 13B of the Act but also section 23 of the Act. In sub-section (1) of section 13B of the Act, a joint petition by the spouses can be presented to the District Court on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more before the presentation of the petition and that they have not been able to live together and further that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. The petition then lies in hibernation for six months and under sub-section (2) both the parties have to activate it on motion to the Court. It is then that the Court enters upon an enquiry into the facts whether the marriage has been solemnized and whether the averments in the petition are true and further there are no impediments in the way as conceived of in section 23 and in particular of sub-section (1)(bb) that such consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. Thus, a decree for divorce by mutual consent is not based merely on mutuality of the consenting parties but the court’s involvement in decision making is inextricably a part of the decree. And since the possibility of an error, legal or factual, entering in the decision making cannot be ruled out, an appeal under section 28 of the Act has advisedly been provided. Besides, section 21 of the said Act says that subject to other provisions contained in the said Act and to such rules as the High Court may make in this behalf all proceedings under the said Act shall be regulated, as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Thus the proceedings in the appeal are to be regulated as far as may be, by the Code of Civil Procedure without altering the substantive right of appeal to the parties concerned. On the above analysis and differentiation, the conclusion is inescapable that an appeal against a consent decree under section 13B of the Act is appealable under section 28 of the Act and sub-section (3) of section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is no bar.”

Likewise, it is pertinent to point out that in the case of Sushama v. Pramod, (2009) 4 Mah LJ 81 : AIR 2009 Bom 111, the Bombay High Court has held as under:

“Legislature has cast obligations upon Court entertaining the proceedings under section 13-B to record a finding that consent for divorce has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. Thus legislature has visualised that there may be a case in which consent for divorce may be obtained and decided to provide a safeguard against abuse of this provision. Hence obligation has been cast upon the Court to verify the same, and to record a satisfaction that the consent given by the parties is free and voluntary. Thus having visualized abuse of such provision for grant of divorce by mutual consent by use of force, fraud etc., it cannot be accepted that legislature did not provide for a remedy to the spouse aggrieved in such matters. To hold that remedy of appeal is not available to such aggrieved spouse, will be rendering nugatory the exercise of obligation cast upon the trial Court by the Legislature.

Accordingly, the Bombay high court held that appeal against the mutual consent decree was legally maintainable.

Similarly, another Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Charanjit Singh Mann v. Neelam Maan, AIR 2006 P&H 201, and a Division Bench of Jharkhand High Court in the case of Hina Singh v. Satya Kumar Singh, AIR 2007 Jharkhand 34, have also held that appeal against decree of divorce by mutual consent is maintainable.

Thus, the answer to your question would be that an appeal against a decree of mutual consent divorce may be legally maintainable.

Whose morale and pride important? Of law enforcers or of law breakers?

Yogi Adityanath

There are media reports suggesting that Shreshtha Thakur, the woman police officer of Syana circle in district Bulandshahar of Uttar Pradesh, who stood up against local BJP leaders and sent five of them to jail for creating obstacles in discharging government duties, was transferred to Bahraich on 2 July 2017. This comes barely about 10 days after the above incident took place. It clearly shows that nothing has changed in Uttar Pradesh despite tall claims made by the BJP which came to power recently in March 2017.

It is noteworthy that on 22 June 2017, the woman police officer stood up to local BJP leaders. She and her team had pulled up a local BJP leader for not carrying proper documentation for his vehicle. He was issued a challan after which he allegedly misbehaved with cops, leading to his arrest. Subsequently, other BJP leaders arrived there and objected to the action of police, and they argued with police. When the arrested BJP leader was produced before the district court, a group of BJP workers at the scene began abusing and raising slogans against the police. The woman police officer had then arrested some of the BJP workers for obstructing the discharge of duties by the police.

A video of the above incident had gone viral on social media.

The media reports clearly suggest that the above woman police officer was transferred following a meeting of a delegation of the BJP’s 11 MLAs and MP with the Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath over the issue. The local BJP leaders had linked her transfer with their pride and pressed the BJP high command to initiate action against the said women police officer. A local BJP leader has been quoted by the media clearly admitting that her transfer was essential to keeping intact the pride of BJP workers and leaders.

Though it has been claimed that she was one of the 244 police officers transferred in the state, the motive is clear to transfer her to a distant place for having taken action against the local leaders of the ruling party.

Earlier also, in the month of May, a young woman IPS officer Charu Nigam was publicly berated and rebuked by the BJP MLA from Gorakhpur Sadar Radha Mohan Das Agarwal.

The BJP government led by Yogi Adityanath came into power just about three months back. These types of incidents clearly show as to how the local BJP leaders in Uttar Pradesh are behaving much in the same manner as leaders of the Samajwadi Party did during the previous government’s rule.

This is not acceptable from a party which makes tall claims of being a disciplined party and promises to restore law and order in the State. This also reflects very poorly on the police leadership in the state. It is the duty of the police leadership to protect the young police officers, more so a woman police officer, when they are performing their duties with full dedication in accordance with law without getting scared of the powerful lobbies. It is unfortunate that instead of helping and protecting such police officers who were strictly enforcing the laws, the Government of the State is supporting the local political leaders of the ruling party who have violated the laws and have behaved arrogantly with the police officers on duty.

If this type of behaviour continues, the days are not far when the BJP rule in the State will also go to the same low levels which were touched during the previous government’s rule. In fact, barring the initial bravado and euphoria of the first few days when the Yogi government came into power, the law and order situation in Uttar Pradesh has gone back to the same level as it existed during the previous government’s role, if not worse than that. The crime situation and the law and order situation have not improved. There have been repeated caste riots and crimes against women. The government appears to be having little control. And, with these types of incidents taking place where police officers performing their lawful duties are punished, you cannot expect much improvement either.

The government has to decide – whose morale and pride are more important. Of the honest law enforcers? Or, of the law breakers who are loyal workers of the party in power? Any wrong priority chosen at this initial phase of the new government will accelerate its drift down the slope of lawlessness. Once the journey down the slope begins, it becomes difficult to apply brakes. And, Uttar Pradesh is one state which would be difficult to control once the unidirectional downfall begins. Yogi Adityanath should know that the initial “Yogi-Yogi” chants have already died down. The honeymoon period is over. It is his performance, and not rhetoric, which will make or break him. In fact, his poor performance may also adversely affect Prime Minister Narendra Modi during 2019 elections.

Post-dated cheque described as security for repayment of instalment of already disbursed loan

Cheque

I have pointed out in an earlier reply that the criminal liability of the accused under the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is attracted only on account of the dishonour of the cheques issued in discharge of liability or debt, but not on account of issuance of security cheques which are not issued for discharge of the liability or debt.

Recently, in the case of Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Ltd., (2016) 10 SCC 458 : AIR 2016 SC 4363, the Supreme Court dealt with a situation where post-dated cheques were given describing them as “security” but they were towards repayment of loan amount, and the loan had also been disbursed already. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that dishonour of such cheques may attract offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The relevant part of the agreement which dealt with such post-dated security cheques in the above case is as under:

“3.1. Security for the loan. — The loan together with the interest, interest tax, liquidated damages, commitment fee, up-front fee prima on repayment or on redemption, costs, expenses and other monies shall be secured by:

(i)-(ii)***

(iii) Deposit of post-dated cheques towards repayment of instalments of principal of loan amount in accordance with agreed repayment schedule and instalments of interest payable thereon.”

The Supreme Court held that the question whether a post-dated cheque is for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the section is attracted and not otherwise.

With regard to the above terms in the agreement, the Supreme Court held that though the word “security” is used in Clause 3.1(iii) of the agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being towards repayment of instalments. The repayment becomes due under the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced and the instalment falls due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed a date which was prior to the date of the cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and instalments have fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement, dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the Act. The cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding liability.

The Supreme Court distinguished the case of Indus Airways (P) Ltd. v. Magnum Aviation (P) Ltd., (2014) 12 SCC 539, where the purchase order had been cancelled and cheque issued towards advance payment for the purchase order was dishonoured. In that case, it was found that the cheque had not been issued for discharge of liability but as advance for the purchase order which was cancelled. It was held that keeping in mind this fine but real distinction, the said judgment cannot be applied to a case of present nature where the cheque was for repayment of loan instalment which had fallen due though such deposit of cheques towards repayment of instalments was also described as “security” in the loan agreement. The Court held that in applying the judgment in Indus Airways, one cannot lose sight of the difference between a transaction of purchase order which is cancelled and that of a loan transaction where loan has actually been advanced and its repayment is due on the date of the cheque.

The crucial question to determine applicability of Section 138 of the Act is whether the cheque represents discharge of existing enforceable debt or liability or whether it represents advance payment without there being subsisting debt or liability.

Accordingly, observing that a post-dated cheque is a well-recognised mode of payment, the Supreme Court held that dishonour of cheque in the present case being for discharge of existing liability is covered by Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Can wife claim stridhan under Domestic Violence Act after living separately?

Tilak Marg

Question: Can wife claim her stridhan from her husband under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 after she is living separately from her husband?

Answer: Merely because wife is living separately, does not mean that the relationship of husband and wife has come to an end. They continue to have the legal relationship of being husband and wife until a decree of divorce is validly passed. Therefore, she continues to be an “aggrieved person” within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Due to this, the wife can file a claim for getting her stridhan back from the husband under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.

In fact, recently, in the case of Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury, (2016) 2 SCC 705 : 2016 Cri LJ 330, the Supreme Court held that a wife who is living separately from the husband even under a decree of judicial separation can claim her stridhan back from the husband under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. In your case, there is no decree of judicial separation and you are merely living separately from the husband due to mutual convenience and not under a decree of a court for judicial separation.

In the above case, the Supreme Court held that the core issue that is required to be addressed is whether the appellant wife has ceased to be an “aggrieved person” because of the decree of judicial separation. Once the decree of divorce is passed, the status of the parties becomes different, but that is not so when there is a decree for judicial separation. No doubt judicial separation creates rights and obligations. And no doubt a decree or an order for judicial separation permits the parties to live apart. And no doubt there would be no obligation for either party to cohabit with the other. And no doubt mutual rights and obligations arising out of a marriage are suspended. The decree of judicial separation, however, does not sever or dissolve the marriage. It affords an opportunity for reconciliation and adjustment. Though judicial separation after a certain period may become a ground for divorce, it is not necessary and the parties are not bound to have recourse to that remedy and the parties can live keeping their status as wife and husband till their lifetime.

The Supreme Court further held that there is a distinction between a decree for divorce and decree of judicial separation; in the former, there is a severance of status and the parties do not remain as husband and wife, whereas in the latter, the relationship between husband and wife continues and the legal relationship continues as it has not been snapped. Thus understood, due to the parties having been judicially separated, the appellant wife cannot be said to have ceased to be an “aggrieved person” under the above Act.

In the application preferred by the wife, she was claiming to get back her stridhan. Stridhan has been described as saudayika by Sir Gooroodas Banerjee in Hindu Law of Marriage and Stridhan. Stridhan property is the exclusive property of the wife on proof that she entrusted the property or dominion over the stridhan property to her husband or any other member of the family. There is no need to establish any further special agreement to establish that the property was given to the husband or other member of the family.

The Supreme Court also held that as long as the status of the aggrieved person remains and stridhan remains in the custody of the husband, the wife can always put forth her claim under Section 12 of the above Act. This issue was considered by the Supreme Court to be of the nature of a “continuing offence”.

Your case, as mentioned above, is on a better footing than the above case decided by the Supreme Court. Therefore, you should be in a position to file an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act for getting back your stridhan.

The ‘SLANTS’, Disparaging Trademarks and the Free Speech Argument: Matal v. Tam (2017)

Trademark

Introduction:

According to the United States Patent & Trademark Office, a ‘trademark’ is: a word, phrase, symbol, or design, or a combination thereof, that identifies and distinguishes the source of the goods of one party from those of the others. In the United States, trademark law emerged in the mid-1800s, serving the two-fold purpose of: ‘protecting the property and reputation of a mark-holder’, and, ‘protecting the public from deception’.

Discontentment with the Federal Trademark Act, 1905 led to efforts for the legislative overhaul and it was in 1938 that Congressman Fritz Garland Lanham (of Texas) introduced the bill which eventually bore his name, that is, the Lanham Act. Despite the opposition surfaced from the Justice Department which considered ‘trademarks’ monopolistic, and the intervening war years, which delayed the passage of the bill, President Truman signed the bill, metamorphosing it into law on 5th July, 1946, and this law became effective one year thereafter.

One of the star features of the Lanham Act was the creation of a ‘Central Federal Registry for Trademarks’, however, in the United States registration of trademarks is not a requirement for trademark protection, but it is advisable, as it serves the following two purposes: (1) Constructive notice of the registered trademark to the public in general; and, (2) Legal (rebuttable) presumption as regards the validity of the trademark.

Much water has flowed down the bridge since 1946. The commercial world has undergone a sea change and consequently to address these challenges suitable amendments were brought to the Lanham Act, from time to time, by the Congress, in particular to combat trademark counterfeiting and cyber-squatting.

Recently, the United States Supreme Court in the case of, Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ (2017), was faced with the following issues of relevance: (1) Whether or not the ‘Disparagement Clause’ of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the registration of a trademark which disparages persons (living or dead), institutions, beliefs or national symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute, is facially in the teeth of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?; (2) What is the purpose of the ‘Disparagement Clause’ of the Lanham Act?; (3) Is it wrong to say that the content of a registered trademark is government speech?; (4) Can disparaging trademarks be prohibited under the ‘commercial speech doctrine’?; (5) Will it be correct to state that the ‘Disparagement Clause’ of the Lanham Act is ‘view-point neutral’?  

First Amendment & Disparagement Clause (The Lanham Act):

First Amendment-

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Disparagement Clause (The Lanham Act): 15 U.S. Code § 1052 (a)-

No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it-

(a)  Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute; or a geographical indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the goods and is first used on or in connection with wines or spirits by the applicant on or after one year after the date on which the WTO Agreement (as defined in Section 3501(9) of Title 19) enters into force with respect to the United States.

 

Facts of the Case: Matal v. Tam:

  • In this case, the applicant (Simon Tam), lead singer of a dance-rock group, applied for trademark registration of the term “THE SLANTS” as the name for his dance-rock group.
  • The term “THE SLANTS” is derogatory term for individuals of Asian descent. The applicant and other members of his dance-rock group believed that by taking the slur (THE SLANTS) as the name of their dance-rock group, they shall be able to reclaim the term and shall further be able to drain its denigrating force.
  • The PTO (Patent and Trademark Office) denied substantial benefits of federal trademark registration to the mark “THE SLANTS”.
  • The PTO did so citing the mandate of the Disparagement Clause contained in 15 U.S. Code § 1052 (a).
  • The applicant contested the denial of registration vide the administrative appeals process, but the same was of no avail.
  • The applicant took the case to the Federal Court. The Federal Circuit (en banc) found the “Disparagement Clause” facially unconstitutional and in the teeth of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
  • The decision of the Federal Circuit (en banc) was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court on 19.06.2017.

Purpose of the First Amendment:

The First Amendment prohibits the Congress and other government entities (and instrumentalities) from abridging the freedom of speech; however, the First Amendment does not say that the Congress and other government entities (or actors) must abridge their own ability to speak freely. The fundamental principle behind the First Amendment is that the government should not punish or suppress speech, based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives that the speech conveys. The First Amendment guards against laws which are “targeted at specific subject matter”[1], for this is a form of speech suppression known as the “content based discrimination”; this category of content based discrimination includes a sub-type of laws that go further, aiming towards the suppression of “particular views” on a subject, this kind of suppression of free speech is known as the “view-point discrimination”. In the case of, Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.[2] it was held that, a law found to discriminate based on view-point is notorious form of content based discrimination.

The First Amendment champions the cause that, public expression of ideas should not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some hearers[3], and secondly, that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.[4]    

Purpose of the Lanham Act:

The Lanham Act provides national protection to trademarks in order to secure to the owners of the marks the goodwill and reputation of their respective businesses and to protect the ability of the consumers to distinguish among competing producers and/or manufacturers.[5]

The Lanham Act prohibits registration of trademarks which may disparage persons (living or dead), institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute. The PTO while deciding whether or not, a trademark is disparaging, is to apply the “Two-Part Test”.

In the “Two-Part Test”, the examiner first considers the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into account not only the dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of the goods (or services), and the manner in which the mark is used in the market-place in connection with the goods (or services); thereafter, if that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, the examiner concerned moves to the second step, asking, whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial component of the referenced group. If the examiner finds that a substantial composite (although not necessarily a majority) of the referenced group would find the proposed mark to be disparaging in the context of contemporary attitudes, a prima facie case of “disparagement” is made out, and thereafter the burden shifts on the applicant to prove that the trademark is not disparaging. The fact that an applicant may be a member of the ‘disparaged group’ or has good intentions underlying the use of the disparaging term as trademark does not give any credence to the fact that a substantial composite of the referenced group may find the term as objectionable.[6]

Rationale behind ‘Trademarks’:

In the case of, B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc.[7], it was held that the principle underlying trademark protection is that, distinctive marks- words, names, symbols and the like, can help distinguish a particular artisan’s goods from those of the others. Further, in the case of, United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.[8], it was observed that, a trademark designates the goods as the product of a particular trader and thereby protect the trader’s goodwill against sale of another’s product as his. In addition, in the case of, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.[9] it was held that, trademarks help consumers to identify goods and services that they wish to purchase, as well as, those which they want to avoid.

Rationale behind ‘Registration of Trademarks’:

Registration of trademarks with the PTO, firstly, serves as a constructive notice of the registrant’s claim apropos the ownership of the mark; secondly, it is a prima facie evidence (rebuttable) of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods (or services) specified in the registration certificate; and thirdly, registration of trademark makes the mark ‘incontestable’ once the mark has been registered for the period of 5 (five) years. Lastly, trademark registration enables the trademark holder to stop the importation into the United States, the articles bearing an infringing mark.

Even if a trademark is not federally registered, it may still be enforceable under the Lanham Act by virtue of, § 43 (a), which creates a ‘federal cause of action’ for trademark infringement. Moreover, unregistered trademarks may also be entitled to protection under other federal statutes such as the Anti-cyber-squatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S. Code § 1125 (d). Once a trademark is registered, then, the PTO is not authorised to remove it from the register unless the registering party moves for cancellation, or, the registration expires, or, the FTC (Federal Trade Commission) initiates proceedings based on certain grounds such as trademark infringement or cyber squatting.

Answering the issues that came for consideration before the United States Supreme Court, the Hon’ble Court held as follows:

(1) The Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act is not narrowly drawn, for it reaches out to any trademark that disparages any person, group or institution. A restriction on speech must serve a substantial interest and it must be narrowly drawn.[10] Curbing of a speech that expresses an idea that offends, strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. The commercial market as of day is already stocked with goods and commodities that disparage eminent figures and groups, and further, the line between commercial and non-commercial speech is not very clear. The Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act is too broadly worded, and it can possibly have a paralysing effect on the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, thus, it is unconstitutional.

(2) The purpose of the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act is to prohibit registration of trademarks which are scandalous and which are derogatory to persons, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, that is to say, the purpose of the Disparagement Clause is, firstly, to prevent the under-represented groups from being bombarded with demeaning messages in commercial advertising, and secondly, to encourage racial tolerance and to protect the privacy and welfare of individuals. However, the difficulty with this clause is that, it fails to appreciate the argument that, whether a particular mark is disparaging or not, is highly subjective an issue and therefore, general rules of acceptance or rejection of a mark as disparaging cannot be coined.[11] 

(3) Trademarks and their precursors have ancient origin, and trademarks were protected ever since the founding of the United States, in common law and in equity, thus, to state that the federal law creates trademarks would be wholly wrong. To observe that: trademarks are in the nature of government speech and not private speech, or, trademarks are in the form of government subsidy, or, constitutionality of Disparagement Clause should be tested on the anvil of ‘government program doctrine’, are meritless arguments, because, firstly, federal registration of trademark does not make it a government speech which enjoys the exemption of the First Amendment scrutiny; secondly, registration of trademark does not constitute approval of the mark[12], moreover, the argument that trademarks are in the form of government subsidy is an unrewarding defence because neither the PTO pays money to the parties seeking registration of the mark, nor, does the government grants trademark to an applicant without charging him the registration fees; and thirdly, registration of trademark is not compulsory however it is desirable, that is to say, even if a trademark is not registered, the federal cause of action for trademark infringement sustains, so also, action against trademark cyber-squatting. A registered trademark is not a government speech and is thus, outside the purview of the First Amendment exemption.

