So, how much delay can be condoned in filing of an appropriate case in the court?
Usually, the limitation period for filing a case or appeal or other appropriate case before the court is laid down in the Limitation Act, 1963. There are provisions for condonation of delays in certain situations.
What about filing of a writ petition before a constitutional court, such as the Supreme Court or the High Court, in a case where a fundamental right is alleged to have been violated by the State?
Well, even in such cases, generally, it has been held that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, even if his fundamental right has been violated. However, in such cases, the courts are usually flexible in condonation of delays.
Recently, in the case of Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569, the Supreme Court allowed a case which was filed in the High Court after a long delay of about 42 years, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
In this case, at the time of hearing in the Supreme Court, the appellant now almost 80 years old widow. She was owner of a piece of land in Himachal Pradesh. The State took over her land in 1967-68 for the construction of a major district road, without taking recourse to acquisition proceedings, or following due process of law. The appellant, being an illiterate widow, coming from a rural background, was wholly unaware of her rights and entitlement in law, and did not file any proceedings for compensation of the land compulsorily taken over by the State.
In 2010, after coming to know about the State initiating acquisition proceedings in respect of land of some other similarly situated persons, whose land had also been taken over by the State, in pursuance of a High Court order, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Himachal Pradesh High Court, praying that the State be directed to pay compensation for the land acquired in 1967-1968; or, in the alternative, direct the State to initiate acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
The High Court did not grant her the relief by observing that the matter involved disputed questions of law and fact for determination on the starting point of limitation, which could not be adjudicated in writ proceedings, and she was granted liberty to file a civil suit.
In appeal, the Supreme Court gave various reasons on merits of the case in favour of the appellant. But, what is relevant for the purposes of this article is the order of the Supreme Court with regard to delay and laches of a long period of about 42 years.
It was held: “The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.”
The court observed that where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.
The Supreme Court also took help from its judgment in a previous similar case in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353. The decision in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152, is also relevant.
It was observed that the appellant was an illiterate person, who was a widow coming from a rural area, and had been deprived of her private property by the State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The appellant had been divested of her right to property without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over half a century. The Court held that the cause of action in the instant case was a continuing one, since the appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal sanction or following due process of law. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court, exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, directed the State to pay compensation to the appellant, notwithstanding the long delay in taking recourse to the courts.
