The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 governs the way the property of a Hindu person dying intestate will succeed to his / her legal heirs. While the entire act provides for various ways how the property would go from the ancestors to the Legal Heirs, there is a disqualification mentioned under Section 25 of the act.
According to Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, if a person commits a murder (or abets it) of another person through whom he / she may be in the line of succession and may inherit property, such murderer is disqualified and property of the murdered person, dying intestate, will not go to the murderer. Section 25 of the Act is being reproduced hereunder:
“25. Murderer disqualified.―A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder.”
Therefore, this disqualification was put in place so that persons who are greedy / who are criminals and want to inherit a particular property an earlier date, will not murder their ancestors to get the same and the rationale is that such a criminal should not get benefit of the crime that he is committed and as such should be disqualified from inheriting any property whatsoever from the murdered person.
It is pertinent to mention herein that even before the abovementioned act i.e. the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was enacted, the Privy Council had in the case of Kenchava Kom Sanyellappa Hosmani v. Girimallappa Channaipa Somasagar, 1924 SCC Online PC 33 had held that a murder will not get benefit of the property of the murdered person. The Privy Council had observed as follows:
“The High Court came to the same conclusions, that is to say, that the murderer had no title, and that the heirship was not to be traced through him, but on a somewhat different line of reasoning. The learned Judges thought that there was no Hindu law which governed the matter, so that they had to have recourse in obedience to the Bombay Regulation of 1827, No. 4, sec. 26, to the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. And while thinking it immaterial whether the murderer had the legal estate vested in him or not because “in either case he must for the purpose of the inheritance be treated as if he were dead when the inheritance opened and as not being a fresh stock of descent,” they thought it “simpler to say that the exclusion extends to the legal as well as beneficial estate.”
Before this Board, it has been contended that the matter is governed by Hindu law, and that the Hindu law makes no provision disqualifying a murderer from succeeding to the estate of his victim and therefore it must be taken that according to this law he can succeed, and he being alive, the Plaintiff has no title.
Their Lordships do not take this view. There is much to be said for the argument of the Subordinate Judge that the principles of jurisprudence which can be traced in Hindu law, would warrant an inference that according to that law a man cannot take advantage of his own wrong, and that if this case had come under consideration by the Hindu sages they would have determined it against the murderer. But it is unnecessary so to decide, because the alternative is between the Hindu law being as above stated or being for this purpose non-existent, and in this latter case the High Court have rightly decided that the principles of equity, justice and good conscience exclude the murderer.” (emphasis and underline supplied)
This is from where the journey of Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act took off. Subsequently, in the Hindu Code drafted by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar under Section 119, it was codified for the first time that the murderer will be disqualified and Section 119 is pari materia to the present Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act and this Section 119 of the Hindu Code was enacted as Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act.
The Madras High Court in the judgment of M. Nagarajan v. V. M. Nagammal, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2547 has observed with respect to Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act as follows:
“20. …The framers of the Act in the objects and reasons have made a reference to the decision of the Privy Council that the murderer is not to be regarded as the stock of a fresh line of descent but should be regarded as non-existent. That means that a person who is guilty of committing the murder cannot be treated to have any relationship whatsoever with deceased’s estate.”
Although the author has vigorously tried searching for the abovementioned statement and objects of the act wherein the reference to the abovementioned judgment of the Privy Council is mentioned, he was unable to get hold of the same. However, the above observation Madras High Court makes it clear that the abovementioned judgment of the Privy Council was the instrumental landmark for the enactment of the provision of Section 25.
Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act (pari materia to Section 121 of the Hindu Code) provides for the succession in case of a disqualified person. So, in the perspective of the present article, it is apparent that if a murderer is disqualified under Section 25 of the Act, the succession of such murderer would be looked into by Section 27 of the Act. As per Section 27 of the Act:
“27. Succession when heir disqualified. ― If any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall devolve as if such person had died before the intestate.”