(4) The Disparagement Clause is very broadly worded. What constitutes commercial speech and what amounts to non-commercial speech is not very obvious. Disparaging trademarks cannot be prohibited under the commercial speech doctrine because commercial speech is no exception to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It was affirmatively held in the case of, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.[13], that, the First Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.   

(5) To say that, the “Disparagement Clause” of the Lanham Act is “view-point neutral” because it applies in equal measure to any trademark that demeans or offends regards being had to 15 U.S. Code § 1052 (a), is wholly incorrect, because, a subject which is first defined by content and then regulated or censored by mandating only one sort of comment can never be view-point neutral.

Thus, in Matal v. Tam (2017), the United States Supreme Court upholding the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, struck down the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act, terming it as ‘unconstitutional’.

 

[1] Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. __ (2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-502_9olb.pdf, Visited on: 25.06.2017

[2] 515 U.S. 819, 828-829 (1995)

[3] Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)

[4] Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)

[5] Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)

[6] § 1203.03 (b) (i), Tademark Manual of Examining Procedure, April 2017, https://tmep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current, Visited on: 25.06.2017

[7] 575 U.S. __ (2015)

[8] 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)

[9] 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000)

[10] Central Hudson Gas & Elect v. Public Ser. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557

[11] Harjo v. Pro-Football Inc., 50 USPQ 2d 1705, 1737

[12] In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 USPQ 2d 1216, 1220

[13] 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: Problems & Challenges

Bankruptcy

Introduction:

A person is said to have become “insolvent” when he becomes incapable of recompensing his debts in the ordinary course of business, or he becomes incapable of disbursing his debts as they become due, whether or not, he has committed an act of insolvency.[1] However, a debtor who does certain acts, tending to defeat or delay his creditors, may be adjudged bankrupt, and so be made liable to the bankruptcy laws.[2]

There is no single umbrella legislation in India that governs the insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings. There is a slew of legislation governing the legal framework albeit insolvency and bankruptcy in India, namely: The Companies Act, 2013; The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985; The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993; The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Amendment Bill of 2016 has already been passed by the Lok Sabha on 01.08.2016 and by the Rajya Sabha on 09.08.2016); The Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909; and The Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920.   

For individual insolvency and bankruptcy, the law had been legislated under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. The High Courts had the jurisdiction over insolvency related matters in the former presidency towns of: Bombay, Madras & Calcutta.[3] Subordinate courts were to hear cases related to individual bankruptcy in all other areas except for the presidency towns, with the District Court being the court of appeal.[4]

So far as corporate insolvency and bankruptcy is concerned, the Companies Act, 1956 & the Companies Act, 2013 along with the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 dealt with the restructuring of distressed “industrial firms”. Under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) assessed the viability of the industrial company, and referred to the High Court unviable companies for liquidation. Although the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 stands repealed, and, the repealing enactment was notified by the Central Government on 25.11.2016. The provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003 came into force on 01.12.2016.

If the loan which is granted by a bank to a debtor is backed by security, then, the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 bestows the banks and the financial institutions with greater power to recover the same by disposing of the collaterals when default in repayment of the loan is committed by the debtor. The 1993 Act provides for the establishment of the Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) to enforce recovery of debts by these institutions. The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) is the appellate forum which entertains appeals from the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). Moreover, the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI) enables the secured creditors (usually, the Banks) to take possession of the collaterals without requiring involvement of a court or tribunal.

Broadly, the bankruptcy reforms in India from 1981 to 2013 can be encapsulated as under:

In the year 1981, regards being had to the Tiwari Committee (Department of Company Affairs), the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 came to fore. Thereafter, in the year 1991, regards being had to the Narasimham Committee I (Reserve Bank of India), the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 came to fore. Similarly, in the year 1998, regards being had to the Narasimham Committee II (Reserve Bank of India), the advent of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 was witnessed. In the year 1999, Justice Eradi Committee (Government of India) proposed the repealment of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 and this led to the enactment of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2002. Later, in the year 2001, L.N. Mitra Committee (RBI) proposed a comprehensive bankruptcy code. In the year 2005, Irani Committee (RBI) came up with the Enforcement of Securities Interest and Recovery of Debts Bill, 2011 and proposed amendments to the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. In the year 2008, Raghuram Ranjan Committee (Planning Commission) proposed certain steps which could result in improvement of the credit infrastructure of the country. Lastly, in the year 2013, the Financial Sector Reforms Commission (Ministry of Finance) came up with the draft of the Indian Financial Code which in fact provided for a corporate-resolution-mechanism for resolving financial problems of the distressed firms.

Wind of Change:

In the wake of the following ground realities, namely: (a) India being ranked 130 out of 189 countries so far as Ease of Doing Business (2015) is concerned; (b) India being ranked 136 out of 189 countries so far as Resolving Insolvency (2015) is concerned; (c) The Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 being archaic, with the former (the 1909 Act) being about a century old legislation; and (d) Corporate bad-debts constituting about 56% of the total bad-debts of the Nationalized Banks;  it was as late as in November, 2015 (precisely, 04.11.2015) that the BLRC (Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee), Chaired by the Former Secretary General, Lok Sabha and Former Union Law Secretary,  Mr. T.K. Viswanathan submitted the final report prepared by the BLRC, which recommended the passage of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2015.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was introduced in the Lok Sabha on December 21, 2015.[5] A reference was made to the Standing Committee, which gave its report on April 28, 2016. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code was passed by the Lok Sabha on May 05, 2016, and by the Rajya Sabha on May 11, 2016. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code received the assent of the President of India on May 28, 2016.

The Long Title of the 2016 Code states as under:

A Code to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals in a time bound manner, for maximization of the value of assets of such persons, to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balancing the interest of stakeholders including alteration in the order of priority of payment of Government dues and to establish an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

The 2016 Code focuses on the following two main objectives, namely, first– equal, expeditious and economic distribution of assets of the debtor, and second– liberation of the person from the demands of the creditor.

Structure of the 2016 Code:

The 2016 Code comprises of 255 Sections, divided into Five (5) Parts- Part I deals with the preliminary aspects of the Code, comprising of one chapter and Sections 1 to 3; Part II deals with the corporate insolvency resolution process, comprising of seven chapters and Sections 4 to 77; Part III deals with the insolvency resolution and bankruptcy for individuals and partnership firms, comprising of seven chapters and Sections 78 to 187; Part IV deals with the regulation of insolvency professionals, insolvency resolution professional agencies and information utilities, comprising of seven chapters and Sections 188 to 223; and Part V deals with miscellaneous provisions, running from Sections 224 to 255 (Sections 245 to 255 enable amendments in other statutes such as the Companies Act, 2013).

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 comprises of 11 Schedules, which provide for amendments to be carried out in following statutes: the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (First Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); the Central Excise Act, 1944 (Second Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Third Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); the Customs Act, 1962 (Fourth Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (Fifth Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); the Finance Act, 1994 (Sixth Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Seventh Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003 (Eighth Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 (Ninth Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (Tenth Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); and the Companies Act, 2013 (Eleventh Schedule annexed to the 2016 Code); so that all provisions as contained in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 can be brought to effect in a comprehensively manner.

It is pertinent to note that vide notification dated 05.08.2016 (S.O. 2618 [E]) Sections 188 to 194 under Chapter I of Part IV of the 2016 Code have been brought into effect, similarly, vide notification dated 19.08.2016 (S.O. 2746 [E]) Sections under Chapter VII of Part IV and Sections under Part V of the 2016 Code have been brought into effect. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has been constituted and Sh. M.S. Sahoo has been appointed as the Chairperson of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India vide notification dated 01.10.2016 (S.O. 3110 [E] & S.O. 3111 [E]). Moreover, vide notification dated 01.11.2016 Sections under Chapter II, Chapter VII of Part IV and Sections under Part V have been brought into effect. Also, vide notification dated 15.11.2016 (S.O. 3453 [E]) Sections under Chapter III, Chapter IV, Chapter VI of Part IV and Sections under Part V have been brought into effect. Notification dated 30.11.2016 (S.O. 3594 [E]) marked the commencement of Sections related to corporate insolvency, further, notification dated 09.12.2016 (S.O. 3687 [E]) marked the commencement of Sections 33 to 54 (both inclusive) under the 2016 Code, and, notification dated 30.03.2017 (S.O. 1005 [E]) marked the commencement of Sections dealing voluntary liquidation and information utilities under the 2016 Code.

There are four prime pillars upon which the 2016 Code rests itself; these are: Insolvency Professionals[6]; Information Utilities[7]; Adjudicating Authorities[8]; and Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India[9].

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016- Key Aspects:

(a) The 2016 Code proposes a paradigm shift from the existing regime of ‘Debtor-in-Possession’ to ‘Creditor-in-Control’; (b) The 2016 Code aims at consolidating all the existing insolvency related laws as well as amending multiple legislation including the Companies Act, 2013 (See: The 11 Schedules annexed with the 2016 Code); moreover, the 2016 Code by virtue of Section 238 of the Code has an overriding effect on all other laws relating to insolvency and bankruptcy; (c). Part II of the 2016 Code deals with insolvency resolution and liquidation of corporate entities, with most of the work concerning the insolvency resolution/liquidation been dealt with by the registered insolvency professionals under the supervision of the NCLT. Once the corporate insolvency process is initiated, the insolvency professional will be required to form a Committee of Creditors, and with their consensus efforts will be made to bring forth a plan to revive the corporate entity; (d) The corporate insolvency resolution process is to last for 180 days with further maximum period of extendable time of 90 days more, whereby efforts will be made to evolve a resolution plan to revive the ailing entity, however, if the efforts fail, the corporate person will be liquidated in time-bound manner. A ‘Fast Track Corporate Insolvency Resolution’ will be available to small corporate entities; (e) As far as the corporate insolvency resolution process is concerned the NCLT is the adjudicating authority and NCLAT is the appellate authority; (f) Part III of the 2016 Code deals with insolvency resolution process and liquidation proceedings qua the individuals and the firms. There are two distinct processes, namely, fresh start and insolvency resolution, for the individuals and the firms; these processes are followed by the ‘bankruptcy order’. It is the DRT which will be the adjudicating authority and DRAT which will be the appellate authority for the individuals and the firms so far as insolvency resolution and liquidation proceedings are concerned; (g) The mechanism of ‘fresh start’ is applicable only to those individuals whose income is below Rs. 60,000/- per annum and the debt amount does not exceed Rs. 35,000/-. Here the insolvency resolution will be handled by insolvency professional with the DRT having a supervisory role; (h) The 2016 Code is not applicable to the corporate entities in the financial sector such as the Asset Reconstruction Companies; (i) Section 196(1) (f) of the 2016 Code empowers the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Board of India to carry out inspections and investigations on insolvency professional agencies, insolvency professionals and information utilities and thereafter pass such orders as may be required for compliance of the provisions of the 2016 Code and regulations issued there under. Further, Section 196(3) of the 2016 Code states that the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Board of India shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 while trying a suit in respect of: discovery and production of books of accounts at such place and such time as may be specified by the Board; summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and examining them on oath; inspection of books, registers and other documents of any person at any place; and lastly, issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (j) Adjudicating authority for corporate persons so far as insolvency resolution is concerned is NCLT, while the appellate authority is NCLAT. Against the orders of NCLAT an appeal can be preferred to the Supreme Court of India within 45 days of the receipt of the impugned order, Section 62 of the 2016 Code is very clear on this aspect. By virtue of Section 63 of the 2016 Code, the jurisdiction of the civil court is expressly barred; (k) Adjudicating authority for individuals and firms so far as insolvency resolution is concerned is DRT, while the appellate authority is DRAT. Against the orders of DRAT an appeal can be preferred to the Supreme Court of India within 45 days of the receipt of the impugned order, Section 182 of the 2016 Code is very clear on this aspect. By virtue of Section 180 of the 2016 Code, the jurisdiction of the civil court is expressly barred.           

Ground Reality- India & the World: Insolvency & Bankruptcy:

The average time taken in the U.S. to complete the insolvency proceedings is 1.5 years; in India it is 4.3 years.[10] A summation of four indices i.e. Commencement of Proceedings Index; Management of Debtor’s Assets Index; Reorganisation Proceedings Index; and Creditor Participation Index, is testimony to the fact that, India lags behind most of the nations so far as time and effort to carry out insolvency proceedings are concerned. Following is a comparative analysis, based on the information provided by the World Bank:

Indicators

Recovery Rate (Cents per USD)

Average duration of insolvency proceedings (years)

Average cost (% of estate) of insolvency proceedings

*Strength of insolvency framework index

India (Mumbai)

25.7

4.3

9

6

South Asia

31.8

2.6

10.1

4.5

OECD Countries

72.3

1.7

9

12.1

*Sum of four indices- Commencement of Proceedings Index; Management of Debtor’s Assets Index; Reorganisation Proceedings Index; and Creditor Participation Index. Source: World Bank

According to World Bank (2015), average time taken to complete insolvency related proceedings in some of the other countries around the world is as follows: Japan- 6 months (approximately); United Kingdom- 1 year; Russia- 2 years; Brazil- 4 years; and China- 1.5 years (approximately). Also, as against India’s recovery rate of 25.7 Cents per Dollar (that is, approximately 26% of debt value), recovery rate in some other economies of the world is as follows: Japan- 90 Cents per USD; United Kingdom- 85 Cents per USD; Russia- 40 Cents per USD; Brazil- 20 Cents per USD; and China- 35 Cents per USD.  

As of April, 2016, approximately 72,841 cases were pending in the country’s 33 Debt Recovery Tribunals. In 2014-15, the 33 DRTs in the country disposed of cumulatively 14,033 cases involving Rs. 5,826.47 crore.[11] In 2014-15, the Company Law Board (CLB) had 13,090 cases for adjudication (inclusive of 7,269 fresh cases); CLB disposed of 8,925 cases, with 4,165 cases still pending as on March, 2015.[12] At the end of June, 2015, the gross non-performing assets of Indian banks were Rs. 3.3 lakh crore (or 4.49% of total advances).

Predicaments as regards the 2016 Code:

  1. The SARFAESI Act, under Section 17, empowers debtors to file an appeal against any action taken by creditors with the Debt Recovery Tribunal; and the Debt Recovery Tribunal is required to decide such applications within 4 months. There is not a single case till date, according to Mr. Vivek Kumar Singh- President of DRT Bar Association (Delhi) that has been decided within a span of 4 months by the DRT.[13] To expect that the 2016 Code will turn around things in a way that will make insolvency resolution a smooth and time-effective stroll to recovery or liquidation is too much to expect.
  2. The minimum single default for triggering the insolvency proceedings is merely a sum of Rs. 100,000/-. This can be a menace, especially under a corporate regime, as any employee for non-payment or late payment of salary (temporary turbulence in company’s cash-flows) or any small vendor for unexpected non-payment of dues, will be in a position to trigger insolvency proceedings although the default is miniscule due to temporary disturbance in cash-flows. In the U.S., three or more creditors can start insolvency proceedings against a company if the company owes them more than USD 12,300 (approximately Rs. 800,000/- as per the current exchange rate). However, in India the 2016 Code sets the minimum threshold as low as of Rs. 100,000/-.
  3. According to some experts, there isn’t any significant evidence that confirms that, stowing entire faith in creditors will accelerate the recovery process or will improve the chances of efficient restructuring; that is, by axing the equity-holders from the entire decision making process will eventually result them to be more apprehensive and less supportive of viable insolvency resolution mechanism.
  4. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is applicable to both corporate and non-corporate persons. According to Section 6 of the Code, where any corporate debtor commits a default, then- financial creditor, operational creditor or the corporate debtor by itself, can initiate the “corporate insolvency resolution process” in respect of such corporate debtor. According to the 2016 Code, any creditor: financial[14] or operational[15], will be able to start the insolvency resolution process by giving the proof of default. If the adjudicating-agency, that is, the National Company Law Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Tribunal, gives a clean-go-signal, then, the entity will be taken over by the ‘Committee of Creditors’ and ‘Insolvency Professionals’. The applicant creditor will prepare a resolution plan and will submit it to the Insolvency Resolution Professional. The plan will then have to be approved by 75% of the creditors (by value) in the Committee of Creditors (operational creditors will not be the part of the committee). There is no certainty that 75% of the creditors will agree to the resolution plan. Thus, as it will not be easy to get 75% creditors on board, much likely, the resolution/revival plan will be in doldrums and there will be eventual rise of litigation. Necessarily, as the operational creditors are denied seat in the Committee of Creditors as per the 2016 Code, thus, the NCLT while reviewing the resolution plan will have to ensure that the operational creditors are treated fairly.
  5. The insolvency resolution mechanism has to be completed within 180 days of the takeover by the insolvency professionals; though in some cases 90 additional days can be provided. If the plan provides for action to ensure the “continuation of corporate debtors as a going concern”, and the same is accepted by the adjudicating agency, the debtor shall survive, provided it complies with its provisions. If the revival plan is rejected, then the entity will go into liquidation. There is no time limit specified for the liquidation process.
  6. Under the U.S. Chapter 11 insolvency resolution process, the resolution plan is initially proposed by the ailing company itself; in the U.S., the law gives the debtor 120 days to file a revival plan. This period of 120 days can be increased or reduced by the court, but in no case can this period exceed 18 months (that is, 1.5 years). If the debtor fails to file a revival plan, within this stipulated period, the task is undertaken by the Committee of Creditors. Taking this into account, with much deliberation it can be said that the period of 180 days/ 270 days provided for by the 2016 Code is highly inadequate. Insolvency Resolution Professional would need considerable time to understand the dynamics of the ailing/defaulting company, its cash-flows, essential financial and operational creditors, before it can chart out an Information Memorandum/Resolution Plan.
  7. So far as the mechanism of ‘fresh start’ is concerned, the same is applicable to those individuals whose monthly income is below Rs. 5000/- and the debt amount is not more than Rs.35, 000/-. This amount is so meagre that very few individuals will be able to take benefit of this mechanism.
  8. If the value of the loan taken over by the Asset Reconstruction Company albeit the defaulting company, is more than 75%, then it will be able to run the company along with the Insolvency Resolution Professional. This area of the mattress is most concerning and is least talked about. There has to be an adequate system in place to keep a check over the functions and modalities of ARCs, given the fact that, as per Section 3(7) of the 2016 Code, the term ‘corporate person’ shall not include any ‘financial service provider’ such as banks, insurance companies, mutual funds and ARCs.
  9. The real challenge lies in ensuring that, the new system is run by judicial experts who see bankruptcy as a commercial problem and not as a legal problem. It will be important to sternly train the judges for the new system, as the 2016 Code has a certain philosophy behind it, that is, a judge or a lawyer, no matter how well-versed he/she is in legal matters, should not decide, whether a business enterprise should survive or evaporate; it is for the creditors to take the call.
  10. There are no special provisions or exemptions provided for the companies in the “stressed sectors”. A sector in stress might see multiple insolvency cases; there are no special provisions for these sectors in stress in the 2016 Code.
  11. No qualification per se has been specified for the Insolvency Resolution Professionals in the 2016 Code. Looking into their scope of work and the responsibilities they shall be shouldering, an Insolvency Resolution Professional is to require skills of a lawyer, a chartered accountant, a management professional, a company secretary and a cost accountant, which by itself not an easy standard to meet.
  12. The Insolvency Resolution Professionals will carry out the following functions: collection of financial information about the debtor; verification of claims of creditors; formation of committee of creditors; running the business of the debtor; and working out a rescue plan agreeable to both, the creditors and debtors. Given the fact that there function shall be central to the rescue/revival of the business of the drowning enterprise, it is discomfit to see the lack of clarity on who these professionals would be in terms of their qualifications and necessary experience; and whether they would be empowered enough to accomplish the task given to them.
  13. Lack of necessary infrastructural facilities: Adjudicating authorities under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 are the DRTs (Debt Recovery Tribunals) for individuals and partnership firms; and the NCLT (National Company Law Tribunal) for the companies. The Government has, however, already notified the formation of NCLT and NCLAT (National Company Law Appellate Tribunal), which have now become functional with the retired Supreme Court Judge, Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya appointed as the Chairperson of NCLAT, and, Justice M.M. Kumar appointed as the President of NCLT.
  14. Number of cases pending in the DRTs in India as on March, 2013 were 42,819, and as on December, 2015, this figure went up to 69,658. Similarly, number of cases pending with the DRATs (Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunals) as on March, 2013 were 3,405 cases. In Delhi, approximately, each presiding officer of the DRT handles 70-80 cases per day. Given the stretched infrastructure and number of pending cases, DRTs will not be very effective.[16] This in turn will have a direct bearing on the question, how far is the 2016 Code effective? Is it too ambitious a legislation which has been floated at a wrong time when already India is facing ‘adjudication infrastructure’ crises, or, will it be correct to say that there is no right time to do the right thing taking into consideration the low ranking that India suffers from in the Global Ease of Doing Business? Answers to these questions will be revealed over a period of time, once all provisions and rules of the 2016 Code get notified and receive judicial interpretation and withstand the constitutional scrutiny.
  15. Section 224 of the 2016 Code states that a fund, namely, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Fund is to be created for the purposes of insolvency resolution, liquidation and bankruptcy of persons under the 2016 Code, and any person can voluntarily make contributions to the fund and in any event of insolvency proceedings been initiated against such person, such person can withdraw funds not exceeding the amount contributed by him to the fund to make payments to the workmen or for protecting his assets or to meet the incidental costs incurred during the insolvency proceedings and for any other or such other like purpose. However, the moot question is this, that, if a person will get only that which he has contributed to the fund, then why at all a person will make contributions of the fund and not deposit the amount he has in a bank-account over which he will earn interest as per the specified rates.     

