Services of probationer can be terminated by a non-stigmatic order without giving hearing

Delhi High Court

It is settled law that it is the employer who decides whether or not probationary services of an employee are or are not satisfactory. This Court cannot substitute its decision with that of the competent authority which decides that the services of a probationer are or are not satisfactory for the employer. Moreover, the services of a probationer can be terminated by a non-stigmatic order without giving the opportunity of hearing. These legal principles were reiterated by Delhi high court, while hearing the petition of a teacher who had been terminated while being on probation. The order was passed by Justice Valmiki J. Mehta of Delhi high court in the case of Gurvinder Singh Saini v. Director Of Education And Ors. [W.P.(C) No.9060/2016, decided on 25 November, 2016]. Full order of the court is reproduced below.

SC AOR Examination – Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111

Supreme Court

This article contains a brief note for the leading case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111, which is a part of the paper “Leading Cases” for the Supreme Court Advocate on Record Examination.

In rare cases defence material can be considered by court while framing charges or taking cognizance

Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar, (2008) 14 SCC 1, the Madhya Pradesh high court has reiterated that while it is true that ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the court while framing of the charge in view of State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415, there may be some very rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when shown to the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecution version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into by the court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cognizance. These observations of the M.P. high court (Gwalior bench) were made in the case of Kunaldev Singh Rathor and others Versus State of MP and another [Misc. Criminal Case No 2360/2014; decided on 2 December 2016] by a single-judge bench comprising Justice S.K. Awasthi. Full judgment of the court is reproduced below.

Principles of natural justice implicit in quasi-judicial as well as administrative action, says MP HC

Madhya Pradesh high court, Jabalpur

Principles of natural justice are implicit in quasi-judicial as well as administrative action. It is settled in law that principles of natural justice do not supplant the law but supplement the law. Their application may be excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. It is not permissible to interpret any statutory instrument so as to exclude natural justice, unless the language of the instrument leaves no option to the Court. Natural justice is so integral to the good government that the onus is on him who urges exclusion to make out why. These legal principles were reiterated by a single-judge bench of Madhya Pradesh high court at Jabalpur, comprising Justice Sujoy Paul, in the case of Dr. K.S. Dubey Vs. State of M.P. & others [Writ Petition No.600/2016; decided on 25 November, 2016]. Full order of the court is reproduced below.

Place where order communicated has territorial jurisdiction, and not where order merely issued, says Delhi high court

Delhi High Court

A mere existence of an order in the Government file (i.e., where the order is issued) does not result in a binding order for creating legal rights, and therefore, when legal rights are created only on communication and a legal cause of action is complete only on such communication, thus accordingly it is the place where the order of termination of services is communicated that would be the place where the territorial jurisdiction arises. This was held by a single judge bench of Delhi high court, comprising Justice Valimiki J. Mehta, in the case of P.K.S. Shrivastava v. Union Of India And Anr. [W.P.(C) No.10392/2015; decided 1 December 2016]. Full order of the high court is reproduced below.

Additional limitation of 30 days under S. 34(3) of Arbitration Act only if court is satisfied

Delhi High Court

Before the further period of 30 days for limitation under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is triggered, the condition precedent is that the court must be satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the prescribed period of three months. This was held by a division bench of the Delhi high court, comprising of Justice Badar Durrez Ahmed and Justice Ashutosh Kumar, in the case of Steel Authority Of India Limited v. M/s Everest Rolling Industries Private Limited [FAO (OS) 231/2016; decided on 01.12.2016].

Conditional Transfers: Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007

Senior citizens

The rationale of this article is to critically analyse and appreciate the scope of Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘MWPSCA’) and the following two decisions of the High Court of Kerala: Shabeen Martin & Anr. Vs. Muriel & Anr., W.A. No. 1851/2016 (decision dated: 03.10.2016); and Radhamani & Ors. Vs. State of Kerala, W.P. (C) No. 13110/2015 (decision dated: 06.11.2015).

