Ordinarily, the rights and liabilities of the parties in a suit should be determined on the basis of facts existing on the date of institution of the suit. However, it has been held that in appropriate cases, changes circumstances in the form of events happening after filing of the suit can be considered (though with caution) by the court for deciding the suit. It has been held that the court may sometimes have the duty to consider the changed circumstances to do justice in the matter.
In the case of Shikharchand Jain v. Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha, (1974) 1 SCC 675 : AIR 1974 SC 1178, the Supreme Court held that:
“Ordinarily, a suit is tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of its institution. But it is open to a Court (including a court of appeal) to take notice of events which have happened after the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties in the changed circumstances where it is shown that the relief claimed originally has (1) by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate; or (2) where it is necessary to take notice of the changed circumstances in order to shorten the litigation; or (3) to do complete justice between the parties.”
Likewise, in the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 SC 1409, the Supreme Court affirmed the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. In this regard, the Supreme Court held that:
“It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice — subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad.”
In Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarain, (1986) 4 SCC 736 : AIR 1987 SC 741, it was held that subsequent events can be taken into consideration and that administration of justice demands that any changes either in fact or in law must be taken cognizance of by the court but that must be done in a cautious manner of relevant facts.
It may however be noted that where the decision of a court has already reached finality with regard to the rights of the parties, a concluded decision should not be reopened on the basis of changed circumstances by taking away the rights of a party which had already accrued to it.