Concluding Remarks:

The 2016 Code is a major step taken in the right direction to provide umbrella legislation for the laws relating to bankruptcy, liquidation and insolvency resolution, concerning both individuals/firms and corporate entities. The idea behind the 2016 Code is to boost foreign direct investment in India by improving India’s score and ranking in the Ease of Doing Business Index. The difficulty with the Code however is this that it seems to be over ambitious for on one hand this Code is aiming to cause major amendments in over 11 statutes and on the other hand it aims to establish institutions in the likes of the NCLT, NCLAT and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India despite the fact that India is facing a massive infrastructure crises. The Code cannot and in fact does not disturbs the constitutional powers vested in the High Courts and the power of the Supreme Court to allow a special leave petition, thus, there is a likelihood that, orders of DRT and NCLT can be challenged in the High Courts and the Supreme Court is some cases of peculiar urgency despite the availability of alternative remedy of appeal to DRAT and NCLAT respectively. Further, Supreme Court will witness appeals coming to it from both ends, that is, from DRAT and NCLAT. Thus, in sum and substance the docket explosion is here to stay with added burden on the legislative wing of the State to cause amendments to all the enactments which the 2016 Code touches upon by virtue of the 11 schedules annexed to it.  

 

[1] See: Section 2(8) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (30 of 1930)

[2] See: Wharton’s Concise Law Dictionary, Universal Law Publishing Co., Sixteenth Edition, p.109

[3] See: Section 3 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909

[4] See: Section 3 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920

[5] The 2016 Code was introduced in the Lok-Sabha by the Finance Minister, Mr. Arun Jaitley on 21.12.2015; and on 23.12.2015 the 2016 Code was referred to a Joint Committee of Parliament, the Chairperson being Mr. Bhupender Yadav.

[6] The 2016 Code provides for a class of regulated persons, the “Insolvency Professionals”; they would play a key-role in the efficient working of the bankruptcy process; they would be regulated by the “Insolvency Professional Agencies”.

According to Section 2(19) of the Code, insolvency professional means a person enrolled under Section 206 of the Code with an insolvency professional agency as its member and registered with the Board as an insolvency professional under Section 207 of the Code.

According to Section 2(20) of the Code, insolvency professional agency means any person registered with the Board under Section 201 of the Code as an insolvency professional agency.

[7] The 2016 Code provides for a new industry of “Information Utilities”. These would store facts about lenders and terms of lending in electronic databases. This would eliminate delays and disputes about facts when default takes place.

According to Section 2(21) of the Code, information utility means a person who is registered with the Board as an information utility under Section 210 of the Code.

According to Section 2(23) of the Code, “person” includes: an individual; a Hindu Undivided Family; a Company; a trust; a partnership; a limited liability partnership; any other entity established under a statute, and includes a person resident outside India.

[8] The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) is the forum where matters pertaining to corporate insolvency will be heard. The Debt Recovery Tribunals will be the forums where matters pertaining to individual insolvency and insolvency proceedings pertaining to partnership firms will be heard.

[9] This body will have regulatory over-sight over the Insolvency Professionals; Insolvency Professional Agencies; and Information Utilities.

[10] Time to resolve insolvency in terms of years for United Kingdom is 1 year; for South Africa it is 2 years; for Pakistan it is 2.7 years; and for Brazil it is 4 years. See: Time to Resolve Insolvency, World Bank, 2015

[11] See: Insolvency Code to fast-track 75,000 cases pending before debt tribunals, Business Line (The Hindu), May 06, 2016

[12] Ibid

[13] See: Dipak Mondal, Going For Broke, Business Today, Vol. 25, Issue: 13, p.32, July 03, 2016

[14] Financial creditors are those whose relationship with the entity is purely financial, in the form of a loan or a debt security.

[15] Operational creditors include employees, vendors and suppliers of the ailing/defaulting company.

[16] Supra 11

Testing the permissibility of two-tier arbitrations in India

Arbitration

INTRODUCTION:

The central theme of this prolegomenon is to answer the following questions of relevance:

  1. What is ‘second instance’ arbitration?
  2. Is ‘two-tier’ arbitration in consonance with the brooding spirit of arbitration mechanism that is to facilitate party autonomy or is it in conflict with the public policy of India?
  3. Can parties to an arbitration agreement confer upon themselves ‘right to appeal’ from the ‘arbitral result’ delivered by one arbitrator to another arbitrator acting as an appellate authority?
  4. Is there any difference between ‘arbitration decision’ and ‘arbitral award’?

Testing the maintainability of suit for mandatory injunction against the licensee

Tilak Marg

INTRODUCTION:

Injunction is an equitable relief and it is a settled law that equity acts in personam, therefore, injunction is a personal matter. The purpose of mandatory injunction is to restore a wrongful state of things to their former rightful order. Principal difference between prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction is that, in the former the defendant is prohibited from doing a particular thing in a particular manner, whereas, in the latter, the defendant is directed to do a particular thing and if he fails to do as directed, the court gets it done through its officers.[1]

No legal bar for Advani to become President due to SC verdict on Ayodhya

Lal Krishna Advani

Recently, the Supreme Court ruled that Lal Krishna Advani, Murali Manohar Joshi and certain other leaders of BJP will have to face conspiracy charges in the Babri Masjid demolition case of 1992. So, these leaders will now have to face the trial in the criminal case as accused. This development has led to widespread media belief that Advani and Joshi are now completely out of the race for the President election that will take place in July 2017, and for the Vice President election that will take place in August 2017, a few months from now. It is being reported that Advani or Joshi cannot be appointed as President of India since they are now facing criminal trial as accused due to which they are said to have become ineligible for the said appointment. However, this is not correct from the legal point of view. There is no legal bar on a person who is accused of an offence from becoming President or Vice President. Of course, there may be questions of ethics and propriety. But, then, those are different questions altogether. Purely from legal point of view, there is no such bar. Let me explain it.

Decoding death penalty to Kulbhushan Jadhav under Pakistan laws and why India does not have similar laws?

Kulbhushan Jadhav

Kulbhushan Jadhav has been sentenced to death by a Field General Court Martial, a military court consisting of Pakistan army officers. The question is: can a civilian (and, who is even a foreigner) be prosecuted by a military court? Court Martial is usually in respect of those persons who are serving in the armed forces. A civilian is subject to the ordinary courts of the land. So, how could Kulbhushan Jadhav be prosecuted in a military court in Pakistan?

“MED – ARB”: A Novel ADR Approach

Arbitration

ADR: Dissatisfaction with court-centred resolution of disputes has long been articulated by critics who regard it as, amongst other things, unfair, unduly formal, and exclusive.[1] There are five traditional methods of disputes resolution in the ADR arena, these are: negotiation, mediation, arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlement. An alternate dispute resolution process includes any process/procedure, other than adjudication by a presiding judge, in which a neutral third party participates to assist in the resolution of issues in dispute.[2]Negotiation” is usually defined as communication for the purpose of persuasion; “mediation” is an act of a third person in intermediating between two contending parties with a view to persuade them to adjust and settle their dispute; “arbitration” is reference of a dispute to an impartial third person chosen by the parties to the dispute who agree in advance to abide by the arbitrator’s award issued after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard; “conciliation” like other ADR processes is settling of disputes without litigation- there can be a valid reference to conciliation only if both parties to dispute agree to have negotiations with the help of a third party or third parties either by agreements or by the process of invitation and acceptance- if both parties do not agree for conciliation, there can be no conciliation; and “judicial settlement” refers to settlement of a civil case with help of a judge, not assigned to adjudicate upon the dispute.

Lending a Voice to the Rivers: Elevating Environment Law Jurisprudence in India

Uttarakhand High Court

INTRODUCTION:

The Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill was introduced for the first time in the Parliament of New Zealand on 02.05.2016, and after the ‘Third Reading’ on 14.03.2017, it received the ‘Royal Assent’ on 20.03.2017. The purpose of the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act, 2017 (2017/7) was to give legislative sanctity to the provisions contained in the deed of settlement which settles the historical claims of Whanganui Iwi so far as those claims relate to the Whanganui River. By virtue of the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act, 2017, Whanganui River has become the foremost river in the world to have been conferred the status of a legal person. Development in the same direction and at an equal pace was witnessed in India, as River Ganga and River Yamuna recently on 20.03.2017 were conferred the status of legal persons, not by the Parliament of Indian Republic but by the Apex Court of the State of Uttarakhand by invoking the parens patrie jurisdiction and pitching light upon the provisions contained in Article 48-A and Article 51-A (g) of the Constitution of India, 1950.

Prostitution and the Law: Charting the Indian Course

Woman

 

INDEX

 

Part I: Introduction

Part II: Law Commission of India- Sixty-Fourth Report (The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956)

Part III: The Sex Workers’ Manifesto

Part IV: Right to Self- Determination of Prostitutes in India

Part V: Section 372 and Section 373 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 & Section 81 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

Part VI: Rehabilitation of Prostitutes and their Children

Part VII: Remarks

Bibliography

 

Part I: Introduction: Four decades back, Charles Winick in his work of acclaim, The Lively Commerce, stated that, in a theoretically good society, where sexual fulfilment ought to be possible as other kinds of personal satisfaction, no one would be a prostitute or a client.[1] Prostitution is often thought of as a threat to the marriage-family institution; law-makers are often afraid that, the delicate threads which binds the society together will be broken if people are free to engage in coitus for pleasure; laws, it is stated, are often not enforced adequately because the police have too many other things to do; judges also know that incarceration will not rehabilitate a prostitute, nevertheless, laws exist to emphasise that prostitution is not a socially acceptable form of behaviour.[2]

Religious Prostitution: According to the Chamber’s Encyclopaedia[3], religious prostitution was a feature of many ancient civilisations, including those of Babylonia, Persia, Egypt, Assyria and Phoenicia. Amongst most of these people, the priests and priestesses were a special class of prostitutes. In Babylonia, however, a compulsory single act of prostitution was required of every woman as part of the worship of the Goddess Mylitta. The most plausible explanation of religious prostitution was the belief of the ancients that benefits would be conferred on anyone who shall have coitus with a God or with one of the God’s servitors.

Prostitution: “Prostitution” in most general sense may be defined as common lewdness of a woman for gain; whoredom; the act or practice of a woman who permits any man who will pay her price to have sexual intercourse with her.[4] In the case of People v. Rice[5], prostitution was defined as, the act or practice of a female of prostituting or offering her body to an indiscriminate intercourse with men for money or its equivalent. In the case of, Carpenter v. People[6], it was held that, the word “prostitute” in its most general sense means the act of setting one’s self to sale, or of devoting to infamous purposes; it also means, what is in one’s power that is: the prostitution of talents or abilities; the prostitution of the press. In the case of State v. Stoyell[7], it was held that, a prostitute is a woman who indiscriminately consorts with men for hire; similarly in the case of Wilson v. State[8], a prostitute was defined as a woman who has given herself up to indiscriminate lewdness; also, in the case of Trent v. Commonwealth[9], a prostitute was defined as a woman submitting to indiscriminate sexual intercourse, which she solicits. 

According to Black’s Law Dictionary (Fourth Edition), “Concubine” was a sort of inferior wife, among the Romans, upon whom the husband did not confer his rank or quality. In the case of, State v. Dusin[10], it was held that, a concubine is a woman who cohabits with a man to whom she is not married. “Concubinatus”, as per the ancient Roman law meant an informal or natural marriage, as contradistinguished from justum matrimonium, the civil marriage. Professor W.W. Buckland in his famous book, Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, held that:

Concubinatus was a recognised connection short of marriage, which seems to owe its legal recognition to the restrictive legislation of the early Empire on marriage… It was encouraged by the immorality of Roman women of high rank; men preferred to contract this union with women of lower class but higher character…

It was categorically held in the case of People v. Cummons[11], that the words concubinage and prostitution have no common law meaning, but in their popular sense, cover all cases of lewd intercourse.

According to Section 2 (f) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act (104 of 1956) read with Section 372 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), prostitution is the act of a female offering her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire, whether in money or in kind. In the case of In re: Deva Kumar[12], it was held that, prostitution involves indiscriminate employment of a woman’s body for hire.

The common law defines “brothel” as a place where people of opposite sexes are allowed to resort for illicit intercourse, whether the women are common prostitutes or not; keeping a bawdy house is a nuisance at common law. As per Section 2(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, “brothel” includes any house, room, conveyance or place, which is used for purposes of sexual exploitation or abuse for the gain of another person or for the mutual gain of two or more prostitutes. It is worthy to note that, in the case of, Sushila v. State of Tamil Nadu[13] it was held that, a solitary instance of prostitution in a place does not make the place a “brothel”; a similar view was reiterated in the case of, In re: John[14], in this case, it was held that, prostitution of a woman should be for the gain of another person, as to the premises to be called as “brothel”. Later, in the case of Krishnamurthy v. Public Prosecutor[15], the Supreme Court held that, a place used once for the purposes of prostitution may not be a “brothel”. In the case of, State of Rajasthan v. Mst. Wahida[16], it was held that, any person who keeps or maintains or acts or assists in the keeping and management of a brothel in India, is liable to be punished under the provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.

According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition), prostitution means the sexual exploitation or abuse of individuals for commercial purposes. Also, a public prostitute is a woman who is a prostitute by profession and whose trade is to let-out her body on hire to all visitors or to all visitors of a specified class. When a woman rests content with one lover for years though she may have changed her lovers at intervals of some years, she is not a public prostitute.

A woman is not a prostitute who indulges in illicit sexual intercourse with only one man; thus, a man cannot be guilty of enticing a female away from her home for the purpose of prostitution, where the proof shows that he enticed her away for the purpose of having coitus with her and not to induce her to have coitus indiscriminately with other men. The most usual motive for indiscriminate sexual intercourse is the money paid there for; hence, prostitution is sometimes defined as “indiscriminate sexual commerce for gain”. If, however, a woman submits to indiscriminate sexual intercourse, which she invites/solicits by words or acts or any device, and without profit, she is as much a prostitute as one who does so solely for hire. Her vocation may be known from the manner in which she piles it, and not from the pecuniary charges and compensation gained.[17]

So far as the position of law in India is concerned, in order to establish prostitution, evidence of more than one individual (that is, ‘customer’/ ‘client’) is not always necessary. All that is essential to prove is that a girl/lady/woman should be a person offering her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire. Sexual intercourse is not an essential ingredient. The inference of prostitution has to be drawn from diverse circumstances established in a case. Sexual intercourse has to be established but, that does not require the evidence of more than one individual (‘customer’/ ‘client’); and no evidence of actual coitus for hire should be adduced or proved. It isn’t necessary that there should be repeated visits by persons to the place for the purpose of whoredom. A single instance coupled with the surrounding circumstances may be sufficient to establish that the place is being used as a brothel and the person alleged has been indulging in promiscuous sexual activity for hire. The prosecution has to prove/establish that in the premises a female indulges in the act of offering her body for hire, thereafter on proof thereof, the place becomes a ‘brothel’.   

The word ‘prostitution’ is not confined to acts of natural sexual intercourse, but includes any act of lewdness. It means surrender of a girl’s chastity for money.[18] There is no specific law to regulate the so-called immoral practice of prostitution in India; no doubt the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 read with the Indian Penal Code, 1860 tries to tackle the problem of prostitution, but it does so, indirectly. Although much is known about prostitution and sex-trade in India, but almost all research apropos it, has been confined to the female sex-workers and their clients. Studies albeit men, who sell sex, either to women or to other men in India has hardly been undertaken.[19] There is a growing need to study this niche area of research in India.

Data Analysing the Indian Experience: Prostitution in India is estimated to be an $8.4 billion industry.[20] The largest red-light areas across India are: Sonagachi (Kolkata), inhabiting more than 11,000 sex-workers; Kamathipura (Mumbai); Budhwar Peth (Pune), inhabiting around 5,000 commercial sex-workers; Meergunj (Allahabad); G.B. Road (Delhi); Chaturbhujasthan (Muzaffarpur); Itwari (Nagpur); and Shivdaspur (Varanasi). As per the National Crime Records Bureau (NCBR), the number of registered cases albeit human-trafficking in India has increased by 38.3% in last five years, that is, from 2848 in 2009 to 3940 in 2013. The conviction rate for such cases has declined by 45%, from 1279 in 2009 to 702 in 2013.[21] A further analysis of the NCBR data reveals that in 2013, maximum crimes (around 65.5%) were registered under the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1956; whereas procuring of minor girls (Section 366-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860) accounted for 31.1% of the crimes. The State of West Bengal is the hub of human trafficking in India, with a registered human trafficking cases of 669 in the year 2013, followed by Tamil Nadu (549 cases), Andhra Pradesh (531 cases), Karnataka (412 cases) and Maharashtra (345 cases).

Legalising Prostitution a Solution?: The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, does not criminalize prostitution or prostitutes per se; but it does punish acts of third-party facilitation of prostitution, like brothel-keeping, living on the earnings of prostitutes or procuring a person for the sake of prostitution. The two-fold argument in favour of legalising prostitution is that, firstly, to criminalize prostitution and expect that an $8.4 billion industry will evaporate from India is a far-fetched thought; secondly, legalising prostitution would mean that, brothel-owners would be held accountable/responsible for the treatment of “fallen women”, and that, the abused/ill-treated sex-workers will have an option of turning to the law for their protection. Legalising prostitution will result in reduction of sexually transmitted diseases, for sex-workers will be required to maintain health-cards; also, condom enabled sessions will result in safe-coitus. Legalising prostitution vide legislative means would result in elimination of pimps and middle-men, and the task of the police would then be, protection of sex-workers, and not extraction of ‘protection of money’ from them. Prostitution has been legalised in: Netherlands, New Zealand, Germany, Iceland, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Turkey, Senegal, Venezuela, the State of Nevada in the United States, and among the Australian States- in- Victoria, Queensland, Australian Capital Territory (ACT), and Northern Territory. In Netherland, like ordinary citizens, prostitutes have been brought under the tax net; prostitution in India is an $8.4 billion underground industry, if prostitution in India is legalised then it can result in better economic growth of the country and at the same time it can result in increased protection, health and safety benefits qua the prostitutes. Experience has it all, for with closure of brothels in 1959 in Queensland (Australia), the marked increase in the incidents of rape was by 149%.                   