Condition Precedent: Conditional transfers can be of two (2) types: first, where the condition has to be complied with or fulfilled before a transfer could be effected; and second, where condition is to be fulfilled after the transfer is complete. In former cases, the conditions are called conditions precedent. Thus, in cases of conditional transfers with condition precedent, it is only if the condition precedent is fulfilled that the transfer would take place and if the condition imposed is either: opposed to public policy; unlawful; immoral; or impossible to perform; then, the transfers subject to such conditions would become void. For example: If X transfers property to Y subject to the condition that Y must murder Z, then, this condition is void and the transfer would also be void.[1]

Conditional Transfers: Section 25 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘TPA’) deals, in essence, with the concept of ‘conditional transfers’. Section 25 of the TPA broadly states that, an interest created on a transfer of property and dependent upon a condition- ‘fails’- if, the fulfilment of the condition is: (a) impossible; or, (b) forbidden by law; or, (c) of such a nature that, if permitted, it would- (i) defeat the provisions of any law, or; (ii) be fraudulent, or; (iii) involve or imply injury to the person or property of another, or; (iv) result in court regarding such a transfer as immoral or opposed to public policy. Thus, Section 25 of the TPA renders the transfer of an estate as ‘void’ in case of a condition precedent making such transfer as either- impossible; immoral; or opposed to public policy. In nutshell, when condition precedent is void, it makes the transfer also void; however, if the condition is a ‘condition subsequent’, the condition is void but the transfer may continue to be valid, that is, a subsequent void condition cannot affect the validity of the transfer.

Section 26 of the TPA states that, where the transfer of property is subject to a condition precedent, and the condition precedent has been substantially complied with, then and then alone, the transfer of property can take place. It is important to note that, if the condition precedent becomes impossible to perform, a substantial compliance will make the transfer possible. For example: If X transfers Rs. 100 to Y on the condition that X shall marry with the consent of C, D and E; and later on, if E dies and Y marries with the consent of C and D, then, Y is deemed to have fulfilled the condition.

Section 23 of the MWPSCA- Transfer of Property to be void in certain circumstances: Section 23 of the MWPSCA elucidates situations and/or circumstances regard being had to which the transfer of property shall be declared to be ‘void’. Before moving any further, one must appreciate the nature and spirit of the MWPSCA. The object of the MWPSCA is to provide more effective provisions for the maintenance (food, clothing, residence, medical attendance and treatment) and welfare (food, health-care, recreation centres and other amenities) of parents (biological, adoptive or step) and senior citizens (person being a citizen of India of 60 years of age or above) guaranteed and recognised under the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.[2]

Section 23(1) of the MWPSCA states that where after the commencement of the MWPSCA, a senior citizen transfers his property by way of a gift deed or otherwise, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide for the basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor (senior citizen) and such transferee refuses or fails to provide for such amenities and physical needs, then, the transfer of such property by the transferor (senior citizen) shall be deemed to have been made by exercise of fraud, undue influence or coercion upon him.

Section 23(2) of the MWPSCA covers a situation whereby a senior citizen has asserted his right to receive maintenance out of a particular estate, as, when such estate was been transferred by the transferor/senior citizen in favour of the transferee, it was based on the condition precedent that the transferee will provide for the basic amenities and physical needs of the transferor/senior citizen. Mischief under Section 23(2) comes in play when the transferee has notice of such a right of the transferor/senior citizen and/or the transfer was gratuitous.

Section 23(3) of the MWPSCA states that an action can be taken under Sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 23, on behalf of the senior citizen by any organisation referred to in Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the MWPSCA, that is, by any voluntary association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or any other law for time being in force.

The question that arose for consideration in the case of Radhamani (Supra) was this: Whether the Maintenance Tribunal[3] under the MWPSCA has the power to declare the transfer of property as void, if in case there is no specific recital in the transfer deed stating that, in lieu of the transfer of property by the senior citizen to the transferee, the transferee will be obliged to provide the senior citizen with basic amenities and physical needs?

The Single Judge Bench (A. Muhamed Mustaque, J.) of High Court of Kerala held as follows:

