Supreme Court AOR Examination – Leading Cases – Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625

This article contains a brief note for the leading case of Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625, which is a part of the paper “Leading Cases” for the Supreme Court Advocate on Record Examination 2015. This note was a part of my lecture delivered in 2013 to about 100+ Advocates who were preparing for the AOR examination. It is a part of the AOR series on leading cases.

Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 : AIR 1980 SC 1789:

The constitutional validity of clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368, which were inserted therein by S. 55 of the Constitution (42^nd Amendment) Act, 1976, came to be questioned in this case. These two clauses are reproduced as under:

“(4) No amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part III) made or purporting to have been made under this article [whether before or after the commencement of Section 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976] shall be called in question in any court on any ground.

(5) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article.”

Likewise, Section 4 of the Constitution (42^nd Amendment) Act, 1976, which was brought into force with effect from January 3, 1977 amended Article 31-C of the Constitution by substituting the words and figures “all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV” for the words and figures “the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of Article 39”. This amendment by Section 4 of the 42^nd Amendment was also challenged in this case. Article 31-C, as amended by the 42^nd Amendment read thus:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in Part IV shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy:

Provided that where such law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of this Article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.”

A Constitution Bench of 5 Judges of the Supreme Court heard this case. Two separate opinions were delivered – the majority decision of 4 Judges was delivered by Chandrachud, C.J., for himself and for Gupta, Untwalia and Kailasam, JJ. The minority decision of 1 Judge was delivered separately by Bhagwati, J. The majority decision held that both the aforesaid amendments vide Sections 55 and 4 of the 42^nd Constitutional Amendment were unconstitutional. The minority decision of Justice Bhagwati concurred that the aforesaid amendment vide Section 55 of the 42^nd Amendment was unconstitutional but it held that the amendment vide Section 4 of the 42^nd Amendment was valid.

Thus, by a unanimous decision of all 5 judges, the Supreme Court held both the newly inserted clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 (inserted vide Section 55 of the 42^nd Constitutional Amendment) as unconstitutional and invalid for being in violation of the basic features of the Constitution. Main reasons for the said decision were as under:

1. Clause (5) of Article 368 confers upon the Parliament a vast and undefined power to amend the Constitution, even so as to distort it out of recognition. Since the Constitution had conferred a limited amending power on the Parliament, the Parliament cannot under the exercise of that limited power enlarge that very power into an absolute power. Indeed, a limited amending power is one of the basic features of the Indian Constitution and therefore, the limitations on that power cannot be destroyed. The Parliament cannot, under Article 368, expand its amending power so as to acquire for itself the right to repeal or abrogate the Constitution or to destroy its basic and essential features. The donee of a limited power cannot by the exercise of that limited power convert the limited power into an unlimited one. Clause (5) of Article 368 was accordingly held unconstitutional and void.
2. The newly introduced clause (4) of Article 368 must suffer the same fate as Clause (5) because the two clauses are inter-linked. Clause (5) purports to remove all limitations on the amending power while Clause (4) deprives the courts of their power to call in question any amendment of the Constitution. The Indian Constitution is founded on a nice balance of power among the three wings of the state. It is the function and duty of the judges to pronounce upon the validity of laws. If courts are totally deprived of that power the fundamental rights conferred upon the people will become a mere adornment because rights without remedies are as writ in water. A controlled Constitution will then become uncontrolled. The conferment of the right to destroy the identity of the Constitution coupled with the provision that no court of law shall pronounce upon the validity of such destruction seems to be a transparent case of transgression of the limitations on the amending power. If there is one feature of the Indian Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial reviewand it is unquestionably, part of the basic features of the Constitution. If by a constitutional amendment, the power of judicial review is taken away and it is provided that the validity of any law made by the legislature shall not be called in question on any ground, even if it is outside the legislative competence of the legislature or is violative of any fundamental rights, it would be nothing short of subversion of the Constitution, for it would make a mockery of the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the states and render the fundamental rights meaningless and futile. Clause (4) of Article 368 was also thus held to be unconstitutional and void.

Thus, the Supreme Court re-iterated the principle laid down in the Kesavananda Bharti case that the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution under Article 368 was limited and that the basic features of the Constitution cannot be amended.

IMPORTANT: Read notes on other leading cases for the SC AOR Examination: AOR Series.