This article contains a brief note for the leading case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : (1978) 2 SCR 621, which is a part of the paper “Leading Cases” for the Supreme Court Advocate on Record Examination 2015. This note was a part of my lecture delivered in 2013 to about 100+ Advocates who were preparing for the AOR examination. It is a part of the AOR series on leading cases.
Read the full judgment: Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Supreme Court Judgment, 25 January 1978.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : (1978) 2 SCR 621:
The passport of the petitioner was impounded in public interest by an order dated July 2, 1977 under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1967, and the Government of India having declined in the interests of general public to furnish to her the reasons for its decision, she filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the order on the grounds that it violated Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The respondent in the counter-affidavit stated that the petitioner’s passport was impounded because her presence was likely to be required in connection with the proceedings before a Commission of Inquiry, which was then functioning.
The case was heard by a 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court and 5 different opinions were delivered. The leading opinion was delivered by Justice P.N. Bhagwati on behalf of 3 Judges.
In view of the statement made by the Attorney General saying that the Government was agreeable to considering any representation that may be made by the petitioner in respect of the impounding of her passport and giving her an opportunity in the matter, the Supreme Court did not consider it necessary to formally interfere with the impugned Order. However, the Court interpreted important provisions of the Constitution that have far-reaching impact. It was held as under:
- Right to travel abroad is part of personal liberty under Article 21. However, it was held that it is covered neither in the right under 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) nor under 19(1)(g) (right to carry on trade, business, profession or calling).
- Fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution are not distinct and not mutually exclusive.
- Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and even if there is a law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of “personal liberty” and there is consequently no infringement of the fundamental right conferred by Article 21, such law, insofar as it abridges or takes away any fundamental right under Article 19 would have to meet the challenge of that article. Now, if a law depriving a person of “personal liberty” and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation, ex-hypothesi it must also be liable to be tested with reference to Article 14.
- The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair” and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it .would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.
- Law in Article 21 affecting personal liberty must satisfy the test of one or more of the rights under Article 19 and the test of reasonableness under Article 14.
- Right to go abroad, an aspect of personal liberty, cannot be curtailed without reasonable opportunity to show-cause.
- Procedure in Article 21 cannot be arbitrary, unfair, oppressive or unreasonable. Such procedure has to be just, fair and reasonable.
- Rules of natural justice must be followed before impounding a passport under Section 10(3)(c) of Passports Act, 1967.
- The soul of natural justice is “fair-play in action” and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world. The inquiry must always be: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected? Now, if this be the test of applicability of the doctrine of natural justice, there can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for this purpose. The aim of both administrative inquiry as well as quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure justice, or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi-judicial inquiry and not to administrative inquiry. It must logically apply to both. The law must now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable.
- Rules of natural justice apply as much to administrative action which entails civil consequences as to quasi-judicial and judicial functions. However, these rules are flexible enough to permit modifications and variations required by the situation. Thus, the area of application of the principles of natural justice was expanded and it was held that these rules can be restricted only if they are likely to paralyse the administrative process and defeat the urgency of the measure.
IMPORTANT: Read notes on other leading cases for the SC AOR Examination: AOR Series.
