In order to discuss the abovementioned question, it is pertinent to refer to a few relevant sections and then proceed ahead.
- Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 provides for Appeal to be filed before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal within a period of 30 days extendable by a period of fifteen days.
- Section 238A of the IBC makes the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the IBC proceedings “as far as may be”. Section 238A of the IBC was added by way of amendment in the year 2018.
- Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act defines “prescribed period” as the period of limitation computed under the Act.
- Section 4 of the Limitation Act provides that if the prescribed period expires on a day the Court is closed, the proceeding may be filed on the day it reopens.
- Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 excludes the day from which the period is reckoned and extends the period if the last day falls on a day the Tribunal’s office is closed.
The question that fell before the Supreme Court was that if the last day of the extra 15 days (45th day) falls on a holiday, can the appeal be filed on the next working day in view of Section 4 of the Limitation Act? This issue was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of Lulu International Shopping Malls Pvt. Ltd. v. Gorinka Pratyusha & Ors., 2026 INSC 1224 : Civil Appeal Nos. 3110-3111 of 2026.
Before dealing with how the Supreme Court in the Lulu International (supra) case has held, it is pertinent to look at a few judgments on the similar issue which have laid down the law.
In the case of Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in light of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that the time prescribed for making an application under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is of 3 months. The period of extra 30 days is not the “period of limitation” and therefore it does not fall under the “prescribed period”. As such, Section 4 of the Limitation Act would not apply to the case. The relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted as under:
“14. … Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines ‘period of limitation’ which means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and ‘prescribed period’ means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in proviso that follows sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the ‘period of limitation’ and, therefore, not ‘prescribed period’ for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the ‘period of limitation’ or, in other words, ‘prescribed period’, in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the present case.”
The Supreme Court in the case of Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Plywood Products, (2021) 2 SCC 317 has held as follows:
“20.The words “prescribed period” appear in several sections of the Limitation Act, 1963. Though these words “prescribed period” are not defined in Section 2 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the expression is used throughout, only to denote the period of limitation. We may see a few examples:
20.1. Section 3(1) makes every proceeding filed after the prescribed period, liable to be dismissed, subject however to the provisions in Sections 4 to 24.
20.2. Section 5 enables the admission of any appeal or application after the prescribed period.
20.3. Section 6 uses the expression prescribed period in relation to proceedings to be initiated by persons under legal disability.
21. Therefore, the expression “prescribed period” appearing in Section 4 cannot be construed to mean anything other than the period of limitation. Any period beyond the prescribed period, during which the court or tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken to be “prescribed period”.”
Therefore, the Supreme Court in the abovementioned Sagufa Ahmed (supra) case observes that the “prescribed period” only means the period of limitation and does not include the discretionary period beyond the prescribed period.
Further the Supreme Court in the case of Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane v. Walchandnagar Industries Ltd, (2023) 8 SCC 453 had observed as follows:
“58. Therefore, in light of the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the proceedings under the Arbitration Act and when Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 specifically excludes the applicability of Section 10 to any act or proceeding to which Limitation Act, 1963 applies and in light of the definition of “period of limitation” as defined under Section 2(j) read with Section 4 of the Limitation Act and as observed and held by this Court in Assam Urban, benefit of exclusion of period during which the Court is closed shall be available when the application for setting aside award is filed within “prescribed period of limitation” and shall not be available in respect of period extendable by Court in exercise of its discretion”
In fact, in the case of V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd., (2022) 2 SCC 244, the Supreme Court held that:
“21. … It is not open to a person aggrieved by an order under the IBC to await the receipt of a free certified copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act 2013 read with Rule 50 of the NCLT and prevent limitation from running. Accepting such a construction will upset the timely framework of the IBC. The litigant has to file its appeal within thirty days, which can be extended up to a period of fifteen days, and no more, upon showing sufficient cause. A sleight of interpretation of procedural rules cannot be used to defeat the substantive objective of a legislation that has an impact on the economic health of a nation.” (emphasis and underline supplied)
In the landmark case of Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors., 2025 INSC 639 : Civil Appeal No. 408 of 2023, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“10.2 … Thus, it is clear that the benefit of exclusion of period during which the court is closed shall be available when the application is filed within “prescribed period of limitation” and shall not be available in respect of period extendable by court in exercise of its discretion.
11. As indicated above, the IBC prescribes strict timelines for filing appeals and taking legal action so as to ensure that insolvency proceedings are not misused to recover time-barred debts. The proviso to Section 61(2) clearly limits the NCLAT’s jurisdiction to condone delay only up to 15 days beyond the initial 30-day period. Where a statute expressly limits the period within which delay may be condoned, an Appellate Tribunal cannot exceed that limit. In other words, the NCLAT being a creature of statute, operates strictly within the powers conferred upon it. Unlike a civil suit, it lacks inherent jurisdiction to extend time on equitable grounds.
11.1. Once the prescribed and condonable periods (i.e., 30 + 15 days) expire, the NCLAT has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals, regardless of the reason for the delay. In Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited, while interpreting Section 9 IBC, this Court underscores the IBC’s strict procedural discipline i.e., only applications strictly conforming to statutory requirements can be entertained. This principle is also applicable to limitation issues under section 61(2), as it supports the idea that tribunals must operate within the bounds of the Code, without adding equitable or discretionary powers not conferred by statute. This Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another has categorically held that the NCLAT cannot condone any delay beyond 15 days even on equitable grounds; and that the appellate mechanism under IBC is strictly time-bound by design to preserve the speed and certainty of the insolvency resolution process.