  1. The MWPSCA has a pivotal role in Indian societal framework; the MWPSCA comprehends a scheme of welfare provisions for senior citizens; the MWPSCA contemplates right of senior citizens beyond the right of ‘maintenance’, that is, for their ‘welfare’.
  2. Section 23 of the MWPSCA empowers a senior citizen to approach the Maintenance Tribunal to declare a certain specific transfer of property, by way of gift or otherwise, after the commencement of the MWPSCA, as void, if in case the transfer of property was premised on the condition that the transferee shall provide for the basic amenities and physical needs of the transferor; and after the transfer got effected such transferee refused or failed to provide for such basic amenities and physical needs.
  3. It is not necessary that the condition precedent apropos the transfer of the property should be explicit in the transfer deed, for, Section 23 of the MWPSCA states that, the condition precedent as regards the transfer of property can be express or implied; what is necessary is that, there should be a condition precedent, providing that, subsequent to the transfer of property, the transferee will be obliged to provide for the welfare of the transferor/senior citizen.
  4. If the condition providing for the welfare of the senior citizen is not expressly provided for in the gift deed/ settlement deed, then, the Maintenance Tribunal is duty-bound to inspect the entire series of events and the surrounding circumstances to find out whether or not, the overall conduct of the donor/senior citizen dispels the intention of the donor/senior citizen to revoke the transfer.
  5. If any challenge is posed by the transferee stating that the transfer deed is devoid of any recitals making it obligatory for the transferee to provide for the basic physical needs and welfare of the transferor/senior citizen, then the same shall be of no consequence and such an argument will lie in the teeth of Section 23 of the MWPSCA. The MWPSCA empowers the Maintenance Tribunal to declare certain transfers as void which hinge towards the fact that such transfers have been obtained by taking advantage of emotionally dependent senior citizens by their relatives, to grab the property of such senior citizens on the pretext of providing them with emotional support.
  6. Section 122 of the TPA defines gift as a transfer of certain existing moveable/immoveable property made voluntarily and without consideration. Section 126 of the TPA makes a provision to suspend/revoke the gift on happening of any specified event on which donor and donee may have agreed. The word ‘consideration’ as regards Section 122 of TPA refers to ‘monetary consideration’ and does not include natural love and affection. The gift deed premised on a promise that donee will look after the donor suffering from old age and destituteness is a transaction sans any monetary consideration. Thus, the purport of Section 23 of the MWPSCA must prevail to the effect that in case the donee does not provide for the welfare of donor/senior citizen, the gift deed which was executed by the donor/senior citizen in favour of the donee on the condition precedent, that, the donee will look after the donor/senior citizen suffering from old age, will become ‘void’. The condition precedent can be oral or it may find mention in the recitals of the gift deed/settlement deed. Under the Second Proviso to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved; moreover, under the Third Proviso to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of the property may be proved.

Further, in the case of Shabeen Martin & Anr. (Supra) the Division Bench (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, C.J. & Antony Dominic, J.) of High Court of Kerala held that, a bare perusal of Section 23(1) of the MWPSCA would show that it is not the legislative requirement or intent, that, the document evidencing the transfer, either by gift or otherwise, should contain an express condition that the transferee shall provide for the basic amenities and physical needs of the transferor/senior citizen. However, if there are evidences to the satisfaction of the authorities under the MWPSCA that the requirements of Section 23 are satisfied in a case, then, it is always open to the authorities to invoke their power under Section 23 of the MWPSCA and invalidate the transfer, holding the document effecting the transfer as null and void, because, the condition precedent on which the transfer was premised (that is, to provide for the welfare of the transferor/senior citizen) had not been complied with by the transferee.

Comment: The MWPSCA is social-welfare legislation with Section 23 of the MWPSCA as the rein highlight. A gift deed/settlement deed entered into between the transferor/senior citizen and the transferee/relative can be reduced to not worth the paper it is written on, if the transferor/senior citizen is able to prove before the Maintenance Tribunal that the transfer was effected by exercise of fraud, undue influence or coercion upon him by the transferee/relative, as the transfer that effected was premised on the promise that the transferee/relative will provide for the physical needs and basic amenities of the transferor/senior citizen during his old age, which the transferee/relative failed to provide. The condition precedent based on which the transfer was effected may not be in writing, forming part of the recitals of the transfer deed, but the same can be inferred from the overall facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties thereto (that is, transferor/senior citizen and the transferee/relative).

*****

[1] See: Poonam Pradhan Saxena, Property Law, Chapter 2: Of Transfers of Property by Act of Parties, Lexis Nexis (2006), p. 115

[2] Though the parents can claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, but the procedure is both time-consuming as well as expensive. Thus, the MWPSCA was enacted with the intellection of providing simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions for the parents to claim maintenance. It is important to note that, senior citizens/parents can choose to seek maintenance either under the MWPSCA or under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if applicable, but not under the provisions of both the enactments.