On a bare perusal of the abovementioned section, it is apparent that if a murderer is disqualified from inheritance (under Section 25), it shall be deemed as if such person had died before the murdered person and hence all persons claiming through the murderer will also consequentially be disqualified. Section 27 goes further ahead than section 25 and creates a legal fiction that the disqualified person had died before the intestate meaning thereby that such disqualified person was non-existent for the purpose of inheritance and no right to the estate can be claimed through him.
The Privy Council in the abovementioned matter of Kenchava (supra) has held as follows:
“In Their Lordships’ view it was rightly held by the two courts below that the murderer was disqualified; and with regard to the question whether he is disqualified wholly or only as to the beneficial interest which the Subordinate Judge discussed, founding upon the distinction between the beneficial and legal estate which was made by the Subordinate Judge and by the High Court of Madras in the case of Vedanayaga Mudaliar v. Vedammal, Their Lordships reject, as did the High Court here, any such distinction. The theory of legal and equitable estates is no part of Hindu law, and should not be introduced into discussion.
The second question to be decided is whether title can be claimed through the murderer. If this were so, the defendants as the murderer’s sisters, would take precedence of the plaintiff, his cousin. In this matter also, Their Lordships are of opinion that the courts below were right. The murderer should be treated as non-existent and not as one who forms the stock for a fresh line of descent. It may be pointed out that this view was also taken in the Madras case just cited.” (emphasis supplied)
Thus, even before the Hindu Succession Act was not codified, way back in 1924, the Privy Council was of the opinion that a legal fiction will be created and the murderer will be considered as non-existent for the purposes of Succession.
Needless to mention herein that the abovementioned judgment of the Privy Council has been followed by various Courts of India and hence this is an authoritative ruling on this topic.
However, at the same time, it is necessary to look into various judgments of the Indian Courts on Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vellikannu v. R. Singaperumal & Anr, (2005) 6 SCC 622 was posed with a similar question whether a daughter in law could inherit property from her father in law when her husband (i.e. son) had murdered his father. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed that for application of Section 27, first it will have to be seen whether the murderer was able to inherit the property from his father or not (under Section 25) and thereafter can a decision be taken on the applicability of Section 27. As per the Hon’ble Supreme Court :
“19. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, the effect of Sections 25 and 27 is that Respondent 1 cannot inherit any property of his father on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience as he has murdered him and the fresh stock of his line of descent ceased to exist in that case. Once the son is totally disinherited then his whole stock stands disinherited i.e. wife or son. The defendant-Respondent 1 son himself is totally disqualified by virtue of Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act and as such the wife can have no better claim in the property of the deceased Ramasami Konar.
20. Therefore, as a result of our above discussion, we are of opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras is correct that the plaintiff is not entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased Ramasami Konar and the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the orders of the two courts below. Since we cannot decide this appeal without deciding the right of Respondent 1 as the right of the appellant flows therefrom as his wife i.e. the plaintiff, therefore, it was necessary for us to first decide whether Respondent 1 could succeed or inherit the estate of his deceased father. When the son cannot succeed then the wife who succeeds to the property through the husband cannot also lay a claim to the property of her father-in-law. The appeal is thus dismissed. No order as to costs.” (emphasis and underline supplied)
The Madras High Court in the case of M. Nagarajan v. V. M. Nagammal, 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 2547 observed with respect to the inheritance of property of a husband who had murdered his wife, in a case that was instituted by the mother in law (deceased’s mother) as follows:
“23. As per Section 3 of the Hindu Succession Act, ‘heir’ means any person, male or female, who is entitled to succeed to the property of an intestate under this Act. Had he not committed murder, then as per Sections 15 & 16 of the Act, the Appellant/Defendant would be qualified and entitled to inherit the property of his wife. Entitlement to succeed to the property is not an independent right de hors the statutory disqualification under Section 25 of the Act, which states that a person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of murder. Entitlement to succeed to the property of the victim depends upon the key factor whether he is qualified to succeed. When a heir is disqualified under Section 25 of the Act, he cannot be said to be entitled to succeed to the property of the deceased. Therefore, the findings of the Courts below that the Appellant/Defendant is not entitled to the property of the deceased Muniyendra, cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the provisions of the statute, principles of ‘justice, equity and good conscience’. As per Section 27 of the Act, if any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall devolve as if such person had died before the intestate, which means that he was non existent for the purpose of inheritance and therefore, no right to the estate of the deceased can be claimed through him.” (emphasis supplied)
In a similar question of law before the Delhi High Court, Smt. Janak Rani Chadha v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2007 DELHI 107, the Delhi High Court observed as follows:
“5. There is no dispute that in view of Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act the husband is not entitled to claim inheritance to the property of his deceased wife. The said section has been incorporated in the Act on the maxim Nemo Ex Suo Delicto Melforem Suam Conditionem force Protest. It is based on the principles of justice, equity and good conscience to make it impossible for a murderer who deserves to be hanged or to be shut behind the prison bars for life, to derive advantage or beneficial interest from the very heinous act committed by him. This has been so stated in the case Nannepuneni Seetharamaiah v. Nannepuneni Ramakrishnaiah, AIR 1970 AP 407. I am in complete agreement with what has been held in the said judgment.
6. As regards Section 27 it goes a step further. It treats, of-course by fiction of law, such person as is described in Section 25 as dead before the intestate. This means that he was non-existent for the purpose of inheritance and therefore no right to the estate of the deceased can be claimed through him. Admittedly the parents of the husband have no independent locus to claim inheritance to the property of the deceased. They can claim only through their son which is impermissible.” (emphasis and underline supplied)
In fact, in a case before the Punjab and Haryana High Court titled Mohinder Kaur & Ors. V. Wassan Singh & Ors., 1968 SCC OnLine P&H 67, the High Court was posed with a question where a father was killed by one of his two sons and the father had willed his entire property in favour of both his sons. Whether such property would be inherited by his son or not. The High Court observed as follows:
“(8) In the circumstances, the question of consideration of the effect of section 27 of Act 30 of 1956 does not really arise because there is no question of intestacy in this case with regard to the remaining half of the property bequeathed by the testator, but if there was such a question I should have been inclined to say that section 27 is in the form of a declaratory enactment of the rule of Hindu law in regard to personal disqualification of the murderer from inheriting to the estate of the person whom he has murdered. To that a rule has been grafted on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience that no title to the estate of the person murdered can be claimed through the murderer. He should be treated as non-existent when the succession opens on the death of his victim; he cannot be regarded as a fresh stock of descent: See Paragraph 99. at page 154 of Mulla’s Hindu Law, Thirteenth Edition and the observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kenchava’s case. I should have been inclined to the view that section 27 has not made any change in that rule of justice, equity and good conscience. On a different view the rule of justice, equity and good conscience will apply to wills by non-Hindus, but not to Hindus, a distinct treatment which could hardly have been intended by the Legislature.”
Therefore, on a brief perusal of the abovementioned decisions of the Privy Council, the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also of various High Courts of India, it is vividly clear that in case a person (‘A’) murders another person (‘B’), under Section 25, not only is ‘A’ disqualified from inheriting any property of ‘B’, but also under Section 27, all the legal heirs of ‘A’ will be disqualified from inheriting any property as a legal fiction will be created that ‘A’ had died before the death of ‘B’ and as such is non-existent.
However, there is a small caveat to this, that if other relatives of ‘B’ who are directly heirs of ‘B’ and who may also be claiming inheritance through ‘A’ will be eligible since they are direct legal heirs of ‘B’. To explain by way of an example, let ‘A’ be the son who murdered ‘B’ his father. ‘C’ who is the wife of ‘B’ and mother of ‘A’ will not be disqualified since she is directly a legal heir of ‘B’, who was murdered.