11.2. Thus, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Accordingly, the second issue is answered by us.
12. In view of the foregoing, the order passed by the NCLAT condoning the delay in filing the appeal, is ultra vires and liable to be set aside.
13. Before parting, we may observe that time is of the essence in statutory appeals, and the prescribed limitation period must be strictly adhered to. Even a delay of a single day is fatal if the statute does not provide for its condonation. As held by us, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Allowing condonation in such cases would defeat the legislative intent and open the floodgates to belated and potentially frivolous petitions, thereby undermining the efficacy and finality of the appellate mechanism.”
In the instant case of Lulu International Shopping Malls Pvt Ltd. (supra), the facts were that the 30 day limitation period to file the Appeal was expiring on 25.04.2025 and the 15 days extendable period expired on 10.05.2025 (second Saturday). The Appeals were filed by the Respondents (Appellant before the NCLAT) on 11.05.2025 i.e., on the 46th day. The NCLAT condoned the delay by applying Section 4 of the Limitation Act on the ground that the 45th day being the last day of the extendable period fell on a second Saturday which was a holiday. Aggrieved by the same, Lulu filed applications before the NCLAT seeking recall of the order and relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Tata Steel (supra) wherein it was held that the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act would only be available when the Appeal was filed within the “prescribed period” of limitation and not within the extendable period. The NCLAT dismissed the recall Applications on the ground that the order was passed on merits and a precedent rendered subsequent to the said order cannot be a reason to recall the same as it would not fall within the ambit of the inherent powers to rectify an error apparent.
As such, Lulu challenged the above order of the NCLAT before the Supreme Court whereby the Supreme Court held as follows:
“10. It is no doubt true that the NCLAT does not have the power of review under the provisions of the IBC but it is vested with the power of recalling its orders by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016. This was the import of the 5-Judge Bench decision of the NCLAT in Union Bank of India (erstwhile Corporation Bank) vs. Dinkar T Venkatasubramanian and others, wherein it was held that, though it was not vested with power to review a judgment, however, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, the NCLAT can entertain an application for recall of a judgment on sufficient grounds. This 5-Judge Bench decision of the NCLAT was confirmed by this Court in Union Bank of India vs. Financial Creditors of Amtek Auto Ltd. and others. This Court observed therein that it was in agreement with the view taken by the 5-Judge Bench of the NCLAT and found no reason to interfere with the said judgment.
11. More recently, in Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority vs. Prabhjit Singh Soni and another, upon reviewing the case law on the subject, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the law which emerged from such decisions was that a Tribunal or a Court is invested with such ancillary and incidental powers as may be necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties and, in the absence of a statutory provision, in an appropriate case, it can recall its orders in exercise of such ancillary or incidental power.
12. Therefore, the NCLAT was not justified in refusing to exercise its inherent jurisdiction even when apprised of the settled legal position with regard to application of Section 4 of the Act of 1963. More so, as the respondents did not even establish sufficient cause for condonation of the the delay on their part in the filing of their appeals. Be it noted that 10.05.2025 was a second Saturday and the NCLAT was of the opinion that the same constituted sufficient grounds to prolong the extended limitation period to the 46th day. However, it is an admitted fact that the appeals were e-filed on the next day, i.e., on 11.05.2025, which was also a holiday, being Sunday. Therefore, such e-filing of the appeals could as well have been done on 10.05.2025 itself. In any event, the application of Section 4 of the Act of 1963 in the case on hand was not valid, given the legal position as set out in Tata Steel Ltd. (supra).
13. It has been contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents that the common order dated 10.10.2025 passed by the NCLAT, condoning the delay in the filing of the appeals, was not separately challenged and as the time to do so has expired, the said order is not liable to be interfered with. It is pointed out that there can be no merger of the said order with the order dismissing the recall applications and, therefore, condonation of delay by the NCLAT is deemed to have attained finality. However, this specious argument loses sight of the fact that the condonation of delay in the filing of the appeals did not attain finality, as the recall applications filed by the appellant in relation thereto kept the issue alive and when the NCLAT, in its wisdom, refused to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to recall such order and the same was subjected to appellate review before this Court, the same can be remedied by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 62 of the IBC.
14. On the above analysis, this Court finds that entertainment of the appeals by the NCLAT was illegal, as the appeals were filed beyond the time prescribed in Section 61(2) of the IBC. Further, the NCLAT erred in failing to apply the law laid down by this court in Tata Steel Ltd. (supra).”
A bare perusal of the abovementioned judgment showcases that the Supreme Court found fault with the NCLAT on more than one count. Firstly, the Supreme Court held that the judgment in Tata Steel was not a subsequent development at all. Once the Supreme Court declares the law on a statutory provision, the same is the law of the land and an earlier order contrary to the same is not saved unless it has attained finality. Secondly, the Supreme Court held that though the NCLAT does not have power to review its orders under the IBC, it does have the power to recall its orders in exercise of Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rues, 2016 and as such the NCLAT should have recalled its order once the Tata Steel judgment was brought to its notice. Thirdly, the Supreme Court observed that since the Respondents had e-filed their Appeals on 11.05.2025, which was a Sunday and also a holiday, therefore, nothing precluded them from filing their Appeal on 10.05.2025 a second Saturday as such the ground that the Court was not working is of no use to the Respondents.
As such, the answer to the question is in the negative. Under Section 61(2) of the IBC, the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act would be available only where the 30th day, i.e., the last day of the prescribed period, falls on a holiday, and not where the 45th day falls on a holiday.



