Once an advocate is appointed by a party in a case before a court, that advocate is considered as his agent under law.
In the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. and M.C. (P) Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 185, the Supreme Court laid down that the advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engaged him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult.
It is noteworthy that by signing the Vakalatnama, the litigant gives his consent to the advocate to appear on his behalf. This is a sort of agency agreement between the litigant and his advocate, authorising the advocate to perform certain acts on behalf of the litigant.
It is pertinent to point out that agent is defined under Section 182 of the Contract Act, 1872, as under:
“182. “Agent” and “principal” defined.—An “agent” is a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for whom such act is done, or who is so represented, is called the “principal”.”
Section 188 of the Contract Act deals with the extent of the authority of an agent, though there are other relevant provisions in this regard in the said Act:
“188. Extent of agent's authority.—An agent, having an authority to do an act, has authority to do every lawful thing which is necessary in order to do such act.
An agent having an authority to carry on a business, has authority to do every lawful thing necessary for the purpose, or usually done in the course, of conducting such business.
Illustrations
(a) A is employed by B, residing in London, to recover at Bombay a debt due to B. A may adopt any legal process necessary for purpose of recovering the debt, and may give a valid discharge for the same.
(b) A constitutes B, his agent to carry on his business of a ship-builder. B may purchase timber and other materials, and hire workmen, for the purpose of carrying on the business.”
Therefore, generally speaking, the litigant is bound by the acts of his advocate performed on his behalf in the court proceedings, though on some rare occasions there may be exceptions which may be permissible under law.