Part II:  Law Commission of India- Sixty-Fourth Report (The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956): The Law Commission of India in its Sixty-Fourth Report made the following observations of importance:

  1. Prostitution is a threat to the institution of marriage and is a means of exploitation of females; prostitution is a social evil which leads to social injustice.
  2. The institution of prostitution is the external manifestation of the failure of man to control his animal will within the limits set by the institution of marriage. Because man has not always remained satisfied with the company of his wife and has sometimes sought the pleasures of the flesh by straying beyond the limits of the marital wedlock, the result has been that the institutions like prostitution and concubinage have existed side by side with marriage since times immemorial.
  3. Any attempt to stop prostitution by legislation or by any other means of social control has always proved abortive. Prostitution has, therefore, been tolerated as a necessary evil. No country in the world has been able to stop this institution successfully. Even if the law stops it, then, in some other insidious and subtle form, it is bound to re-appear in society, that may have greater potentiality of destroying the peace in family life and also society. The institution of “call girls” seems to be an instance in point. Thus, instead of banning it totally, the law in every country has tried to regulate it so that it may be kept within its legitimate bounds without unduly encroaching upon the institution of marriage and the family.
  4. Total prohibition on prostitution is not possible. Various measures have been adopted from time to time to check the evil effects of prostitution and to control its undesirable aspects, but the inarticulate assumption that the law cannot abolish it effectively, has been the basis of legislation in India as well as in many other countries. Down from 1837, when the Penal Code was taken up on the anvil[22], to 1956, when the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 was enacted, it has been observed by the State that, abolishment of prostitution altogether is not possible through the legislative means, as the practice is deeply entrenched/rooted in the Indian social milieu.
  5. Adoption of a “wider view” albeit prostitution is undesirable.[23] Conduct of a particular type may be: (a) approved by law; (b) permitted without approval or disapproval by law; (c) disapproved but not prohibited by law; (d) prohibited by law. Prostitution falls partly within category (c) and partly within category (d). The fact that certain types of prostitution are not totally prohibited by law, does not necessarily imply that they are approved by the law.
  6. Prostitution, in so far as it consists of secret acts of consenting individuals without exploitation, and in private, is not appropriate for penal sanctions, and the fact that the pleasure derived from such prostitution is one which is socially disapproved, is not in itself a sufficient ground for the imposition of criminal sanctions.
  7. According to the Report of the Street Offences Committee (1928), as quoted in the Report of the Committee on Homo-sexual Offences and Prostitution (1957) –

Firstly, as a general proposition, it is universally accepted that, the law is not concerned with private morals or with ethical sanctions. The law is plainly concerned with the outward conduct of citizens in so far as that conduct injuriously affects the rights of other citizens. Certain forms of conduct it has always been thought right to bring within the scope of the criminal law on account of the injury which they occasion to the public in general. It is within this category of offences, if anywhere, that public solicitation for immoral purposes finds an appropriate place.

Secondly, the immorality of an act should never be the decisive factor in making it illegal, since the appropriateness of a moral sanction does not entail the appropriateness of a legal sanction. What is grist to the fine mill of morality, may well escape the clumsy engine of the law, or be mangled by it; but any attempt to exclude the immorality of an act as a relevant factor in deciding whether to make it illegal, is both dangerous and futile. It is dangerous because it leads to the illusion that a legal system can function without the foundation and the frame of reference of a moral system, and it is futile because moral values have a way of infiltrating into even the most anti-septic legal system.

  1. Where the law deals with sexual behaviour between consenting parties in private, its enforcement would be difficult. Laws which prohibit sexual acts when committed in private- assuming that the acts are considered appropriate for penal sanctions- can, for reasons obvious, are to be enforced only to a limited extent; however-much the conduct may be the subject of moral condemnation.
  2. Call-Girls: So long as prostitution itself is not a crime, the individual act of a girl who offers her services on phone cannot be prohibited. If a call-girl does not parade her charms in the public, or indulge in soliciting or in other prohibited acts of like nature, she cannot be held guilty. What is prohibited is prostitution of another person for profit of oneself, or promoting prostitution by letting out a house, exploiting girls for prostitution in specified places and the like.

Call- Girl Establishment: Call-girl establishments, that is, houses or flats to which men go and to which prostitutes are summoned by telephone message or some other arrangement, stand in a different category. In most cases, they would satisfy the definition of “brothel”, or attract penal provision relating to living on the earnings of prostitution.

  1. The legal attitude world-wide towards prostitution can be classified in four broad categories: (a) total prohibition; (b) regulation; (c) repression; and (d) total toleration. Countries in category (a) regard prostitution as illegal in all cases. In these countries prostitution per se is a crime, and even clandestine misconduct is punishable. Countries in category (b) regulate prostitution by licensing or other measures, but do not prohibit it totally. Countries in category (c), to which India belongs, repress prostitution by forbidding its blatant manifestations, while those in category (d) impose no prohibitions or restrictions on prostitution.
  2. Repressive measures against prostitution are hampered by three (3) main considerations: the persistent demand for exclusive physical satisfaction which the prostitute offers; the existence of a type of women who is drawn to prostitution by virtue of her psycho-neurotic make up; and the social attitude towards sex. The modern view is that the underlying causes of prostitution today are not economic but psychological, though this does not apply to the period of religious prostitution, or to the period when prostitution was generally condoned, or when no other means of livelihood was open to indigent women. Socio-economic factors are still important in borderline cases. Barring few exceptions, prostitutes generally show an anti-masculine attitude so strong as to be psycho-neurotic and, for them, the performance of the “act of love” against payment constitutes self-assertion, while at the same time they derive satisfaction from the unique ‘independence’ of their profession.
  3. Prostitution like many other evils is a social problem, the eradication of which cannot be achieved by legislation alone, for it requires the co-operation of every individual citizen of the country. When the general moral level of the community will rise to an exalted idealistic level, prostitution shall be brought down and thus will be effectively reduced.

Part III: The Sex Workers’ Manifesto[24]: The First National Conference of Sex Workers in India (14th to 16th November, 1997) in Calcutta was a major step attempting to put forth generally, the plight and pity of the sex-workers in India. The central theme of the conference was this: Can a sex-worker insist on having safe-sex? Can sex-work be termed as an occupation? Is it justified to see sex-work as morally sinful? Is it possible to rehabilitate prostitutes? Do men and women have equal claims to sexuality? Is prostitution a means to promote ‘free-sex’?

Rendering answers to the questions posed above, it was observed as follows:

  1. Sex-workers, usually, are not in a position to negotiate with their clients. If a sex-worker is starving, either because she does not have enough custom or because most of her income is spent towards maintaining a room, or meeting the demands of madams, local power-brokers, or the police, how can she be in a position to refuse a client, who is not persuaded to use condoms or views it as an unnecessary impediment in his way to ‘absolute’ pleasure.
  2. Historically speaking, “sex-work” is regarded as one of the oldest profession in the world, much because of the fact that it meets an important social demand. However, today, the term ‘prostitute’ is rarely used to refer to an occupational group who earn their livelihood by means of providing sexual services, rather it is deployed as a descriptive term denoting a homogenised category, usually of women, who pose threat to public health, sexual morality, social stability and civic order.
  3. Like other human propensities and desires, sexuality and sexual need are fundamental and necessary to the human condition. Pleasure, happiness, comfort and intimacy find expression through sexuality. However, the State and social structures acknowledge a very limited and narrow aspect of sexuality. Sex is seen primarily, and almost exclusively, as an instrument for reproduction, negating all aspects of pleasure, comfort and the desire intrinsic to it. Privileging heterosexuality and homosexuality is not only denied legitimacy, but is considered as undesirable, unnatural and deviant. Thus, ‘sex’ and ‘sexuality’ which finds liberating expression in our art and literature is given no societal sanction beyond its reproductive purpose. Therefore, sex-work is considered not only morally sinful but also, unethical.
  4. People who are interested in the welfare of prostitutes, and many others who are genuinely concerned, often fail to think beyond rehabilitating sex-workers or abolishing prostitution altogether. It is high time to realise that, it is perhaps, if not impossible then very difficult to rehabilitate a sex-worker because the society never permits erasure of their identity as prostitutes or the ‘fallen’ ones.
  5. Societal norms qua sex and sexuality do not apply similarly to men and women. If sexual needs are at all acknowledged, in our society, beyond procreation, it is only for men. Polyandry and polygamy, although both are blotted with social prohibitions; but India’s scriptural past is a testimony to the fact that polyandry was seen with more caveats than polygamy.
  6. Free-sex implies irresponsibility and lack of concern for well-being of others. Often the so-called clients of sex-workers compel them to have protection-free coitus which is the root cause of sexually transmitted diseases. Prostitutes are to educate themselves of the ills of condom-free sex, and likewise the ‘clients’ should acknowledge that freedom of sexuality has to come with responsibility and genuine respect for the needs and desires of others.

Part IV: Right to Self- Determination of Prostitutes in India: The Preamble of the Constitution of India, 1950, pledges to secure socio-economic justice to all its citizens with stated liberties, equality of status and opportunity, assuring fraternity and dignity to individuals in a united and integrated nation, the Republic of India. Prostitutes (the “fallen women”, as they are often called) too are a part of Indian citizenry, and thus are an integral part of “We the people”. Whoredom in society has not been an unknown phenomenon; it is of ancient origin and has its manifestations in various forms with varied degrees, unfounded on so-called social sanctions. The victims of prostitution are usually the poor, the illiterate and the ignorant sections of the society. Prostitutes have always been seen as the objects/ instruments of sexual gratification; and never as complete human beings with dignity of person and self-determination. Their problems multiply due to the coercion laid around them and due to the tortuous treatment meted out to them. Rape of a prostitute is often considered as an ‘offence non-existential’.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a catena of judgments has categorically laid down that, the un-chastity of a woman does not make her open to any and every person to violate her person as and when he desires. The mere fact that, the prosecutrix was of lose moral character and was habitual to sexual intercourse and might have gone to the accused herself, is no ground to disbelieve her statement. In the case of Mohan v. State of M.P.[25], it was held that, it is no defence as against the crime of rape, that the girl so raped was of easy virtue and was habitual to sex.

Lately, the Allahabad High Court through Aditya Nath Mittal, J., in the matter of Shushil v. State of U.P.[26], observed that, even if a prostitute lodges a report of rape and her evidence inspires confidence, then there is no rule of law that the statement of the prostitute cannot be believed. The Court observed that, even a prostitute has the fundamental right as well as moral and social rights and she is at liberty to permit, or not permit, a person for sexual intercourse. Nobody can commit sexual intercourse even with a prostitute under threat or compulsion.

Moreover the above dicta of the Allahabad High Court, seems to have garnered the colour and substance from the following ratio of the Supreme Court, State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar[27], here, Apex Court stated as follows:

…even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to privacy and no one can invade her privacy as and when he likes. So also, it is not open to any and every person to violate her person as and when he wishes. She is entitled to protect her person if there is an attempt to violate it against her wish. She is equally entitled to the protection of law. Therefore, merely because she is a woman of easy virtue, her evidence cannot be thrown overboard.

Right to self-determination albeit prostitutes, is firmly grounded in India, much vide the rulings of the apex court, but none the less, a caveat to this premise of law remained on the statute books, much in the form of Section 155 (4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; while generally, Section 155 speaks of ‘impeaching credit of witness’; Section 155 (4) stated that, when a man is prosecuted for rape or an attempt to ravish, it may be shown that the prosecutrix was of generally immoral character. However, Clause (4) of Section 155 was omitted, to meet the ends of justice, by Act 4 of 2003, vide Section 3 (with effect from: 31-12-2002).   

Part V: Section 372 and Section 373 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 & Section 81 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015: Sale and/or purchase of minors for immoral purposes, is a penal offence in India. Section 372 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, makes selling of minor for purposes of prostitution an offence punishable with imprisonment of 10 years and fine. Similarly, Section 373 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, makes buying of minors for purposes of prostitution an offence punishable with imprisonment for 10 years and fine.

Section 372 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, states that, when a female under the age of 18 years is sold, let for hire, or otherwise disposed of to a prostitute or to any person who keeps or manages a brothel, the person so disposing of such female shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have disposed of her with the intent that she shall be used for the purpose of prostitution.

Section 373 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, states that, any prostitute or any person keeping or managing a brothel, who buys, hires or otherwise obtains possession of a female under the age of 18 years shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have obtained possession of such female with the intent that she shall be used for the purpose of prostitution. In so far as Section 373 is concerned, a precedent of reverent importance is that of, Dowlat Bee v. Saikh Ali[28], in this case the question before the court of law was that, if a person were to contract with a minor girl, aged 17 years for prostitution; would it be ‘buying’ or ‘hiring’ within the meaning of Section 373 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860? Scotland, CJ was of the opinion that the terms of Section 373 are wide enough to penalise such suffering; however, Holloway, J dissented, holding that Section 373 could not be interpreted to include a hiring by minor herself, all such cases will be covered by provisions relating to kidnapping and abduction.[29]

In the case of, Emperor v. Vithabai Sukha[30] it was held that, where a brothel keeper allowed a girl under 18 years of age to visit the brothel for two or three hours in the night, and allowed her to prostitute herself to customers for money, it was held that the brothel-keeper was guilty of an offence under Section 373 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Section 2(14) (viii) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 states that, child in need of care and protection means a child, who has been or is being or is likely to be abused, tortured or exploited for the purpose of sexual abuse or illegal acts. Section 81 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 states that, any person who sells/buys a child for any purpose shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 5 years and shall also be liable to fine of Rs. 100,000/-. However, where such an offence is committed by a person having actual charge of the child, including employees of a hospital or nursing home or maternity home, the term of imprisonment shall not be less than 3 years and may extend up to 7 years. Also, Rule 32 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 provides for the rehabilitation and social reintegration of the juveniles. Rule 32 states that, the primary aim of rehabilitation and social reintegration is to help children in restoring their dignity and self-worth and mainstream them through rehabilitation within the family where possible, or otherwise through alternate care programmes and long-term institutional care shall be of last resort.

Part VI: Rehabilitation of Prostitutes and their Children: Section 16 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, provides for the rescue of persons living or carrying on, or made to carry on prostitution, in a brothel. Section 16 provides that, a Magistrate (that is, Metropolitan Magistrate, Judicial Magistrate of First Class, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate) may direct a police officer not below the rank of a sub-inspector to enter any brothel and remove any person there from; after removing the person, the police officer must forthwith produce him before the Magistrate.

Rehabilitation of sex-workers has been an issue of considerable importance qua which substantial amount of time and efforts have been invested by the Apex Court since the very commencement of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. Not very long ago, in the case of Budhadev Karmaskar v. State of West Bengal[31], the Apex Court reiterating its observations, as made vide order dated 02.08.2011, held as follows:

We are fully conscious of the fact that simply by our orders the sex workers in our country will not be rehabilitated immediately. It will take a long time, but we have to work patiently in this direction. What we have done in this case is to present the situation of sex workers in the country in the correct light, so as to educate the public. It is ultimately the people of the country, particularly the young people, who by their idealism and patriotism can solve the massive problems of sex workers. We, therefore, particularly appeal to the youth of the country to contact the members of the panel and to offer their services in a manner which the panel may require so that the sex-workers can be uplifted from their present degraded condition. They may contact the panel at the email address: panelonsexworkers@gmail.com.

How far this effort of the Supreme Court has been successful, is still unaccounted.

Women found in flesh trade should be viewed more as victims of adverse socio-economic circumstances rather than as offenders in our society. The commercial exploitation of sex is to be regarded as crime, but those trapped in custom-oriented prostitution and gender-oriented prostitution should be viewed as victims of gender oriented vulnerability. That could be done by not only the law enforcing agencies but by constant counselling and interaction by the NGOs impressing upon sex-workers the need to shed off the path and to start with new lease of life. It is pertinent to mention that, the customary initiation of women in the practice of Devadasi, Jogins and Venkatasins is still prevalent in not just Andhra Pradesh, but also Karnataka and Maharashtra. This in fact is affront to human dignity and self-respect but pursuit of customary beliefs traps the fair sex into this glorified unworthy self-sacrifice, which ultimately leads to prostitution in temples and other charitable institutions, this in turn is a crime against humanity and violation of human rights conferred under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Constitution of India, 1950. Only economic rehabilitation can prevent the practice of dedication of young girls to prostitution as Devadasi, Jogins and Venkatasins. In catena of judgments it has been held that, dedication of minors to the service of a temple as dasis (servants) amounts to a disposal of such minors, knowing it to be likely that they will be used for purpose of prostitution.[32]

According to the Declaration and Agenda for Action from the World Congress against the Commercial Exploitation of Children (Stockholm), the commercial sexual exploitation of children is a fundamental violation of rights of children. It consists of sexual-abuse by the adult and remuneration in cash/kind to the child or a third person(s). The infant/juvenile is treated as a sexual object and as a commercial object. The commercial sexual exploitation of infants/juveniles constitutes a form of coercion and violence against children, and it amounts to forced labour and a current-day form of slavery. There are three pioneer and interrelated forms of commercial sexual exploitation of children: prostitution; pornography; and trafficking for sexual purposes.[33] Around 10 million children worldwide are estimated to be in the profession of sex-trade.[34]

In the case of Gaurav Jain v. Union of India[35], the issue that came up before the Supreme Court was the rehabilitation of the children of the prostitutes. The Apex Court observed that, segregating children of prostitutes by locating separate schools, and providing separate hostels, would not be in the best interest of the children and the society at large. The Honourable Court directed that, these children should be segregated from their mothers and should be allowed to mingle with others and become a part of the society. The Court further contemplated that, the children of prostitutes should, however, not be permitted to live in the inferno and other undesirable surroundings of prostitute homes. This was observed particularly so in context of the young girls whose body and mind are likely to be abused with growing age for being admitted into the profession of their mothers. Whilst the court did not accept the plea for separate hostels for children of the prostitutes, it felt that, accommodation in hostels and other reformatory homes should be adequately available to help segregation of these children from their respective mothers living in prostitute homes as soon as they are identified.

In another case, Gaurav Jain v. Union of India[36], the moot question that came up before the Supreme Court for adjudication was this: What are the rights of the children of fallen women, the modules to segregate them from their respective mothers and others, so as to give them protection, care and rehabilitation to bring them back to the mainstream of national life? And as a facet of it, what should be the scheme to be evolved to eradicate prostitution at the source itself? And, lastly, what succour and sustenance can be provided to the fallen victims of flesh trade?

The Court in this case, through K. Ramaswamy, J., observed that, prostitutes are victims of circumstances and hence, should be treated as human beings like others, so as to bring them back into the mainstream of the social order without any stigma attached to them. The prostitutes and their children need to be treated with humanity and compassion so that their integration into the social mainstream is plain-sailing. Victims of flesh trade need care and consideration of the society. The Convention on the Right of the Child; the Fundamental Rights, contained in Part III of the Constitution of India; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Directive Principles of State Policy, apply with equal vigour and force to ameliorate the socio-economic, educational and cultural conditions of the fallen women and their children.

The Apex Court reconnoitred that, so far as the Constitution of India is concerned, Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 provides for equality in general; Article 21 guarantees right to life and personal liberty; Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, or any of them; Article 15 (3) provides that nothing shall prevent the State from making special provisions for women and children; Article 16(1) provides for equality of opportunity in matters of public employment; Article 23 prohibits human-trafficking and forced labour, making it punishable under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (which was renamed in 1990 as the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act); Article 39(f) provides that children should be given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions which do not put to compromise their dignity and freedom, also childhood and youth should be protected against exploitation, moral and material abandonment; Article 46 directs the State to promote the educational and economic interests of women and people of weaker sections of society, to protect them from social injustice and all other forms of exploitation; Article 51-A enjoins duty on every citizen to develop scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of enquiry and reform and to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. Thus, the court stated that, social justice and economic empowerment is firmly rooted in the constitutional firmament of India, holding it ‘fundamental’ to the life and liberty of every citizen (prostitutes and their children included).

The Court further pointed out that, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provides that, all human beings are born free; equal in dignity and rights. Article 2 states that, everyone i.e. prostitutes with their children included are entitled to all rights and freedoms set-forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without any distinction of any kind such as that of: race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Article 3 provides that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. Article 4 enjoins that no one shall be held in servitude; slave trade and sex-trade are prohibited in all forms. The victims of flesh trade are no less than destitute of slave trade. Article 6 provides that everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law, and thus identity of the victims of flesh trade cannot evaporate in thin air; their presence need to be acknowledged and consolidated efforts need to be made, both on executive/administrative side and judicial side to rehabilitate them and to provide for their welfare. India being a signatory to the UDHR is obligated to work towards the aspirations that the declaration contemplates.

The Court further stated that, the Declaration of Right of the Child, to which India is a signatory, encapsulates by virtue of Article 3(1) that, all actions concerning children whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, legislative bodies, court of law or administrative authorities must yield to the best interest of the child. Further, the Court elucidated that, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979 by virtue of Article 1, prohibits discrimination against women; Article 5 enjoins to modify social patterns of conduct of men and women with a view to achieve elimination of prejudices and all other customary practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority/superiority of the sexes or on stereotyped roles of men and women; Article 12 prescribes that discrimination against women should end in the field of health-care in order to ensure better health services, including those related to family planning. Article 13 directs the State Parties should work towards elimination of discrimination against women in all areas of socio-economic life, entitling them to all benefits apropos family life, marital status and right to foster their children in best possible manner.