[3] According to Section 2(j) of the MWPSCA, ‘Tribunal’ means the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Section 7 of the MWPSCA. According to Section 7 of the MWPSCA, the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette constitute one or more Tribunals for each Sub-Division and the Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer not below the rank of Sub-Divisional Officer of the State and where two or more Tribunals are constituted for any area, the State Government may, by general or special order, regulate the distribution of business among them. Section 15 of the MWPSCA provides for the constitution of Appellate Tribunal by State Government presided over by an officer not below the rank of District Magistrate.

Chief Election Commissioner seeks comprehensive review of the Representation of the People Act

Electronic Voting Machine

The Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) of India, Dr. Nasim Zaidi has strongly emphasised the need for a comprehensive review of the Representation of the People Act in view of issues and challenges thrown up before the Election Commission while implementing the said law. Dr. Zaidi said “it is also being felt that EC should undertake comprehensive review of the RP Act in view of issues and challenges that have been thrown up before EC from time to time and come up with Draft RP Bill which then go through the motion of examination by competent authority in due course to time.”  

Issue whether Civil Procedure Code applicable in Arbitration appeal referred to larger bench by SC [read order]

Arbitration

A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court has referred the issue whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to a larger bench, since this bench felt that an earlier contrary decision of a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court in the case of ITI Ltd. vs. Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd., (2002) 5 SCC 510, seemed to be incorrect. This order of the Supreme Court was passed by a bench of Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Amitava Roy in the case of Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. M/s. Applied Electronics Ltd. [Civil Appeal No(s). 11584 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 2865 OF 2015); decided on 24 November 2016].

Ex-parte interim custody of child can be granted to aggrieved party in Domestic Violence case, says Orissa HC [read order]

Orissa High Court

A conjoint reading of section 21 and section 23(2) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act shows that the Magistrate is empowered to pass an ex parte order in granting interim or temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved party even basing on the affidavit filed by such aggrieved party without notice to the respondent. This was held by a single bench of Justice S. K. Sahoo of Orissa high court in case of Vinay Gupta v. Saveri Nayak [CRLREV No. 635 of 2016; decided on 28 November 2016].

Offer period under SEBI regulations can start from share purchase agreement, says SC

Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)

The Supreme Court has held that the offer period for the purposes of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997, can commence from the date of a concluded agreement i.e. share purchase agreement as in the present case. This order came from a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court, comprising of Justices Ranjan Gogoi and N.V. Ramana, in the case of Securities & Exchange Board of India v. Burren Energy India Ltd. & Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 361 OF 2007, decided on 2 December 2016].

No appeal but only revision against order of a Wakf Tribunal, holds Himachal High Court

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Section 83(9) of the Wakf Act, 1995, provides that no appeal shall lie against any decision or order whether interim or otherwise, passed by the Tribunal established under the Act. However, in terms of proviso to Sub-Section (9) of Section 83 of the Act, any person aggrieved by the orders of the Wakf Tribunal can invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. This was held by the Himachal Pradesh high court recently in the case of Mumtaz Ahmad v. State of H.P., decided on 16 November 2016. The order was passed by a division bench of the high court comprising Chief Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir and Justice Sandeep Sharma.

Limitation for appeal under Family Courts Act is governed by S. 28 of Hindu Marriage Act, says Bombay HC Full Bench

Bombay High Court

For an appeal filed under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, period of limitation prescribed under sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 shall apply. Therefore, the period of limitation for such an appeal would be 90 days (as provided under the Hindu Marriage Act) and NOT 30 days (as provided under the Family Courts Act). This has been held by a full bench of the Bombay high court, comprising Justices Naresh H. Patil, R. D. Dhanuka and Smt. Sadhana S. Jadhav on 1 December 2016. This judgment has been delivered in the case of Shri Shivram Dodanna Shetty v. Sou. Sharmila Shivram Shetty [Family Court Appeal No. 161 of 2013].

Uttarakhand HC direct Govt to setup inter-State Council for cleaning Ganga river [read order]

Ganga river

Uttarakhand high court has directed the Government of India to establish the inter-State Council under Article 263 of the Constitution of India for all the riparian States through which river Ganga flows i.e. Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal, within a period of three months, for making recommendations to the Central Government in order to clean/rejuvenate river Ganga on the analogy of National Water Development Agency as well as Water Resources Development Council. The Central Government, shall consider the recommendations made by such Council within a period of three months and take necessary measures to restore river Ganga to its pristine glory. These and many other directions were issued by a division bench of Uttarakhand high court, comprising Justices Rajiv Sharma and Alok Sing, on 2 December 2016 in a public interest litigation case [Lalit Miglani v. State of Uttarakhand & others, Writ Petition (PIL) No.140 of 2015].

