Supreme Court AOR Examination – Leading Cases – L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 400

This article contains a brief note for the leading case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 400 : AIR 1995 SC 1151 [as also for the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India has been reported as (1997) 3 SCC 261, for the reasons explained hereinbelow], which is a part of the paper “Leading Cases” for the Supreme Court Advocate on Record Examination 2015. This note was a part of my lecture delivered in 2013 to about 100+ Advocates who were preparing for the AOR examination. It is a part of the AOR series on leading cases.

Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 400 : AIR 1995 SC 1151:

Important Note: The List of Leading Cases mentions case reported vide (1995) 1 SCC 400 against L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India wherein, in fact, in this case the matter was only referred by a 3-Judge Bench to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court. In fact, the case decided by a 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India has been reported as (1997) 3 SCC 261. Therefore, it appears that by mistake, the Supreme Court has included 3-judge bench decision in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 400 : AIR 1995 SC 1151 as a leading case, instead of including the 7-judge decision in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261. Accordingly, I have covered both these cases in this note. However, please remember that the “Leading Cases” paper of the AOR Examination refers only to the first case out of these two.

(A) L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 400 : AIR 1995 SC 1151:

In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 400 : AIR 1995 SC 1151, a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court referred the matter to a larger Bench on the issues relating to:

1. Validity of Section 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, whereby a Single Member Bench of an Administrative Tribunal (such as CAT) was empowered to exercise powers of the Tribunal.
2. Whether the power of judicial review need not always be exercised by regular courts and the same can be exercised by an equally efficacious alternative mechanism (such as an Administrative Tribunal), as held by a 5-Judge Constitution Bench in the case of P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124.
3. Whether the Administrative Tribunals (such as CAT) established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, were equal in status to the High Courts, as held in the aforesaid case of P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124. It is pertinent to mention that in the said S.P. Sampath Kumar case, the Supreme Court had upheld the validity of Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, under which the jurisdiction of all courts except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136 with respect to matters falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunals concerned, was excluded.

A larger Bench of 7-Judges considered these issues, which is reported as L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1997 SC 1125, which is discussed below.

(B) L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1997 SC 1125:

Certain Tribunals had been set up under the provisions of Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution. A 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the following issues in this case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1997 SC 1125:

1. Whether the power conferred upon Parliament or the State Legislatures, as the case may be, by sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of Article 323 A or by sub-clause (d) of clause (3) of Article 323B of the Constitution, to totally exclude the jurisdiction of ‘all courts’, except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, in respect of disputes and complaints referred to in clause (1) of Article 323A or with regard to all or any of the matters specified in clause (2) of Article 323B, runs counter to the power of judicial review conferred on the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution?
2. Whether the Tribunals, constituted either under Article 323A or under Article 323B of the Constitution, possess the competence to test the constitutional validity of a statutory provision/rule?
3. Whether these Tribunals, as they are functioning at present, can be said to be effective substitutes for the High Courts in discharging the power of judicial review? If not, what are the changes required to make them conform to their founding objectives?

The 7-judge bench of the Supreme Court held as under [in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1997 SC 1125]:

1. The power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Court under Article 226 and in Supreme Court under Article 32 is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded.
2. The power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
3. Clause 2(d) of Article 323A of the Constitution, and Clause 3 (d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, respectively, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Article 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional.
4. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, the Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their own parent statutes.
5. The Tribunals, will continue to act as the only Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, it is meant that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.
6. All decisions of the Tribunals would be subject to scrutiny before Division Bench of their respective High Courts under Arts. 226/227. No appeal would lie directly to Supreme Court under Article 136 from the decision of the Tribunals. However, the directions in respect of making the decisions of Tribunals amenable to scrutiny before the respective High Courts will come into effect only prospectively.
7. The appointment of Administrative Members to Administrative Tribunals need not be stopped.
8. Where a question involving interpretation of a statutory provision or rule in relation to the Constitution comes up for consideration before an Administrative Tribunal, Proviso to Section 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, will automatically apply and Chairman or Member concerned shall refer the matter to a Bench consisting of at least two Members, one of whom must be a Judicial Member. So construed, S. 5(6) is no longer be susceptible to charges of unconstitutionality.

IMPORTANT: Read notes on other leading cases for the SC AOR Examination: AOR Series.