Thus, in nutshell, the Court was of the opinion that, prostitutes have universal moral and social rights which entitle them and their children to live a life of dignity, devoid of social ostracism and discrimination. However, this case filliped on a rather curious-note, when D.P. Wadhwa, J. of the bench comprising of, K. Ramaswamy and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ., expressed his dissent albeit the directions issued by K. Ramaswamy, J. on the question of prostitution and its eradication, and on the nature and scope of Articles 142 and 145 (5) of the Constitution of India, 1950. Whilst D.P. Wadhwa, J. consented with K. Ramaswamy, J. on directions issued albeit social rehabilitation of the children of the prostitutes and establishment of juvenile homes.

Later, in the case of Gaurav Jain and Anr v. Union of India & Ors[37], the Supreme Court of India (the Three Judges Bench comprising of: Sujata V. Manohar, S.P. Kurdukar, and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.) elucidating on the scope of its power under Article 142 held that, Article 142 cannot override Article 145(5). The Apex Court observed as follows:

  1. Even in non-adversarial public interest litigation if the two-judges comprising the Division Bench differ, matter has to be referred to the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger bench for decision, and it would not be competent for one of them to issue directions for compliance by invoking Article 142 on the plea that the same has been done to avoid delay involved in reference to a larger bench.
  2. The directions issued under Article 142 by K. Ramaswamy, J. in Gaurav Jain Union of India, (1997) 8 SCC 114, regarding prostitution, its amelioration and eradication to which D.P. Wadhwa, J., the other member of the Division Bench dissented, cannot stand in law.

Thus, this case overruled, Gaurav Jain v. Union of India, (1997) 8 SCC 114; however, directions issued in Gaurav Jain v. Union of India, (1997) 8 SCC 114, with respect to social-reintegration of the children of the prostitutes and establishment of juvenile homes were upheld.

Part VII: Remarks: Legal regime in India albeit sex-work is laid down under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. Sex-work per se is not prohibited under the mandate of the 1956 Act; however, the enactment penalises and prohibits specific activities relating to commercial sex. The 1956 Act provides for the rescue and rehabilitation of individuals engaged in sex-work. The 1956 Act makes punishable: brothel-keeping vide Section 3; living on earnings of prostitution vide Section 4; procuring, inducing or detaining individuals for prostitution vide Sections 5 and 6– penalties are higher where offences involve children (individuals less than 16 years of age) and minors (individuals less than 18 years of age). Prostitution in areas notified by Police and areas near public places is prohibited vide Section 7; and soliciting prostitution is prohibited and is punishable vide Section 8 of the 1956 Act.

The 1956 Act contemplates implementation of the mandate of the Act through Police and Magistracy. The 1956 Act contemplates implementation of the mandate of the Act through police personnel, both, Special Police Officers and Trafficking Police Officers; these officers are accorded special powers vide Section 13, to raid, rescue and search premises suspected of serving as brothels (See also: Section 15). The 1956 Act vide Sections 16, 17, 18 and 20, empowers the Magistrates to order arrests and removal, directing taking into custody of the rescued persons, closing down of brothels and eviction of sex-workers. The 1956 Act vide Sections 19, 21, 23 and the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act- State Rules, further provide for institutional rehabilitation for ‘rescued’ sex-workers.

Major defects albeit the 1956 Act:

(i) Section 2(a) of the 1956 Act defines “brothel” as “any house, room, conveyance or place or any portion of any house, room, conveyance or place which is used for purposes of sexual exploitation or abuse for the gain of another person or for the mutual gain of two or more prostitutes.” (Underlining is mine).

Section 3 of the 1956 act provides for punishment for keeping, running and managing a “brothel”. The term “for the mutual gain of two or more prostitutes” renders premises shared by prostitutes as illegal, even if it is for residential purposes only. There have been a plethora of instances, where by prostitutes have lost their homes and earnings under the guise of “closing down of brothels”.

(ii) Section 4 of the 1956 Act states that, any person above the age of 18 years, who knowingly lives on the earnings of a prostitute, shall be liable for punishment. Thus, what can be contemplated from the language of Section 4 is that, aged parents, siblings, and partners of prostitutes, who either due to old age or by reason of a disability are dependent on them are liable for punishment, which shall run in the following terms: imprisonment up to 2 years, or fine up to Rs. 1000/-, or imprisonment up to 2 years and fine up to Rs. 1000/-. This provision, thus, is not very well drafted; its implications are atrocious.

(iii) Section 8 of the 1956 Act states that, any woman who tempts, or attracts, or endeavours to tempt or attract the attention of any person for the purpose of prostitution; or, solicits or, molests any person or, loiters or, acts to cause obstruction or, annoyance to persons or, offends public decency, for the purpose of prostitution, shall be punishable with: imprisonment up to 6 months or fine up to Rs. 500/- or both, on first conviction; and imprisonment up to 1 year and fine up to Rs. 500/-, in the event of a second or subsequent conviction.

However, a man who commits any offence under this section (that is, Section 8), shall be punishable with imprisonment for not less than 7 days but up to 3 months.

Section 8 is one of the most misused-provision of the 1956 Act. Sex-workers are often arrested even when they are not soliciting. This provision although does nothing to prevent (or abate) human trafficking, but still it is often used, particularly to criminalize and prosecute prostitutes even when they are not soliciting.

(iv) Section 15(5A) of the 1956 Act mandates medical examination of individuals removed from brothels inter-alia for detection of sexually transmitted diseases. Prostitutes often are forcibly tested for sexually transmitted diseases and results of their tests are disclosed in the open court. This is contrary to the national policy which mandates obtaining of consent and necessitates confidentiality and counselling for HIV testing.

The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, no doubt is an improvisation over the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 but still a lot is to be achieved, particularly with reference to the abuse and social ostracism that sex-workers face despite the fact that prostitution per se is not illegal in India. Prostitutes cannot be seen as individuals with half-rights or no-rights; the Constitution of India guarantees them all rights as are available to all other citizens of the country, the crowning glory of them all being the “right to self-determination”. Because prostitution per se is not illegal in India, the contention or the moot point of argument should not be, whether or not to legalise activities of sex-workers, but as to how to regulate prostitution in India?

Necessary fetters are required to be imposed on the exercise of police powers of the State, particularly in respect of raids that are carried out in the abode of the sex-workers, in the bid of terming them as ‘brothels’. Rehabilitation of sex-workers is too academic a proposition much because of the social hypocrisy we are surrounded with, and due to the attitude of social denial, we live in. Despite the fact that flesh trade is an $8.4 billion industry in India, hardly any affirmative steps have been taken to regulate prostitution and to improvise the living conditions of sex-workers in India. Prostitutes in India face “identity crises”, their existence is acknowledged only when brothels are raided and surveys are conducted by the Government and other agencies/authorities.

The only good that can be done to uplift the prostitutes from their situation of crises is to acknowledge them as human beings not only of ‘flesh’ but also of emotions; rights; privileges and liberties; and to make them realise that the Constitution of India shields them, protects them and embraces them, as it does to all other citizens of the country.   

*****

Bibliography:

Primary Sources:

  1. The Constitution of India, 1950
  2. The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956
  3. The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956
  4. The Indian Penal Code, 1860
  5. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  6. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007
  7. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
  8. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
  9. The Convention on the Right of the Child
  10. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979
  11. The Law Commission of India: Sixty Fourth Report, The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, Chapter I: Introduction, March 1975
  12. The Report of the Street Offences Committee, 1928
  13. The Report of the Committee on Homo-sexual Offences and Prostitution, 1957

Secondary Sources:

  1. Black’s Law Dictionary (Fourth Edition)
  2. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Dictionary (Fifth Edition)
  3. Professor W.W. Buckland, Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian
  4. Charles Winick, The Lively Commerce, Quardrangle (1971)
  5. Chamber’s Encyclopaedia (1961), Volume II, p.257
  6. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, Chapter XVI: Criminal Force & Assault, Wadhwa & Company (Nagpur), 30th Edition (2006), p. 675
  7. Gagandeep Kaur, Law and Changing Private Morality in India, Journal of Law Teachers of India, Volume II, Issue 1-2, 2011, p. 126
  8. Palash Krishna Mehrotra, Legalisation of prostitution will help protect vulnerable women in India, Daily Mail, 19 October 2014
  9. Devanik Saha, The number story: A human trafficking cases rise, convictions come down, The Indian Express, 30 January 2015
  10. PSA Pillai, Criminal Law, Chapter 40: Kidnapping and Abduction, Lexis Nexis, 9th Edition, 2006, p.714-715
  11. Sridevi Panikkar, Child Sex Tourism: An Overview of the Domestic and International Response, Delhi Law Review, Volume II (2005-2006), p.157
  12. Sex Workers’ Manifesto, http://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/Sex%20Workers%20Manifesto%20-%20Meeting%20in%20India.pdf, Last viewed on: 05.06.2016

 

[1] See: Charles Winick, The Lively Commerce, Quardrangle (1971)

[2] See: Law Commission of India: Sixty Fourth Report, The Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, Chapter I: Introduction, March 1975

[3] See: Chamber’s Encyclopaedia (1961), Volume II, p.257

[4] See: Com. v. Cook, 12 Metc., Mass., 97; State v. Anderson, 284 Mo. 657, 225 S.W. 896, 897; U.S. ex rel. Mitter v. Curran, C.C.A.N.Y., 18 F. 2d 355, 356

[5] 277 Ill. 521, 115 N.E. 631, 632

[6] 8 Barb., N.Y., 610

[7] 54 Me. 24, 89 Am. Dec. 716

[8] 17 Ala. App. 307: 84 So. 783

[9] 181 Va. 338, 25 S.E. 2d 350, 352

[10] 125 Kan. 400, 264 P. 1043, 1044

[11] 56 Mich. 544, 23 N.W. 215

[12] 1972 MLJ (Cr.) 150

[13] 1982 Cr LJ 702 (Mad)

[14] AIR 1966 Mad 167

[15] 1967 Cri LJ 544 (SC)

[16] 1981 RCC 42

[17] See: P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 1029

[18] See: Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, Chapter XVI: Criminal Force & Assault, Wadhwa & Company (Nagpur), 30th Edition (2006), p. 675

[19] See: Gagandeep Kaur, Law and Changing Private Morality in India, Journal of Law Teachers of India, Volume II, Issue 1-2, 2011, p. 126

[20] See: Palash Krishna Mehrotra, Legalisation of prostitution will help protect vulnerable women in India, Daily Mail, 19 October 2014

[21] See: Devanik Saha, The number story: A human trafficking cases rise, convictions come down, The Indian Express, 30 January 2015

[22] The Penal Code was actually passed in 1860

[23] According to the narrow view, the law should reach only acts causing positive harm. According to the wider view, the law should also punish behaviour which, though not causing positive harm to the individual, may damage the cherished moral fabric of the society, and destroy values which are considered worth preserving at all costs.

[24] See: Sex Workers’ Manifesto, http://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/Sex%20Workers%20Manifesto%20-%20Meeting%20in%20India.pdf, Last viewed on: 05.06.2016

[25] 2001 Cr LJ 3046 (M.P.)

[26] See: Criminal Appeal No. 422 and 425 of 1994, the Allahabad High Court, Order dated 13.05.2016

[27] AIR 1991 SC 207

[28] 5 MHCR 473

[29] See: PSA Pillai, Criminal Law, Chapter 40: Kidnapping and Abduction, Lexis Nexis, 9th Edition, 2006, p.714-715

[30] (1928) 30 Bom LR 613, 52 Bom 403

[31] (2011) 10 SCR 577

[32] See: (1881) 1 Weir 359 (FB); Queen-Empress v. Basava, (1891) 15 Mad 75; Reg. v. Jaili Bhavin, (1869) 6 BHC (Cr C) 60; Queen-Empress v. Tippa, (1892) 16 Bom 737

[33] See: Sridevi Panikkar, Child Sex Tourism: An Overview of the Domestic and International Response, Delhi Law Review, Volume II (2005-2006), p.157

[34] See: Palash Krishna Mehrotra, Legalisation of prostitution will help protect vulnerable women in India, Daily Mail, 19 October 2014

[35] 1990 Supp SCC 709: 1991 SCC (Cri) 140

[36] (1997) 8 SCC 114

[37] (1998) 4 SCC 270

Anti-suit Injunctions: Practice and Procedure

Tilak Marg

INTRODUCTION:

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 neither defines nor deals with anti-suit injunctions. When a court restrains a party to a suit/proceeding before it from instituting or prosecuting a case in another court including a foreign court, it is called anti-suit injunction. An anti-suit injunction can be issued on the ground of equity and good conscience and to avoid injustice. International anti-suit injunction though operates between parties, it effectively restricts jurisdiction of the foreign sovereign court. International anti-suit injunction can be granted where there is duplication of parties and issues and prosecution of simultaneous proceedings would affect speedy and effective determination of the case.[1]

No specific rules govern the grant of anti-suit injunction. Discretion in the matter of granting anti-suit injunction can be exercised only where compelling circumstances exist and to prevent irreparable miscarriage of justice. The courts in India like the courts in England are courts of both law and equity. The principles governing the grant of injunction, which is in the nature of an equitable relief, by the court will also govern the grant of an anti-suit injunction which is but a species of injunction. It is a common ground that the courts in India have power to issue an anti-suit injunction to a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction in an appropriate case.

DOCTRINE OF ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS:

An anti-suit injunction involves a restraint on a party seeking to approach a foreign court. As against this, wherein an Indian Court is approached by a party for stay of its own proceedings, then, the Indian Court necessarily delves into issues such as: forum conveniens, that is, which would be the appropriate forum- the Indian Court or the foreign court; the jurisdictional clause as to the choice of court in the event the dispute emanates from a contract; and in some cases it is called upon to deal with an arbitration agreement obtaining between the parties. In determining, which would be the appropriate forum, that is, Indian Court or the foreign court- it necessarily takes into account the forum with which the dispute has a “real” and “substantial” connection.

In a situation where an Indian Court is moved for an anti-suit injunction, possibly, two situations arise so far as the defendant is concerned: one, where a party against whom an anti-suit injunction is sought is an Indian party or resident in India; and the other, where defendant is a foreign party or resident abroad. Insofar as a party is Indian or resident in India, it presents no difficulty; however, in case of a foreign party or those resident abroad, the court in India will necessarily have to tread carefully in issuing an anti-suit injunction as in such circumstances it will have to base it on the principle of sufficiency of connection in the context of appropriateness of the forum. Courts in India will have to be even more circumspect where the foreign party has already instituted an action in a foreign court. An Indian Court will necessarily bear in mind that if summons are issued outside the territorial jurisdiction of Indian Courts, it may not be complied with or, that the foreign party may attempt to seek remedy in the jurisdiction of the court where it is resident. However, subsistence of such situation should not deter an Indian Court to issue an injunction if it otherwise finds that it has jurisdiction.[2]  An anti-suit injunction is directed against a person and hence, acts in “personam” and not against a court in which the defendant proposes to institute an action, although, no doubt, the result in effect would be, which is unavoidable, that proceedings cannot be initiated in the foreign court by the defendant.

An anti-suit injunction cannot be issued by a domestic forum against another domestic forum in India in view of the specific bar contained in Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which states that, an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought. Law confers on every person an inherent right to bring a suit of civil nature of one’s choice, at one’s peril, howsoever frivolous the claim may be, unless barred by a statute. There may be more than one court which may have jurisdiction in the matter but so long as a particular court has the jurisdiction, the privilege is of the plaintiff. The principle of forum non conveniens has no application to domestic forums in India.[3]

TESTS FOR ISSUANCE OF ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION:

The tests for issuance of the anti-suit injunction to a person amenable to the jurisdiction of the court in person has been varying; firstly, it was the test of ‘equity and good conscience’, later, the test adopted was that of, ‘to avoid injustice’. The test adopted in the recent cases is whether the foreign proceedings are ‘oppressive or vexatious’. Some foreign courts (such as the Supreme Court of Canada) have adopted the test of the requirement of ‘the ends of justice’. Thus, the essence or the ultimate objective is to enquire how best the interests of justice will be served, that is, whether grant of anti-suit injunction is necessary in the interest of justice.[4] Regard being had to the grant of an anti-suit injunction, a party to a contract containing the jurisdiction clause cannot normally be prevented from approaching the court of choice of the parties as it would amount to aiding breach of the contract; yet, when one of the parties to the jurisdiction clause approaches the court of choice in which exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction is created, the proceedings in that court cannot per se be treated as vexatious or oppressive nor can the court be said to be a “forum non conveniens”. It is important to note that, the burden of establishing that the forum of choice is a forum non conveniens or the proceedings therein are oppressive or vexatious would be on the party so contending to aver and prove the same.

In sum and substance, the principle of forum non conveniens applies to foreign forums, and Indian Courts can apply the said principle vis-à-vis foreign forums, or, while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The principle of forum non conveniens does not apply to civil suits in India which are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. For there being no provision under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, recourse to Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is not permissible for application of the principle of forum non conveniens to domestic forums especially keeping in mind that it is the other side of the coin of the doctrine of anti-suit injunction. An aggrieved party can, none the less, approach the Supreme Court of India under Section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the grant of necessary relief in this behalf.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE GRANT OF AN ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTION:

In exercising the grant of an anti-suit injunction the court must be satisfied of the following aspects: (1) the defendant, against whom injunction is sought, is amenable to the personal jurisdiction of the court; (2) if the injunction is declined, the ends of justice will be defeated and injustice will be perpetuated; and (3) the principle of comity i.e. respect for the court in which the commencement or continuance of action/proceeding is sought to be restrained must be borne in mind.

In a case where more forums than one are available, the court in exercise of its discretion to grant anti-suit injunction will examine as to which is the appropriate forum i.e. forum conveniens, having regard to the convenience of the parties and may grant anti-suit injunction in regard to proceedings which are oppressive or vexatious or in a forum non conveniens. Moreover, where jurisdiction of the court is invoked on the basis of jurisdiction clause in a contract, the recitals therein in regard to exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction of the court of choice of the parties are not determinative but are relevant factors and when a question arises as to the nature of jurisdiction agreed to between the parties the court has to decide the same on a true and fair interpretation of the contract based on the facts and in the circumstances of each case.

A court of natural jurisdiction will not normally grant an anti-suit injunction against a defendant before it, where parties have agreed to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of a court (including a foreign court), save in exceptional cases for good and sufficient reasons, with a view to prevent injustice. Further, where parties agree under a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause, to approach a neutral foreign forum and be governed by the law applicable to it for resolution of their disputes arising under the contract, ordinarily, no anti-suit injunction will be granted, as it will be presumed that the parties have agreed after thinking over their convenience and all other relevant factors before submitting to such a forum.

EXCURSUS:

From the above discussion, following conclusions can be drawn:

  1. In an anti-suit injunction, one court grants an injunction, restraining the parties from approaching another court. It must be kept in mind that the court granting an anti-suit injunction must otherwise have jurisdiction over the matter. Similarly, the court refraining from entertaining the matter on the principle of forum non conveniens must also have jurisdiction to entertain the matter, however, it refrains from entertaining the matter because it considers itself to be an inappropriate forum;
  2. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is invoked by a court to not entertain a matter presented before it in view of the fact that there exists a more appropriate court of competent jurisdiction which would be in a better position to decide the lis between the parties;
  3. Doctrine of forum conveniens requires the parties to agitate issues before a court of competent jurisdiction which is also a convenient court apropos all the parties to the dispute;
  4. Doctrine of anti-suit injunction which is premised on the doctrine of forum non-conveniens, has to be applied with due care and caution as it involves issues as regards, respect for corresponding international forums;
  5. Rule of comity of courts requires that exercise of this power, that is, grant of anti-suit injunction, must be exercised sparingly because an anti-suit injunction though is directed against a person, in effect, it causes interference in exercise of jurisdiction by another court;
  6. Fundamental principle behind the grant of an anti-suit injunction is to choose that forum in which the case can be tried more properly/suitably, keeping in mind the interest of all the parties to the dispute.

[1] See: PPN Power Generating Co. Ltd. v. PPN (Mauritius) Co., 2004 SCC Online Mad 668

[2] See: Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Essel Sports (P) Ltd., 2010 SCC Online Del 443

[3] See: Horlicks Ltd. v. Heinz India (P) Ltd., 2009 SCC Online Del 3342

[4] See: Modi Entertainment Network v. W.S.G. Cricket Pte. Ltd., (2003) 4 SCC 341

Doctrine of Equitable Set-Off: Critical Analysis

Introduction: Set-Off- Meaning and Characteristics:

According to the Black’s Law Dictionary (Seventh Edition, 1999), a set-off is nothing but a debtor’s right to reduce the amount of a debt by any sum the creditor owes the debtor. In the case of, Union of India v. Karam Chand Thapar and Bros (Coal Sales) Ltd and Ors, referring to the concept of set-off and quoting from ‘A Treatise on the Law of Set-Off, Recoupment, and Counter Claim’, by Thomas W. Waterman, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that, set-off signifies the subtraction or taking away of one demand from another opposite or cross-demand, so as to distinguish the smaller demand and reduce the greater by the amount of the less; or, if the opposite demands are equal, to extinguish both. Set-off, broadly speaking, means ‘stoppage’, much because the amount due to be set-off is stopped, or, is deducted from the cross-demand.  