Delhi HC refuses to interfere with cash withdrawal restrictions post demonetization [read order]

Demonetised currency notes of Rs. 1000 and Rs. 500

After the demonetisation of currency notes of ₹ 1000 and 500, the restriction imposed is only with regard to cash withdrawal from a bank account over the counter, but there are no restrictions or limits for operating the bank account by non-cash method, such as cheques, demand drafts, credit or debit cards, mobile wallets and electronic fund transfer mechanisms or the like. Further, the decision to withdraw the bank notes of specified amount w.e.f. 09.11.2016 is to be implemented is a policy decision which is beyond the scope of powers of judicial review. This was held by a division bench of Delhi high court, comprising Chief Justice G. Rohini and Justice V. Kameswar Rao, on 2 December 2016, in the case of Ashok Sharma v. Union of India & Anr. [W.P.(C) 11130/2016].

What is the last date by which GST has to be compulsorily rolled out and can it be extended?

Goods and Services Tax (GST)

The Government of India has contemplated to roll out the Goods and Services Tax (GST) with effect from 1 April 2017. Full efforts are being made in this direction. The rate structure for GST has already been decided by the GST Council. Draft Model GST Law, IGST Law and GST Compensation Law have already been put in public domain, which have to be passed by the Parliament. At the time of this writing (3 November 2016) the GST Council is meeting in New Delhi to deliberate and try to resolve the contentious point of dual control of assessees under this new indirect tax regime. However, there are reports in media that after the demonetization of ₹ 1000 and 500 currency notes, many opposition parties are not in a mood to cooperate with the Central Government on GST and its roll out may not now be possible from 1 April 2017. The question is how long can the roll out of GST be delayed and whether there is an outside limit under law beyond which the GST roll out cannot be delayed? Also, whether such last date can be extended further? Let us examine these issues in this article.

Pending anticipatory bail application, accused evading arrest cannot be said to be absconding, says Bombay HC

Bombay High Court

Where it was contended by accused persons that during the pendency of their applications seeking pre-arrest bail, investigating agency has issued proclamation against them under section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it was held by the Bombay High Court that when the anticipatory bail applications under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, are pending before any court of law, it cannot be said that the accused are absconding. It only means that the accused are evading arrest to take their applications under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to its logical end. In view of this, proclamation issued against present applicants shall not be acted upon during the pendency of the hearing of these applications. These directions were issued by a single bench of Justice Smt. Sadhana S. Jadhav of Bombay High Court on 1 December 2016 in the case of Nitin Chandrrkant Kadam V/s. The State of Maharashtra [Criminal Anticipatory Bail Application No. 1880 of 2016] and 5 other cases tagged therewith.

Reliance Jio using PM Modi in advertisements is prohibited in law but with fine of ₹ 500 only

Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India

In a reply given in Rajya Sabha on 1 December 2016, the Central Government has informed that no permission was given to Reliance Jio to use the picture of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in its advertisements at the time of launch of Reliance Jio services. Government also informed that permission is required under the provisions of the Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950, which is administered by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution. However, a perusal of relevant provisions of the said Act shows that a violation of the provisions of the said Act carries a penalty of only ₹ 500, which is inconsequential for a company of the size of Reliance Industries Ltd., which owns Reliance Jio.

Wife leaving husband without reason, not entitled to maintenance, says MP HC [read order]

Where the wife had voluntarily left her husband’s house without any reason and was not thrown with force from her matrimonial home or she was not forced to leave her matrimonial home, she would not be entitled to claim maintenance from her husband. This is what has been held by a single bench of Justice  Jarat Kumar Jain of Madhya Pradesh high court, Indore bench, in the case of Anil S/o Shri Suganchandra Jain vs. Smt. Sunita W/o Shri Anil Kumar Jain [Criminal Revision No. 829 of 2014; decided on 29 November 2016].

Gujarat cadre IPS Rakesh Asthana becomes interim Director of CBI

Rakesh Asthana, IPS

After the retirement of Anil Sinha, Director CBI (Central Bureau of Investigation) today, 2 December 2016, the Government has given the charge of the post of Director CBI to Shri Rakesh Asthana, IPS, as an interim measure. Shri Asthana is an IPS officer of 1984 batch of Gujarat cadre.