Vicarious liability of a director of company in cheque bounce case

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    • #1547
      Anonymous
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      Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act states that “If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly“.

      To make a director of a company vicariously liable for a cheque bounce case under Section 138 of the Act, is it necessary that there should be a specific averment in the complaint that he “was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company”? If such averment is missing from the complaint, can such a director be still convicted of cheque bounce case in a vicarious manner if he had no direct role in issuing the cheque etc.?

      In the case of my client who is director of a company, no such specific averment is made in the complaint of cheque bounce case against the company in which my client is also named as accused? Can the case stand against my client?

    • #1548

      Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act makes it crystal clear that if the person who commits an offence under Section 138 of the Act is a company, the company as well as other persons in charge of or responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company at the time of commission of the offence is deemed to be guilty of the offence. Thus, it creates a constructive liability on the persons responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.

      In the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89, the Supreme Court observed as under:

      “A liability under Section 141 of the Act is sought to be fastened vicariously on a person connected with a company, the principal accused being the company itself. It is a departure from the rule in criminal law against vicarious liability. A clear case should be spelled out in the complaint against the person sought to be made liable. Section 141 of the Act contains the requirements for making a person liable under the said provision. That the respondent falls within the parameters of Section 141 has to be spelled out. A complaint has to be examined by the Magistrate in the first instance on the basis of averments contained therein. If the Magistrate is satisfied that there are averments which bring the case within Section 141, he would issue the process. We have seen that merely being described as a Director in a company is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Section 141. Even a non-Director can be liable under Section 141 of the Act. The averments in the complaint would also serve the purpose that the person sought to be made liable would know what is the case which is alleged against him. This will enable him to meet the case at the trial.”

      “It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.”

      Likewise, in the case of Sabitha Ramamurthy v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya, (2006) 10 SCC 581, it was held as under:

      “A bare perusal of the complaint petitions demonstrates that the statutory requirements contained in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act had not been complied with. It may be true that it is not necessary for the complainant to specifically reproduce the wordings of the section but what is required is a clear statement of fact so as to enable the court to arrive at a prima facie opinion that the accused are vicariously liable. Section 141 raises a legal fiction. By reason of the said provision, a person although is not personally liable for commission of such an offence would be vicariously liable therefor. Such vicarious liability can be inferred so far as a company registered or incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 is concerned only if the requisite statements, which are required to be averred in the complaint petition, are made so as to make the accused therein vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company. Before a person can be made vicariously liable, strict compliance with the statutory requirements would be insisted. Not only the averments made in para 7 of the complaint petitions do not meet the said statutory requirements, the sworn statement of the witness made by the son of the respondent herein, does not contain any statement that the appellants were in charge of the business of the Company. In a case where the court is required to issue summons which would put the accused to some sort of harassment, the court should insist strict compliance with the statutory requirements.”

      From the above judgments of the Supreme Court, it is thus clear that it is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint for cheque bounce case for the purposes of Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company.

      In the case of K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48, the Supreme Court summarised position under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act thus:

      “(i) If the accused is the Managing Director or a Joint Managing Director, it is not necessary to make an averment in the complaint that he is in charge of, and is responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company. It is sufficient if an averment is made that the accused was the Managing Director or Joint Managing Director at the relevant time. This is because the prefix “Managing” to the word “Director” makes it clear that they were in charge of and are responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company.

      (ii) In the case of a Director or an officer of the company who signed the cheque on behalf of the company, there is no need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company or make any specific allegation about consent, connivance or negligence. The very fact that the dishonoured cheque was signed by him on behalf of the company, would give rise to responsibility under sub-section (2) of Section 141.

      (iii) In the case of a Director, secretary or manager [as defined in Section 2(24) of the Companies Act] or a person referred to in clauses (e) and (f) of Section 5 of the Companies Act, an averment in the complaint that he was in charge of, and was responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company is necessary to bring the case under Section 141(1) of the Act. No further averment would be necessary in the complaint, though some particulars will be desirable. They can also be made liable under Section 141(2) by making necessary averments relating to consent and connivance or negligence, in the complaint, to bring the matter under that sub-section.

      (iv) Other officers of a company cannot be made liable under sub-section (1) of Section 141. Other officers of a company can be made liable only under sub-section (2) of Section 141, by averring in the complaint their position and duties in the company and their role in regard to the issue and dishonour of the cheque, disclosing consent, connivance or negligence.”

      Coming now to the case of your client, if no such specific averment is made in the complaint of cheque bounce case against your client as whether he was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company, it may be difficult to prove the case against your client. This is clear from the above Supreme Court judgments.

           


      Dr. Ashok Dhamija is a New Delhi based Supreme Court Advocate and author of law books. Read more about him by clicking here. List of his Forum Replies. List of his other articles. List of his Quora Answers. List of his YouTube Videos.

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