Test Identification Parade of the Accused: Law, Practice and Safeguards

Police Station

INTRODUCTION:

In all criminal trials, the two most intrinsic points of determination are the following: whether the alleged offence was committed, and, if so, who committed the offence. One of the ways employed to establish the identity of a person as the doer of a particular act is by way of identification parades. Evidence by way of identification parades is taken under Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The purpose of identification parade is to test the veracity/trustworthiness of the evidence of the witness. The object of conducting a Test Identification Parade (hereinafter referred to as the “TIP”) is, firstly, to satisfy the investigating authority, before remitting the case to the court for trial, that the person arrested, who was not previously known to the witness, was in fact one of those who committed the crime; and secondly, to satisfy the court that the accused arrested is in fact the culprit.[1] The whole idea behind TIP is to test whether or not the witness who claims to have seen the culprits at the time of occurrence/commission of the offence is thoroughly reliable and can identify the culprits from midst of other individuals without any aid and/or other source. TIP is conducted to test the veracity of the witnesses who claim to have seen the culprits committing the offence.[2] This practice of TIP is not borne out of procedure, but out of prudence.

Identification of an accused in the court of law is substantive evidence, whereas, evidence of identification in TIP though is primary evidence but is not substantive one, and the same can be used only to corroborate the identification of the accused by the witness in the court of law. It is interesting to note that, if TIP is not conducted and the witness identifies the accused for the first time in the court of law, then, the evidence regarding identification in the court of law does not ipso facto becomes inadmissible and cannot be discarded on the ground that it was not preceded by TIP; the court identification of accused without TIP is admissible if the court finds it trustworthy. The general rule is that, the evidence of identification of the accused before the court of law should not, ordinarily form the basis of conviction until and unless it is corroborated by previous identification in the TIP or vide some other evidence, although there are certain exceptions to this rule, for example, in the case of State of H.P. v. Prem Chand[3], the eyewitness knew the accused to be his uncle and had seen him coming to his house on the day of occurrence and also on the day preceding the day of occurrence and clearly identified him in the court of law, here, the Apex Court held that there was no need to hold TIP. Further, in the case of, Ramesh Kumar v. State of Punjab[4], it was held that, there is no need for identification parade where the witnesses already knew who the assailants were. TIP is not a sine qua non in every case, that is, if the facts and circumstances of a case conclusively establish the guilt of the accused, then, there is no need to hold TIP.

PURPOSE OF TEST IDENTIFICATION PARADE:

Usually, there is a stretched time gap between the commission of an offence and the trial of the offence, and quite naturally if the accused is not known to the eyewitness, then, how can it be expected of the eyewitness to remember minute details such as: general appearance, physical structure, stature and complexion of the accused, and as a necessary corollary, how can it be expected of the eyewitness to identify the accused with exactitude in the court of law; thus, to resolve this anomaly, soon after the commission of crime, if any eyewitness is available then TIP should be conducted as a matter of priority, prudence and propriety and not just procedure, so that the eyewitness is able to depose about the accused and the crime scene when his memory is fresh and unsullied. It is important to note that, evidence of TIP conducted by police cannot be tendered in the court of law because such identification amounts to a statement made to the police and accordingly as per the purport of Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, such evidence being in the nature of statement made to the police during investigation it cannot be tendered as evidence in the court of law. In order to make TIP admissible in the court of law, so that it can be used to corroborate the oral evidence that would be given in the court of law, TIP must be conducted in the presence of a magistrate (judicial or executive).

Once the witness identifies the accused at the TIP conducted before the magistrate, then, the magistrate becomes a witness and is to tell the court about the various precautionary steps that the magistrate took to see that the witness actually picked out the concerned accused/suspect at the TIP without any police help. If a witness clearly and correctly identifies the accused at the TIP but not before the court of law, then, the evidence of the magistrate, who conducted the TIP holding that the witness identified the accused at the TIP, supported by remarks of the trial judge regarding the demeanour of the witness, that, the witness was frightened and was thus unable to recognise the accused at the trial, would be relevant and sufficient to convict the accused.   

In the case of, Ahmed Bin Salam v. State of A.P.[5], the police inquired from the witness as to whether or not, he could identify the persons who were on scooter and who threw bombs towards the deceased; the accused persons were thereafter shown to the witness and the witness identified them as accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that, such an exercise cannot be termed as TIP. 

TEST IDENTIFICATION PARADE- NOT SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE:

TIP is not substantive evidence; it only assures that the investigatory process is progressing on right lines.[6] TIP is a part of the investigatory process under Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. TIP has been in common use for a very long time; the object is to place the suspect of crime in a line with other individuals for identification. The purpose is to find out whether or not the suspect/accused is the perpetrator of the crime. This is all the more essential where the name and details of the accused, although, are not known to the eyewitnesses of the incident, but, still by recalling the scene of crime and the physical features (face, eyes, complexion, height and/or physique) of the accused/suspect the eyewitnesses are able to identify the accused/suspect.[7] The rationale of TIP is to confirm the identity of the accused and to help the police in their investigation. In the case of, State of A.P. v. V.K. Venkata Reddy[8], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India categorically held that, the evidence given by a witness in the court of law is substantive testimony while the identification made by the witness in the TIP is only confirmatory of the testimony made before the court of law.

Further, in the case of, Rabinder Kumar Pal v. Republic of India[9], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that, photo identification of accused and TIP are only aides to the investigation conducted by the investigating officer (‘I.O.’ for short) and these do not form substantive evidences. Substantive evidence is the evidence in the court of law on oath. The logic behind TIP, which includes photo-identification, lies in the fact that it is only an aid to the investigation, where an accused is not known to the witnesses; the I.O. conducts TIP to ensure that he has caught hold of the right person as the accused.

DELAY IN HOLDING TEST IDENTIFICATION PARADE MUST BE EXPLAINED:

Many times TIP gets delayed due to the non-availability of the magistrate; the delay in holding TIP must be accounted for satisfactorily, for example, in the case of, Rajesh Govind Jogesh v. State of Maharashtra[10], the explanation tendered by the I.O. that no magistrate was available in Bombay for 5 (five) weeks for supervising the TIP was held to be not a satisfactory explanation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India; whereas, in another case, Murarilal Jivaram Sharma v. State of Maharashtra[11], delay of 2 (two) months in holding TIP was held to be sufficiently explained where the I.O. although kept writing to the magistrate for holding TIP but the magistrate was not able to spare time due to his pre-occupations. Delays in holding TIP can reduce the credence that can be attributed to the evidence obtained vide the TIP route.

HOLDING TEST IDENTIFICATION PARADE WHEN NECESSARY AND WHEN NOT:

Absence of TIP in all cases is not fatal, for example, in the case of Dastagir Singh v. State of Karnataka[12], where X was raped by A, and, X was able to see A due to the proximity involved in the commission of crime, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, held that, to say that, TIP is necessary to test the veracity, reliability and memory of X, will be incongruous and farcical because in offences such as that of rape, the victim herself is a “natural witness”. However, in another case, Devinder Singh v. State of H.P.[13], the Apex Court held that, because the crime of rape was committed in the night, in the room of the victim, where there was no light, even if, it is stated that the victim had a fleeting glimpse of the accused when torch was lighted in the room after the commission of the crime, it will not be enough as the accused was not known to the victim, and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to hold TIP, and failure to do so was held to be fatal to the case of the prosecution. In the case of Jadunath Singh v. State of U.P.[14], it was emphatically held that, if the prosecution refrains from holding TIP on the plea that, the witness already knew the accused, but later it transpires during the course of the trial that the witness did not know the accused in the past, then, the prosecution runs the risk of losing the case; therefore, if there is any doubt, it is always advisable for the prosecution to hold TIP. On the contrary, in the case of, Asha & Ors v. State of Rajasthan[15], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that, TIP was not necessary as the F.I.R. was lodged within one (1) hour of the commission of the crime and the culprits were named in the F.I.R., that is, the culprits were known to the complainant.

Where the witness states before the court that, he identified the accused at the TIP and the magistrate corroborates the witness, then there is no difficulty. But, the problem begins when the witness states that, (a) he did not identify the accused at the TIP, but is able to identify the accused in the court; or, (b) he did identify the accused at the TIP, but is unable to identify the accused in the court; or, (c) he did not identify the accused at the TIP, nor is able to identify the accused in the court. The question for consideration which arises here is this: Can the magistrate give evidence of the TIP which was held by him and during which the accused was identified by the witness?

The purpose of TIP is to enable the witness who claims to have seen the commission of the crime, to identify the accused/suspect out of the several persons lined up by the I.O. in the presence of judicial/executive magistrate. The TIP takes place in the presence of magistrate and it is the magistrate who prepares the record of the TIP proceedings. It is for the witness to point out the accused/suspect out of the several persons and it is for the magistrate to corroborate the identification by the witness of the accused/suspect. Thus, in situations (a) and (c), there is nothing for the magistrate to corroborate, and it is only in situation (b) that a magistrate can corroborate the identification of the accused/suspect by the witness.           

IDENTIFICATION BY PHOTOGRAPH:

Section 22 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (“TADA” for  short) stated that: “Where a person has been declared a proclaimed offender in a terrorist case, the evidence regarding his identification by witnesses on the basis of his photograph shall have the same value as the evidence of the test identification parade.

In the case of, Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab[16], constitutional validity of Section 22 of TADA was challenged before the Apex Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that, Section 22 of TADA was opposed to the fair and reasonable procedure enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950.

IDENTIFICATION BY VOICE:

In the case of, Mohan Singh v. State of Bihar[17], the trial pertained to an offence concerning conspiracy for murder; here, the witness heard the accused while the accused was demanding money from the victim, and subsequently the witness identified the accused by the voice of the accused. Even prior to the happening of the incident, the witness had some acquaintance with the accused. The court held that, the evidence tendered by the witness, identifying the accused by his voice was reliable.

TEST IDENTIFICATION PARADE- SAFEGUARDS:

  1. TIP must ideally be conducted as soon as possible to avoid any mistake on the part of the witnesses. The judicial/executive magistrate who is to conduct the TIP must first acquaint himself with the facts of the case, and thereafter he must take note of the suspects who are to be identified and the witnesses who shall be identifying the suspects;
  2. Where the prosecution-witness is well-acquainted with the accused/suspect, holding of TIP is a complete waste of public time and money;
  3. Ideally, before conducting TIP, two independent and well thought-of individuals (not connected/associated with police officials) must be called-up by the police officials to participate in the TIP. The judicial/executive magistrate should brief these independent individuals about the facts of the case, and, as to who is to be identified (suspect) and who all are to come forward to identify (eye-witnesses);
  4. All police officers and constables must be asked to completely withdraw themselves from the room where the TIP is to be conducted;
  5. Ideally, TIP must not be held in a police station building but rather separate rooms must be reserved for holding TIP in separate building[18];
  6. In the case of, Bhaskar Virappa Kanchan State of Maharashtra[19], it was held that, at times TIP can be conducted even in a police station, provided, the place of identification is completely separate from the police office; police officials have no access to the place where TIP is being conducted; there was no opportunity for the identifying witnesses to see the accused/suspect before the TIP; and there is nothing on record to state that the accused/suspect was shown to the identifying witnesses prior to the TIP;
  7. Before the commencement of the TIP, the two independent-well-thought-of individuals (panch witnesses) must be asked to bring the accused/suspect from the lock-up room, and the judicial/executive magistrate must state in the identification memo that, the accused was brought to the room where TIP was to be conducted by the respective two independent individuals (panch witnesses);
  8. When the accused/suspect is brought before the judicial/executive magistrate, then, it is incumbent upon the judicial/executive magistrate to allow the accused/suspect to take any place he likes in the parade. The place the accused/suspect selects to stand at must be mentioned in the identification memo by the judicial/executive magistrate;
  9. An accused/suspect has no right to cover his face while the TIP is going on; thus, it is necessary that adequate number of dummies are made to stand with accused/suspect in the TIP, and ideally, each accused must be put to identification disjointedly;
  10. Before the parade begins, the judicial/executive magistrate must allow the accused/suspect to alter his/her dress; if, the accused/suspect alters his/her dress, then, the fact of his/her altering the dress must be recorded by the judicial/executive magistrate in the memo of identification prepared by him;
  11. The judicial/executive magistrate must mention in the identification memo, whether the identifying-witnesses identified the accused/suspect straightway, or, after some hesitation, or, after pointing at the wrong person and then later correcting themselves;
  12. Police authorities must ensure that delay in conducting TIP should not result into exposure of identity of the accused to the witnesses as this will be fatal to the very premise of TIP;
  13. Appreciation of evidence obtained vide the TIP route depends upon the strength and trustworthiness of the witnesses;
  14. If the manner of holding TIP throws doubt/suspicion on the police officials, then, TIP will have no evidentiary value. However, mere presence of police officials and/or public prosecutor at the place where TIP is conducted will not vitiate it, especially when no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused[20];
  15. Witnesses should be prevented from seeing the suspect before he is paraded; if there is only one suspect who is to be identified, then, at least half a dozen of other individuals must be placed in the parade, however, if there are two suspects that are to be identified then there should be at least ten (or twelve) of other individuals that must be placed in the parade. Not more than two suspects are to be placed in any single TIP;
  16. The suspect must be placed among persons of similar height, weight, age, physical structure and complexion as far as possible;
  17. If there are more witnesses than one, then, witnesses should be introduced one by one and should be asked to identify the suspect; witnesses must be allowed to touch any of the persons paraded before them;
  18. If parade takes place in a prison then the prison officer should be present throughout the parade;
  19. The identification memo prepared by the judicial/executive magistrate must contain the details as regards the time, place and date of the parade; details of the panch witnesses (two independent individuals); names of the persons standing in the parade; and statements made by the identifying witnesses[21];
  20. In the case of, Krishnarayana Babu v. State[22], it was held that, it is the duty of judicial/executive magistrate to take note of every objection which is made by an accused/suspect at the time of TIP so that the court which has to appreciate the evidentiary value of the TIP can take into consideration those objections and in the light of those objections can understand the contents of the identification memo;
  21. After the TIP is complete then, the judicial/executive magistrate must read over the contents of the identification memo to the panch witnesses and they must sign the memo, stating that they agree with the details of the TIP contained in the memo;
  22. Identification memo must be written in the language of the court;
  23. If a First Class Magistrate or Second Class Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government holds identification, then, Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 applies and the identification memo prepared is admissible in evidence under Section 80 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 without proof. However, if others, such as, Naib Tehsildar, (that is, Third Class Magistrate) holds identification parade, then, he must be called on to prove the identification memo[23];
  24. Court identification of the accused/suspect for the first time by an identifying witness is generally an evidence of inherently weak character[24];
  25. There are no minimum number of witnesses that are required to identify the suspect/culprit in TIP; and,
  26. There is no statutorily prescribed time limit within which TIP must be conducted. Prudence demands that TIP must be conducted as soon as possible.

EXCURSUS:

  1. Where the accused is not named in the F.I.R. and was not previously known to the witnesses, TIP must be held[25];
  2. Identification of the accused through a photograph can take the place of a formal TIP[26];
  3. Failure to hold TIP would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification of the accused in the court of law if such court identification of accused is found to be reliable, trustworthy and dependable[27];
  4. In the case of, Dana Yadav State of Bihar[28], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India categorically held that, the sole purpose of TIP is to lend corroboration to the court identification of the accused, and, identification before court should not normally be relied upon if the name of the accused is neither mentioned in the First Information Report, nor, is stated before the police;
  5. Holding TIP is not obligatory and accused has no right to insist upon the holding of TIP. Delay in holding TIP although is not fatal, but, efforts must be made to hold it as soon as possible to avoid the mischief of accused being shown to the witnesses[29];
  6. Court identification of the accused by the witness is useless, when the witness has already failed to identify the accused at the TIP[30];
  7. Incorrect identification of the accused by a witness in the court of law has no bearing if the case of the prosecution stands proved by virtue of other evidences. In the case of, Simon State of Karnataka[31], the court held that, there can be variety of reasons for failure to identify, that is, the witness might have been won over, or, might have lost memory because he had seen the accused on the crime scene several years ago;
  8. If the accused is caught red-handed from the scene of crime then no question of TIP arises[32];
  9. If the contents of the TIP are contrary to the contents of the F.I.R. and the statement of the accused under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, then, TIP will be held to be unreliable[33];
  10. If the accused refuses to appear for TIP then an adverse inference of guilt can be drawn against him (Section 54A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973).[34] However, in the case of, Satnarayan v. State of A.P.[35], it was held that, a suspect cannot be compelled to participate in TIP if he is undergoing treatment;
  11. No one can be compelled to line-up for TIP and if the accused/suspect refuses to submit himself for TIP, he does so at his own risk[36];
  12. If court is of the opinion that regard being had to the facts of a particular case, bail should be granted to the accused, then, bail cannot be rejected simply because TIP is still to be conducted. Court is empowered to grant bail by imposing some limited conditions on the accused such as that the accused shall not appear in public or interact with media for a limited period of time;
  13. Giving thumb impression, or, foot impression, or, palm/finger impression, or, specimen of handwriting, or, exposing parts of body for the purpose of identification, is outside the periphery of “to be a witness” so far as the mandate of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, 1950 is concerned.[37]

 

[1] See: Satya Narain v. State, AIR 1953 All 385

[2] See: Md. Kalam v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2008 SC 1813

[3] (2002) 10 SCC 518

[4] (1993) Cri L.J. 1800 (SC)

[5] 1999 Cri L.J. 2281 (SC)

[6] See: Musheer Khan v. State of M.P., (2010) 2 SCC 748

[7] See: Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1978 SC 1201

[8] (1976) 1 SCC 463

[9] (2011) 2 SCC 490

[10] AIR 2000 SC 160

[11] AIR 1997 SC 1593

[12] AIR 2004 SC 2884

[13] AIR 2003 SC 3365

[14] AIR 1971 SC 363

[15] AIR 1997 SC 2828

[16] (1994) 3 SCC 569

[17] (2011) 9 SCC 272

[18] See: Anthony v. State of Maharashtra, 2003 (4) Mah L.J. 894 (Bom)

[19] 2003 Bom CR (Cri) 1648

[20] See: State of U.P. v. Girija Shankar Mishra, 1985 Cri L.J. NOC 79 (Del) (DB)

[21] See: Yakul Abdul Razak Menon v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1

[22] 1996 Cri L.J. 4484 (Mad)

[23] See: Asharfi v. State, AIR 1961 All 153

[24] See: Malkhan Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 2003 SC 2669

[25] See: Mohd. Saleem v. State, 1992 Cr. L.J. 1959 (Delhi)

[26] See: Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of T.N., AIR 1988 SC 1274

[27] See: Malkhan Singh v. State of M.P., AIR 2003 SC 2669

[28] (2002) 7 SCC 295

[29] See: Anil Kumar v. State of U.P., (2003) 3 SCC 569

[30] See: Hare Kishan Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1988 SC 863

[31] AIR 2004 SC 2775

[32] See: Kishore Prabhakar Sawant v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 2 SCC 45

[33] See: State of Orissa v. Harachand Khilei, 2008 Cr. L.J. (NOC) 524 (Orissa)

[34] See: Kiwan Prakash Pandurang Mokash v. State of Maharashtra, ILR 1974 Bom 337

[35] 1994 Cri L.J. 37 (AP)

[36] See: Suraj Pal v. State of Haryana, (1995) 2 SCC 64

[37] See: State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808

Appearance of Parties and Consequence of Non-appearance- Order IX of CPC- Practical Insights

Court room

Appearance of Parties and Consequence of Non-appearance- Order IX of CPC- Practical Insights

INTRODUCTION:

Order IX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”) deals with issues as regards the appearance of parties to the suit and consequences apropos their non-appearance.

Order IX, Rule 1 of the Code stipulates that parties to a suit are to present themselves before the court on the date fixed in the summons issued by the court to the defendant; summons are issued, firstly, to secure the appearance of the defendant (in person or through pleader) and, secondly, to enable the defendant to answer the claim of the plaintiff.

Order IX, Rule 2 of the Code states that, where the plaintiff fails to pay the court-fee or postal charges chargeable for the service of summons to the defendant or fails to present the copies of the plaint as required by Order VII, Rule 9 of the Code, then, the suit of the plaintiff can be dismissed, regards being had to the discretion of the court. An appeal cannot be preferred against an order passed by the court dismissing the suit under Order IX, Rule 2 of the Code; only a revision under Section 115 of the Code can be preferred against such an order dismissing the suit.[1]   

Order IX, Rule 3 of the Code further states that, where on the date fixed for the hearing of the suit, neither of the parties to the suit appears, then, the suit can be dismissed. Dismissal under this rule does not amount to a decree and no appeal as such lies from it; the plaintiff can either bring a fresh suit or can apply under Order IX, Rule 4 of the Code to set aside the dismissal.  

Order IX, Rule 4 of the Code stipulates that, when a suit is dismissed under Order IX, Rule 2, or, Order IX, Rule 3, of the Code, then, a fresh suit on the same cause of action is not barred if within limitation. An application for restoration of suit under Order IX, Rule 4 is to be preferred within 30 days of dismissal of the suit.[2] Once the application for setting aside the dismissal is allowed, the defendant is entitled to get notice of restoration and the date of further hearing[3]; the requirement of notice to the defendant is mandatory (and not directory) and non-service of notice is sufficient enough to get the decree set aside.[4]

Order IX, Rule 5 of the Code states that, a suit shall be dismissed where the plaintiff after the return of summons being not served, fails to apply for fresh summons within a period of 7 (seven) days reckoning from the date on which the earlier summons were returned as un-served. However, the court shall not dismiss the suit, if the plaintiff satisfies the court that: (a) despite best endeavours, the plaintiff failed to discover the residence of the defendant; (b) defendant is avoiding the service of process; and/or, (c) there is sufficient cause favouring the plaintiff to pray for the extension of the time for the service of summons upon the defendant. Where a suit is dismissed under Order IX, Rule 5 of the Code, the plaintiff is not prevented from bringing a fresh suit.[5]

Order IX, Rule 6 of the Code provides for the procedure that is to be adopted when on the first date of hearing of the suit only the plaintiff appears and the defendant does not appear despite the summons being duly served on the defendant, or, summons being duly served on the defendant but not within sufficient time, or, when summons were not duly served. Under Order IX, Rule 6 of the Code, the defendant can be proceeded against ex parte provided summon were duly served upon him within sufficient time.

Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code contemplates a situation where by the case was proceeded ex parte since the defendant did not appear before the court of law, or, where the defendant failed to appear before the court of law after filing of the written statement, but, thereafter the defendant appears before the court of law and assigns good cause for his previous non-appearance, and thereby, prays for the setting aside of the ex parte order.

Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code deals with a situation where by the suit is dismissed in default, for, only the defendant appears before the court of law and the plaintiff fails to appear. Under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code, a suit cannot be dismissed for non-appearance of the plaintiff if: (a) the defendant admits the whole of the claim of the plaintiff; or, (b) the defendant admits the claim of the plaintiff only in part and not in whole; the court, therefore, shall decree the suit accordingly in favour of the plaintiff, as against the defendant.  

Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code states that, where a suit is dismissed either in part, or, in whole, under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code, then, a fresh suit on the same cause of action is barred.[6] An application for restoration of the suit under Order IX, Rule 9 is allowable provided it is made within 30 days of the dismissal of the suit.[7] An appeal can be preferred under Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) of the Code against an order rejecting an application under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code[8]; however, a revision may lie from against an order restoring a suit dismissed in default.[9]  

Order IX, Rule 10 of the Code provides that where there are more plaintiffs than one, and one or more of them appear before the court of law on the date fixed, while the others do not appear, then, the court may permit the suit to be proceeded as if all the plaintiffs have appeared, or may pass such an order as the it thinks just.

Order IX, Rule 11 of the Code provides that where there are more defendants than one, and one or more of them appear before the court of law while the others do not appear, then, the court may permit the suit to be proceeded as if all the defendants have appeared, or may pass such an order as it thinks just.

Order IX, Rule 12 of the Code states that when the plaintiff and/or the defendant, who have been ordered to appear before the court of law in person, neither appear nor show sufficient cause for non-appearance, then, such plaintiff and/or defendant are to be subjected to all the Rules as provided for in Order IX of the Code in this behalf, which are as such applicable apropos the plaintiffs and/or the defendants, who do not appear.[10]

Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code states that an ex parte decree passed against a defendant can be set aside if the defendant satisfies the court on either of the two counts: (a) the summons were not duly served on the defendant, or, (b) the defendant was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from appearing before the court when the suit was called out for hearing. The court has the discretion to set aside the ex parte decree passed against the defendant on such terms as to costs or otherwise (deposit of decretal amount in the court) as the court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of each case.[11] It is important to note that, the second proviso to Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code states that, the court shall not set aside an ex parte decree merely on the ground of irregularity in the service of the summons in a case where the defendant had sufficient notice of the date of hearing of the suit, and had enough time to appear and answer the claim of the plaintiff. An application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code must be preferred within 30 days from the date of the decree, or, where the summons were not duly served, within 30 days from the date of the knowledge of the decree.

Order IX, Rule 14 of the Code states that, no ex parte decree can be set aside without notice to the opposite party. Moreover, in the case of, Mahesh Yadav v. Rajeshwar Singh[12], it was held that, an order setting aside an ex parte decree is a judicial order and therefore, it must be supported by reasons.   

PRACTICAL INSIGHTS:

  1. Order IX, Rule 2 of the Code states that, where summons are not served upon the defendant in consequence of plaintiff’s failure to pay the costs for service of summons or present copies of the plaint thereof, then the suit filed by the plaintiff may be dismissed. However, despite non-furnishing of costs for service of summons and failure to present the copies of the plaint thereof, if the defendant (in person or through pleader) appears before the court to answer the claim of the plaintiff, then the suit of the plaintiff shall not be dismissed. Moreover, if the suit is dismissed under Order IX, Rule 2 of the Code, nothing bars the plaintiff either to file a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action, or, to apply for the setting aside of the order of dismissal under Order IX, Rule 4 of the Code.
  2. In the case of Salem Advocates Bar Association, Tamil Nadu Union of India[13], it was held that the period of 7 (seven) days mentioned in Order IX, Rule 5 of the Code is merely directory and is not mandatory.
  3. Order IX, Rule 6 of the Code states that, where the defendant fails to appear before the court of law on the date fixed for hearing, then, the defendant can be proceeded against ex parte. Defendant can apply for the setting aside of the ex parte order under Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code, but the underlying principle remains that, until the suit is finally decided, the defendant has a right to come forward and defend the suit, that is to say, even if the defendant fails to furnish good cause for his previous non-appearance, he cannot be penalised in the sense of being forbidden from taking part in further proceedings of the suit or of whatever might still remain of the trial; the only disability the defendant shall suffer is that, he will not be relegated to the same position that he occupied at the start of the trial.[14]
  4. In the case of Arjun Mohindra[15], it was held that, there is no material difference between the expressions “good cause” as used in Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code and “sufficient cause” as used in Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code.
  5. Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code contemplates a situation where by the defendant appears but, the plaintiff does not appear on the date fixed for hearing, and owing to the non-appearance of the plaintiff, the court dismisses the suit. It is essential to note that, to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff without hearing him is a serious matter and such course should be adopted only when the court is satisfied that ends of justice requires it to be so done. The court is powerless to dismiss a suit when the plaintiff fails to appear before the court owing to his death.
  6. Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code states that, if the plaintiff elucidates a “sufficient cause” that prevented him from appearing before the court, then the court may set aside the order passed by it under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code. In the case of, Raman Arunachalam[16], it was held that, if sufficient cause is shown by the plaintiff for his non-appearance, then re-opening of the trial of the case is mandatory, but when sufficient cause is not shown, it is merely directory. Also, in the case of, Madhumilan Syntex Ltd. v. Union of India[17], it was held that, if the court is satisfied that there was sufficient cause as regards the non-appearance of the plaintiff, then, the court may set aside the order of dismissal and fix a day for proceeding with the suit.
  7. Period of limitation for moving an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code is 30 days from the date of decree, but where it is found that the summons were not duly served then the period of limitation begins to run from the date of knowledge of the decree.[18]
  8. “Sufficient cause” for the purpose of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code has to be construed as an elastic expression for which no hard and fast rule can be laid down. In the case of P. Srivastava v. Raizada[19], it was held that, the relevant date for deciding “sufficient cause” for non-appearance by the defendant is the date on which the ex parte decree was passed, and, the previous negligence or past defaults of the defendant which have already been condoned are not to be looked into. In sum and substance the test that is to be applied is whether the party honestly intended to remain present at the hearing of the suit and did his best to do so; sufficient cause must be other than lack of knowledge of the proceedings. In the case of Parimal v. Veena[20], the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, held that, the term ‘sufficient cause’ used in Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code means that the defaulting party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been ‘remaining inactive’ or ‘not acting diligently’.
  9. It is a settled law that for allowing/disallowing an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code, the merits of the case are not to be looked into. In the case of, Kewal Ram Ram Lubhai[21], it was held that the court is obliged to set aside an ex parte decree only against those defendants who have preferred an application under Order IX, Rule 13, that is to say, if in a suit by X against P, Q and R, an ex parte decree was passed against the defendants, and thereafter an application was preferred for setting aside the ex parte decree by P and Q, but not R, on the ground that the summons were not served on them, then, the ex parte decree can be set aside apropos P and Q, but not R. Further, it is important to note that, the first proviso to Rule 13 of Order IX categorically states that, if the nature of decree is such that it cannot be set aside against one such defendant preferring application under Rule 13 of Order IX alone, then, the ex parte decree must be set aside against all other defendants also. For example: R sues X and Y on a promissory note, and an ex parte decree is passed against both the defendants. Thereafter, X alone applies to set aside the decree and shows sufficient cause for his absence, then, decree must be set aside against Y also, in as much as the liability of both is based on a common ground.
  10. Explanation to Rule 13 of Order IX of the Code makes it abundantly clear that, where an appeal has been preferred against an ex parte decree, for setting aside the decree ex parte, and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the withdrawal of the said appeal, then, no application can be preferred to set aside the ex parte decree under Rule 13 of Order IX of the Code. Apart from this, following points of consideration must be borne in mind:
    1. An appeal lies against an order rejecting the application preferred to set aside the ex parte decree under Order XLIII, Rule 1(d) of the Code.
    2. No appeal, but only revision under Section 115 of the Code, lies against an order setting aside an ex parte
    3. The inherent powers of the court as provided for under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised for setting aside an ex parte decree, when the defendant fails to establish existence of ‘sufficient cause’ apropos his non-appearance.
  11. Provisions apropos Rule 13 of Order IX of the Code are not applicable to ‘summary suits’ filed under Order XXXVII of the Code.[22] Although Rule 7 of Order XXXVII of the Code states that except as provided the procedure in suits under Order XXXVII of the Code shall be the same as the procedure applicable to suits instituted in the ordinary manner, but, Rule 4 of Order XXXVII of the Code specifically provides for the setting aside of a decree passed ex parte under Order XXXVII of the Code. Unlike Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code, Order XXXVII, Rule 4, of the Code speaks of ‘special reasons’ and not ‘sufficient reasons’ to set aside a decree passed ex parte. The expression ‘special circumstances’ has not been defined in the Code, nor it is capable of any precise definition by the court, owing to the vast expanse of human problems that might have prevented the defendant from appearing before the court to answer the claim of the plaintiff.
  12. An ex parte decree is a decree within the purport of Section 2(2) of the Code. An appeal against an ex parte decree can be preferred under Section 96(2) of the Code. A revision can also be preferred under Section 115 of the Code against an ex parte
  13. When an ex parte decree is passed by the court against the defendant apart from taking recourse of filing a review petition, or, a suit for setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground of fraud played by the plaintiff on the court; the defendant has further, two clear options available with him, namely, first, to file an appeal under Section 96(2) of the Code against the decree passed ex parte; and second, to file an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code. The aggrieved defendant can move ahead simultaneously with both the options, but in case the appeal preferred fails, then, owing to the explanation appended to Rule 13 of Order IX of the Code which is to be construed strictly, the application preferred under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code is not maintainable, however, converse of this proposition is not true, that is to say that, in case the application preferred under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code fails then an appeal filed under Section 96(2) of the Code is not maintainable. Moreover, an appeal can be preferred against the dismissal of the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code under Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the Code.[23]
  14. Order XVII of the Code deals with ‘Adjournments’ and Rule 2 of Order XVII of the Code categorically states that, where on the day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned, the parties to the suit or else any of them fails to appear before the court then, the court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes specified by Order IX of the Code in that behalf, or, the court shall make such other order as it deems fit.  

CONCLUSION:

  1. Where a suit is dismissed under Order IX, Rule 2, or, under Order IX, Rule 3 of the Code, the plaintiff can bring a fresh suit or else can apply for the setting aside of such an order of dismissal of suit under Order IX, Rule 4 of the Code.
  2. To challenge the order of dismissal of suit under Order IX, Rule 5 of the Code, a revision under Section 115 of the Code can be preferred.[24]
  3. When an application is preferred for setting aside an ex parte decree on the ground of non-service of summons, then, it is obligatory upon the party preferring the application for setting aside the ex parte decree to disclose the source of knowledge about the passing of the ex parte[25]
  4. Order IX, Rule 7 and Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code operate on varied grounds. Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code on one hand provides for a mechanism to seek the cancellation of an ex parte decree finally disposing of the suit, whereas, Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code on the other hand provides for a mechanism to seek the cancellation of an ex parte
  5. The period of limitation for moving an application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code is 3 years; this period of limitation is provided for in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. This limitation period of 3 years begins to run from the date on which the ex parte order is passed.
  6. Where the suit has been dismissed under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code, the plaintiff cannot move in appeal, rather the plaintiff can seek the setting aside of the order passed under Order IX, Rule 8 of the Code by moving an application before the same court dismissing the suit under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code.
  7. In the case of, Onkar Singh Angrez Singh[26], it was categorically held that, non-appearance of counsel on account of strike call is not a sufficient cause for restoration of suit dismissed in default within the purport of Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code.
  8. An order passed dismissing an application preferred under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code is appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1(c) of the Code.
  9. An application under Order IX, Rule 13, of the Code for setting aside an ex parte decree is to be preferred within 30 days from the date of the decree passed ex parte.
  10. An order passed dismissing an application preferred under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code is appealable under Order XLIII, Rule 1(d) of the Code.
  11. Where an ex parte decree is passed, that is, decree is passed in absence of the defendant, then, the defendant has the following remedies available to him: (a) To apply to the court which has passed the ex parte decree to set it aside under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code; (b) To prefer an appeal against the ex parte decree under Section 96 (2) of the Code; and (c) To prefer review of the ex parte decree under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code.
  12. The first proviso to Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code deals with the scenario where a decree is of such a nature that it has to be set aside against all the defendants despite the fact that only one applicant applies. These situations are: (i) where the decree is one and is indivisible; and, (ii) where the suit could result into inconsistent decree if the decree is not set aside against the other defendants also. An example to illustrate situation (ii) is this: P alleges that, Q and R are in joint possession of an immovable property and sues Q and R seeking a relief of declaration, stating that, P is in joint possession with Q and R. Q is served with a copy of summons but R remains un-served. Both, Q and R do not appear on the date of hearing and an ex parte decree is passed against both, Q and R. R applies for setting aside of the ex parte decree against him and the decree is accordingly set aside. Thereafter, R is able to establish that, P has no title to the property and thus, is not entitled to the relief of declaration sought by him. In such a scenario, there are bound to be two (2) conflicting/incoherent decrees wherein, in one, P has a decree against Q declaring that, P is in joint possession with Q and R, and the other, wherein R is able to establish that, P has no title and that P is not in joint possession with Q and R. In such a scenario, the ex parte decree obtained by P must be set aside against Q also.
  13. No application for setting aside an ex parte decree can be heard and decided without notice being issued to the opposite party. Thus, the purport of Rule 14 of Order IX of the Code is that, an application for setting aside an ex parte decree cannot be heard and decided ex parte.

 

[1] See: Aakarsh Kamra, Code of Civil Procedure, Chapter 6: Appearance of Parties and Consequence of Non-Appearance, Lexis Nexis, First Edition (2015), p.125

[2] See: Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963

[3] See: Jawar Prasad Shaw v. Jhaina Ghosh, AIR 2005 NOC 303 (Cal)

[4] See: Reena Sadh v. Anjana Enterprises, AIR 2008 SC 2054

[5] See: Order IX, Rule 5(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

[6] The test that is to be applied to consider whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit is the same or not, as the cause of action in the previous suit, is this: “Are the causes of action in the two suits in substance and not technically identical?” The term ‘cause of action’ is to be construed with reference to the substance of the action and not the form of the action. See: Mohammed Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Khan, AIR 1949 PC 78; and Suraj Rattan Thirani v. Azamabad Tea Co. Ltd., AIR 1965 SC 295

[7] See: Article 122 of the Limitation Act, 1963

[8] See: K.P. Jaya Kumar v. K. Ravindran, AIR 2004 Ker 209 (DB)

[9] See: Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, The Key to Indian Practice, Chapter 8: Hearing and Disposal, Lexis Nexis, Eleventh Edition (2016), p.141

[10] See: Surya Narayana Raju v. Appanna, AIR 1969 AP 645

[11] See: V.K. Industries v. M.P. Electricity Board, AIR 2002 SC 1151

[12] (2009) 2 SCC 205

[13] (2005) 6 SCC 344

[14] See: Arjun Singh v. Mohindra, AIR 1964 SC 993; East India Cotton Mfg. Co. v. S.P. Gupta, 28 (1985) DLT 22

[15] AIR 1964 SC 993

[16] AIR 1936 Ran 335

[17] AIR 2007 SC 1481

[18] See: Kailash Chand v. Smt. Hemlata, 1998 (2) CCC 304 (Raj.)

[19] AIR 2000 SC 1221

[20] (2011) 3 SCC 545

[21] AIR 1987 SC 1304

[22] See: Rajni Kumar v. Suresh Kumar Malhotra, 2003 (3) SCALE 434

[23] See: Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar, AIR 2005 SC 626

[24] See: Bank of Baroda v. Menubhai Jivanji Patel, AIR 2006 Guj 37

[25] See: Firoz Khan v. Bibi Hasina Khanam, AIR 1994 Pat 103

[26] AIR 1993 P&H 134

Does appointment of Yogi Aditynath as CM of UP offend Constitution?

Yogi Adityanath

The pseudo-secularists are shouting from the rooftops that the secular character of the Constitution has been murdered. Why? A Hindu hardliner Yogi Adityanath has been appointed as the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. It is really astonishing that they do not understand even the basic provisions of the Constitution. Or, may be, they are liars and mislead the public about the provisions of the Constitution even though they may be understanding the same.

Article 370 of the Constitution of India, 1950 & the Security Interest Act, 2002

Justice

Constitutional Set-up: The Constitution of India, 1950, like the most post-war constitutions, was based on the Westminster Model i.e. bicameral legislative bodies at the Centre and unicameral/bicameral legislatures in the states. The Constitution of India is federal in character and it recognises the existence of a legal system founded upon the rule of law and on the principle of legality, eschewing arbitrariness and ensuring equality before law and equal protection of laws within the territory of India. The federal structure of the Indian Constitution is largely reflected in Part XI of the Constitution of India, 1950, which is largely drawn from the Government of India Act, 1935.  Every state in India has a High Court (some smaller states share a common High Court) and the subordinate-judiciary in each state is under the administrative and judicial control of the concerned High Court of the particular state.[1] The law declared by the Apex Court i.e. the Supreme Court of India, is binding on all courts in the country.

Article 370 of the Constitution of India, 1950: Article 1 of the Constitution of India, 1950, states that, India is a Union of States. According to Section 3 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1956, the State of Jammu & Kashmir (hereinafter referred to as the “State of J&K”) is an integral part of the Union of India. Section 147 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1956, categorically states that, no Bill or amendment seeking to make any change in the provisions of Section 3 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1956, shall be introduced or moved in either House of Legislature of the State of J&K. Due to some historical reasons, the State of J&K has been accorded a special treatment within the framework of the Constitution of India. Amendments that are made to the Constitution of India, 1950 are made to apply to the State of J&K only if the President, with the concurrence of the State Government applies such amendments to the State of J&K. So far as distribution of powers between the Union of India and the State of J&K is concerned, it is to be noted that, regards being had to the matters of national importance in which a uniform policy is desirable, the same is retained with the Union of India, and the matters of local concern remain with the State of J&K. The State of J&K has no vestige of sovereignty outside the Constitution of India, 1950 and the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1956 is subordinate to the Constitution of India, 1950. The Preamble of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1956 is bereft of the words, ‘Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic’, as they appear in the Preamble of the Constitution of India, 1950.

Under the British regime, the State of J&K was an Indian-State ruled by a hereditary- Maharaja. On 26.10.1947, when the State of J&K was attacked by the Azad Kashmir Forces with the support of Pakistan, then, the then Maharaja (Sir Hari Singh) was obliged to seek the help of India after executing the “Instrument of Accession” similar to the one which was executed by the Rulers of other Indian-States. By virtue of the Instrument of Accession dated 26.10.1947, the Dominion of India acquired jurisdiction over the State of J&K with respect to the following subjects: Defence, External Affairs and Communications; and like other Indian-States which survived as political units at the time of the framing of the Constitution of India, the State of J&K was included as a “Part-B” State in the First Schedule to the Constitution of India, as promulgated in 1950.[2] Though the State of J&K was included as a “Part-B” State, all the provisions of the Constitution of India applicable to “Part-B” States were not extended to the State of J&K. This peculiar position was due to the fact that having regard to the circumstances in which the State of J&K acceded to India, the Government of India declared that it were the people of the State of J&K, acting through their Constituent Assembly, who were to determine the Constitution of the State of J&K and the jurisdiction that the Union of India would exercise over the State of J&K. Thus, the applicability of the provisions of the Constitution of India, 1950 to the State of J&K were to be in the nature of an interim arrangement, and this in fact is the sum and substance of the provision embodied in Article 370 of the Constitution of India, 1950.[3]  

The SARFAESI Act, 2002: The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the “SARFAESI Act”) empowers the banks to enforce their security interest outside the court’s process by moving under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act to take possession of secured assets of the borrower and sell them outside the court process. The Preamble of the SARFAESI Act states that, it is an Act to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 1(2) of the SARFAESI Act, categorically states that, it shall extend to the whole of India. The key provisions of the SARFAESI Act are Section 13(2), Section 13(4) and Section 17.

Under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment of a secured debt (or any instalment thereof), and his account in respect of such debt is classified as a non-performing asset by the secured creditor, then, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within 60 days from the date of such notice, failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights as provided for to the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.

Under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, in case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, then, the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt: (1) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset; (2) take over the management of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale and realise the secured asset; (3) appoint any person to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; and (4) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt. The secured creditor can proceed against the guarantor also without recourse to any of the said measures, and he is entitled to sell the assets pledged with him without first taking any of the actions mentioned in (1) to (4) above.

Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act confers a right of appeal to any person, including the borrower, if that person is aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act taken by the secured creditor. Any person aggrieved by any order made by the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act may also prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.[4] The expression “any person” used in Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is of wide import and takes within its sweep not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.[5] It is necessary to note that insofar as the State of J&K is concerned, Section 17-A and Section 18-B of the SARFAESI Act are applicable; in these sections the words ‘Debt Recovery Tribunal’ and ‘Appellate Tribunal’ as appearing in Section 17 and Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, are substituted for the words ‘District Judge’ and ‘High Court’.   

State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta & Anr[6]: Following set of questions arose for adjudication before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the present case:

  1. Whether the SARFAESI Act falls in Entry 45 and Entry 95 of List I of the Seventh Schedule or in Entry 6 and Entry 11-A of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950?
  2. Whether a Parliamentary Legislation would require concurrence of the State Government before it can apply to the State of J&K under Article 370 of the Constitution of India, 1950?
  3. Whether the SARFAESI Act in its application to the State of J&K would be held to be within the legislative competence of the Parliament as the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, namely, Sections 13, 17-A and 18-B collide with Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act of Jammu & Kashmir, 1920?

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held as follows:

  1. Article 246(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950 read with Entry 45 and Entry 95 of List I of the Seventh Schedule clothe the Parliament with the power to enact the SARFAESI Act.[7] Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule has no other competing Entry, and so far as List II of the Seventh Schedule is concerned, the same does not extend to the State of J&K, moreover, Entry 11-A (dealing with ‘Administration of Justice’) in List III of the Seventh Schedule does not apply to the State of J&K for the Forty Second Amendment Act, 1976 by virtue of which Entry 11-A come into existence does not extend to the State of J&K, also, Entry 6 of List III of the Seventh Schedule dealing with the transfer of property does not apply to the State of J&K. The SARFAESI Act in pith and substance is identifiable with Entry 45 read with Entry 95 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950.
  2. In the case of, Union of India Delhi High Court Bar Association, (2002) 4 SCC 275, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India categorically held that, Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule relates to “banking” and banking operations inter alia include the following: accepting of loans and deposits; granting of loans; and recovery of the debts due to the banks. Further, in the case of, Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala, (2009) 4 SCC 94, the Apex Court held that, “…undisputedly, the DRT Act and the Securitisation Act have been enacted by Parliament under Entry 45 in List I in the 7th Schedule…”. Recently, in the case of, UCO Bank & Anr. v. Dipak Debbarma & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 11247 of 2016 & Civil Appeal No. 11250 of 2016 (Date of Decision: 25.11.2016), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, the SARFAESI Act is relatable to the Entry of “banking” which is included in List I of the Seventh Schedule; sale of mortgaged property by a bank is an inseparable and integral part of the business of banking.
  3. Amendments that are made to the Constitution of India, 1950 are made to apply to the State of J&K only if the President, with the concurrence of the State Government, applies such amendments to the State of J&K. Moreover, Sub-clause (3) of Article 370 of the Constitution of India, 1950 makes it clear that Article 370 of the Constitution of India, 1950 shall cease to be operative only from such date as the President of India may by public notification declare, and this cannot be done under the Proviso to Article 370(3) unless there is a recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of J&K so to do.
  4. According to Article 370(1) (b) (i) of the Constitution of India, 1950 the power of Parliament to make laws for the State of J&K shall be limited to the matters enumerated in the Union List (List I) and the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India,1950, which in consultation with the State of J&K are declared by the President of India to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession dated 26.10.1947. For matters contained in the Constitution of India, 1950 in the Union List (List I) and the Concurrent List (List III) but not in the Instrument of Accession, the concurrence and not consultation of the State of J&K is required. Regards being had to the import of Article 370(2), the concurrence given by the Government of the State of J&K before the Constituent Assembly is convened, can only be given effect to, if it is ratified by the Constituent Assembly of the State of J&K.
  5. It is important to note that the Instrument of Accession dated 26.10.1947 was superseded by the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1950, and this in turn was superseded by the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 (as amended from time to time). A combined and harmonious reading of Article 370 of the Constitution of India, 1950; the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 (as amended from time to time); and the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1956 will help us reach the following set conclusions:
    1. All entries specified in the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 (as amended from time to time) as contained in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950, clothe the Parliament with an exclusive jurisdiction to make laws in relation to the subject matters set out in those entries. Following Entries as they appear in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950 do not apply to the State of J&K: Entries 8, 9, 34 and 79; all other Entries in List I apply to the State of J&K with the necessary modifications and/or substitutions.
    2. The State List (List II) continues to be omitted altogether so far as its application to the State of J&K is concerned. Parliament has the concurrent power with respect to the State of J&K as regards the Entries specified in the Presidential Order of 1954 under List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950 is concerned.
    3. Every other subject matter which is not expressly referred to, either in List I (Union List) or List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950, is within the legislative competence of the State Legislature of the State of J&K.        
  6. To refer to Entry 11-A and Entry 6 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950 and to further state that Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act of Jammu and Kashmir, 1920, would render the key provisions (Sections 13(1), 13(4) & 17) of the SARFAESI Act as nugatory is wholly incorrect. Entry 6 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950 which deals with the transfer of property does not apply to the State of J&K as it has not been extended to the State of J&K.
  7. The SARFAESI Act in pith and substance relates to “banking” and not to “transfer of property”. Entry 45 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950 is applicable to the State of J&K. There is no direct conflict as regards Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act of Jammu & Kashmir, 1920 and Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act. Holistic reading of the Proviso added to Rule 8(5) of SARFAESI Rules, 2002, read with Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act will leave no room to doubt the applicability of the SARFAESI Act to the State of J&K. Proviso to Rule 8(5) of SARFAESI Rules, 2002 states as follows:

“Provided that in case of sale of immovable property in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the provisions of Jammu and Kashmir Transfer of Property Act, 1977 shall apply to the person who acquires such property in the State.”[8]

Thus, Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act of Jammu & Kashmir, 1920 would not stand infracted by application of the SARFAESI Act to the State of J&K. 

  1. Entry 95 in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950, empowers the Parliament to enact provisions in the nature of Section 17-A and Section 18-B of the SARFAESI Act, thus, thereby vesting the powers ordinarily to be exercised by in the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act with the District Court and the High Court respectively.      

Excursus: Entries 45 and 95 of the Union List clothe the Parliament with the exclusive power to make laws with respect to banking, and the SARFAESI can be said to be ascribable to Entries 45 and 95 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950. Section 5 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1956 categorically states that, the executive and legislative power of the State of J&K shall extend to all matters except those with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for the State of J&K under the provisions of the Constitution of India, 1950. Thus, anything that comes in the way of the SARFAESI Act by way of the State of J&K enactment, must necessarily give way to the SARFAESI Act by virtue of Article 246 of the Constitution of India, 1950 as extended to the State of J&K, read with the Section 5 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1956. Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act of Jammu & Kashmir, 1920, no doubt gives certain special privileges to the Permanent Residents of the State of J&K as regards matters concerning transfer of property, but, by virtue of Article 246 of the Constitution of India, 1950 read with Section 5 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1956, in case of any conflict between the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act of Jammu & Kashmir, 1920, the provisions of the SARFAESI Act are to prevail. Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act also declares that, the provisions of the SARFAESI Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.

Lastly, the entire gamut controversy can be diluted by taking into consideration the following points of relevance:

  1. The SARFAESI Act is relatable to Entry 45 read with Entry 95 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950;
  2. Provisions of the SARFAESI Act are not in conflict with Section 140 of the Transfer of Property Act of Jammu & Kashmir, 1920, necessary emphasis must be supplied to the proviso annexed to Rule 8(5) of the SARFAESI Rules, 2002;
  3. List II (State List) is frozen, so far as its application to the State of J&K is concerned;
  4. Entry 11-A in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950 is not applicable to the State of J&K in light of the fact that the Forty Second Amendment Act does not extend to the State of J&K;
  5. Entry 6 in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950 which deals with transfer of property has not been extended to the State of J&K;
  6. The Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, 1956 is subordinate to the Constitution of India, 1950. The State of J&K has no vestige of sovereignty outside the Constitution of India, 1950.

 

[1] See: Fali S. Nariman, India’s Legal System: Can it be saved? , Penguin Books India (2006), p.41-42

[2] In the original Constitution of India, the State of Jammu & Kashmir was specified as a “Part-B” State. After independence, all the ‘Princely States’ that had acceded to the Indian Dominion were labelled as “Part B” States in the Constitution of India, 1950. While all the ‘Princely States’ accepted the Constitution of India, 1950, the State of J&K reserved the right to frame its own constitution.

[3] See: Dr. Durga Das Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, Lexis Nexis (20th Edition), 2011, p.263-266

[4] See: Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 9771 of 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 18 of 2011), Supreme Court of India, Date of Decision: 30.10.2013, Coram: K.S. Radhakrishnan & A.K. Sikri, JJ.

[5] See: United Bank of India v. Satyavati Tondon & Ors, (2010) 8 SCC 110

[6] Civil Appeal Nos. 12237-12238 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 30884-30885 of 2015), Supreme Court of India, Date of Decision: 16.12.2016

[7] Entries 45 and 95 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, 1950 state as follows:

45. Banking;

  1. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List; admiralty jurisdiction”

[8] Inserted vide S.O. 1578 (E), Dated: 12.07.2012, with effect from 12.07.2012

The Right to Information Act, 2005 and the Doctrine of Res Judicata

Right to Information (RTI)

The Right to Information Act, 2005 is a beneficial piece of legislation which statutorily recognises the fact that the ‘right to information’ is an integral part of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution of India, 1950 to the citizens of the country.[1] The purpose of the Right to Information Act, 2005 is to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority and to contain corruption.[2]

It is necessary to appreciate that, although, every right is in the nature of a legally protected interest[3], but, there has to be a balance and proportionality between rights and restrictions on one hand, and rights and duties, on the other. It will create an imbalance, if undue or disproportionate emphasis is placed upon the rights of the citizens without considering the significance of the correlative duties. The true source of right is duty.[4] The duty, that, the Right to Information Act, 2005 entails upon the citizens of the country is to not to convert the Right to Information Act, 2005 into a litigation tool. 

In the case of, Pradeep S. Ahluwalia v. Delhi Tourism & Transportation Development Corporation[5], the Central Information Commission (New Delhi) took occasion to observe that, there is a practice adopted by some RTI applicants, whereby they file photocopies of RTI requests with the same public authorities time and again seeking information, irrespective of the fact that the previous application reached the second appellate level and the information was furnished or was refused regards being had to the wisdom of the authorities. Failing to appreciate that when the matter was not taken to the High Court for judicial review, the matter assumed finality and cannot thereafter be re-agitated with the Public Information Officer, the cantankerous RTI applicants keep filing repeatedly the RTI applications trying to take the public authorities for a ride. The Learned Commission further observed that, although the Right to Information Act, 2005 does not contain any specific provision that bars the re-asking of information from the concerned public authority, but, public policy demands that principle akin to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 be read into the Right to Information Act, 2005, to make the overall scheme of the 2005 Act more effective and superfluous.

The opinion expressed by the Learned Commission has force and the same can be elucidated by taking into account the following stream of reasons:

  1. If the Public Information Officers, First Appellate Authorities and the Commissions allow repeated RTI applications, then, there will be no end to the ‘information litigation’ and the public authorities will be at the receiving end for no fault of theirs.
  2. Public policy demands that: ‘it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation’ and ‘no man should be taxed twice over for the same cause’.
  3. It is implicit from the scheme and the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005 that every citizen has a right to obtain information from a concerned public authority, but, only once and not interminably.
  4. Repeated filing of RTI applications, by chronic information-seekers, has the effect of clogging the public offices by obstructing the free flow of information to the deserving and genuine RTI applicants, besides preventing the officers of the concerned public authority from performing the duties attached to their office.
  5. The decision of the Learned Commission is in line with the following dictum of the Supreme Court of India: Bombay Gas Co. Jagannath Pandurang[6]. In this case, the Apex Court, speaking through, A. Alagiriswami, J., held that, the doctrine of res judicata is a wholesome one which is applicable not merely to matters governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 but to all litigations.
  6. Previously also, the Learned Commission in the matter of, Prem Prakash Kumar NFL, Panipat[7], took occasion to observe that, sometimes the nature of queries and information sought by the applicants are such that it is evident on the face of the record that, the applicant will never be satisfied with the information received, because the endeavour is to promote self-interest rather than public interest, and to fight with the public authority tooth and nail without just cause. More often than not, such information-seekers are usually the disgruntled expelled employees of the public authorities. Further, in the case of, Shri Gopal Soni v. The New India Assurance Company Ltd.[8], the Commission was compelled to observe that, when sometimes employees of a public authority get suspended for insubordination and misconduct, then, as a matter of revenge these employees fire a spate of RTI applications, asking for voluminous records which is to be gathered, collected and collated from different wings of the concerned public authority, resulting in diversion of resources of the public authority and imposing on the public authority a heavy cost. The Commission observed that in cases of vague RTI applications, it is incumbent upon the public authority to invoke Section 7(9) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, which states that, ‘an information shall ordinarily be provided in the form in which it is sought unless it would disproportionately divert the resources of the public authority or would be detrimental to the safety or preservation of the record in question’.  

The Learned Commission in Pradeep S. Ahluwalia (Supra) went a step further to state that, the doctrine of constructive res judicata is applicable to the Right to Information Act, 2005 with full force and vehemence; meaning thereby, that when an applicant wants to avail an opportunity of obtaining information on a particular subject, he is expected to seek all the related information from the concerned public authority in that given opportunity itself, and he cannot file another RTI application for a bit/piece of information which he forgot to ask. The gravamen is this: ‘an individual should ask all possible aspects of information about a subject-matter, once and for all’.

Observations made by the Learned Commission apropos the applicability of the doctrine of constructive res judicata to the Right to Information Act, 2005 seems to be well-founded, regards may be had to the fact that, on many occasions applicants seek information from one-wing of the public authority and based on the information received, they file a slew of RTI applications against the other wing of the public authority, as if the RTI applicant is legally entitled to cross-examine the public authority under the aegis of the Act. In other cases, a series of RTI applications are filed against one wing of the public authority and on receipt of the information asked for, another set of RTI applications are filed against the other wing of the public authority to confirm the information previously received, by slightly altering/modifying the previously asked questions. Such practices are derogatory of the spirit and the legislative intent of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

However, the moot question is this: Can the reading of the Doctrine of Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata into the Right to Information Act, 2005 stop the cantankerous information-seekers from achieving their bleak ends?

The answer will be in the ‘negative’, for a simple reason that, the Right to Information Act, 2005 enables every citizen to seek information (which is not otherwise exempt) from a public authority and the reason for seeking the information has no bearing; all that is required is that, the information seeker must be an Indian citizen, and the information sought is not exempt from disclosure under the Act. Thus, any chronic information-seeker to harass any public authority can ask the same set of questions with/without modification again and again, repetitively, if not by self then through his colleagues, friends or relatives who are ready and willing to aid/complement him in his dreary objectives. By doing this, the chronic information-seeker will achieve his objective of harassing the public authority on one hand and on the other hand, he will be triumphal in circumventing the clutches of the Doctrine of Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata. Requirement of locus standi is exempt as regards the Right to Information Act, 2005.[9]

Possible solution: The Central/State Public Information Officer of any concerned public authority on perceiving that a particular information-seeker is acting cantankerously, he can direct the public authority to once and for all, publish all the queries asked for by the applicant on the official website of the concerned public authority, for, it is settled that the information which is in public domain cannot be asked for vide the RTI route, and for all future queries albeit the same or slightly modified/altered information reference can be made by the Central/State Public Information Officer to the specific link available on the official website of the concerned public authority. In the case of Sh. K. Lall v. Sh. M.K. Bagri, Assistant Registrar of Companies & CPIO[10], the Learned Commission observed that, once certain information is placed in public domain and is accessible to the citizens either freely or against payment of a pre-determined price, then that information cannot be said to be ‘held’ or ‘under the control’ of the public authority and would thus, cease to be an ‘information’ accessible under the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Excursus: It is a known fact that the Right to Information Act, 2005 is sans any provision which, specifically or otherwise, provides for penalising an information-seeker, who abuses the right to information by clogging the public office with repetitive queries of same or slightly modified footing. A well perceived legislative action on this score can prove to be of great value. It cannot be forgotten, that, the public authorities and so also the Hon’ble Commissions adjudicating the matters in the realm of the 2005 Act function on the money of the State exchequer i.e. taxpayers’ money, thus, right to information must be exercised to contain corruption and to promote transparency and accountability and should not be used as a litigation tool. Informed citizenry is an acid test of any democracy, but when the citizens of a democratic polity think only of the rights conferred onto them, blindfolded to the ensuing correlative duties, then, the system is bound to crumble under the burden of its own insensitivity.

 

 

[1] See: Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal, (2011) 1 SCC 496

[2] See: C.B.S.E. v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497 (Para 59)

[3] See: Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95 (Para 22)

[4] See: Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re, (2012) 5 SCC 1 (Para 39)

[5] CIC/AD/A/2013/001046-SA, Date of Decision: 20.06.2014

[6] (1975) 4 SCC 690 (Para 11)

[7] Decision No. 246/IC/(A)/2006; F.No. CIC/MA/A/2006/00374 & 375; Date of Decision: 28.08.2006

[8] F. No. CIC/AT/A2008/00097, 000116, 000124; Date of Decision: 12.06.2008

[9] Section 6 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, deals with the ‘Request for obtaining information’. Section 6(2) categorically states as follows: ‘An applicant making request for information shall not be required to give any reason for requesting the information or any other personal details except those that may be necessary for contacting him’.

[10] F. No. CIC/AT/A/2007/00112