The Supreme Court in a recent case of Manoj Kumar Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh and Anr. [CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 775 OF 2013] on Tuesday, 23rd August 2016, quashed an FIR (First Information Report) filed against an Air Force Officer, for the death of his wife which occurred five years prior to the institution of the FIR. A bench comprising of Justice Madan B. Lokur and Justice R.K. Agarwal quashed the FIR on grounds of gross delay and that it amounted to malicious prosecution which was a result of an afterthought and also on the ground that the court where the case was instituted had no territorial jurisdiction as no cause of action had arisen there. The Court also discussed in detail the scope of an inquiry instituted under Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 in contrast to investigation conducted under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. [Full judgment given below.]
It was a case of suicide (within 7 years of marriage) of one Ms. Nandini who was wife of the appellant herein Mr. Manoj (serving in the Indian Air Force at that time). An inquiry under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. was conducted with respect to the death of Nandini and it was found that there was no foul play involved and accordingly the case was closed. None of the family members of the deceased raised any suspicion over the death, at that time. However, five years after the death, an FIR was instituted by the brother of the deceased against the husband and his relatives under Sections 304B (dowry death) and 498A (matrimonial cruelty) of the Indian Penal Code.
It was contended by the husband that since an investigation had already been conducted at the time of the death and finding no suspicion or foul play, the case was closed, a second FIR in respect of the same incident cannot be filed, five years later. Although, there was no formal FIR registered at the time of death, the husband of the deceased contended that the earlier or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfied the requirement of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., hence there cannot be second FIR or fresh investigation of any subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence.
For the purpose of determining whether ‘information’ received under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. satisfies the requirement of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., the Court discussed in detail the scope of Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. and observed as follows:
“10) The proceedings under Section 174 have a very limited scope. The object of the proceedings is merely to ascertain whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances or an unnatural death and if so what is the apparent cause of the death. The question regarding the details as to how the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what circumstances he was assaulted is foreign to the ambit and scope of the proceedings under Section 174 of the Code. …. The procedure under Section 174 is for the purpose of discovering the cause of death, and the evidence taken was very short. …. The purpose of registering FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into motion, which culminates with filing of the police report and only after registration of FIR, beginning of investigation in a case, collection of evidence during investigation and formation of the final opinion is the sequence which results in filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code. In George and Others vs. State of Kerala and Another (1998) 4 SCC 605, it has been held that the investigating officer is not obliged to investigate, at the stage of inquest, or to ascertain as to who were the assailants. A similar view has been taken in Suresh Rai and Others vs. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 84.
11) In this view of the matter, Sections 174 and 175 of the Code afford a complete Code in itself for the purpose of “Inquiries” in cases of accidental or suspicious deaths and are entirely distinct from the “investigation” under Section 157 of the Code wherein if an officer in-charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered to investigate, he shall proceed in person to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case. In the case on hand, an inquiry under Section 174 of the Code was convened initially in order to ascertain whether the death is natural or unnatural. Learned senior counsel for the appellants claims that the earlier information regarding unnatural death amounted to FIR under Section 154 of the Code which was investigated by the police and thereafter the case was closed. On a careful scrutiny of materials on record, the inquiry which was conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the death is natural or unnatural cannot be categorized under information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence within the meaning and import of Section 154 of the Code. …. In view of the above discussion, it clearly goes to show that what was undertaken by the police was an inquiry under Section 174 of the Code which was limited to the extent of natural or unnatural death and the case was closed. Whereas, the condition precedent for recording of FIR is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence and in the case on hand, it leaves no matter of doubt that the intimation was an information of the nature contemplated under Section 174 of the Code and it could not be categorized as information disclosing a cognizable offence. Also, there is no material to show that the police after conducting investigation submitted a report under Section 173 of the Code as contemplated, before the competent authority, which accepted the said report and closed the case.
12) In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the investigation on an inquiry under Section 174 of the Code is distinct from the investigation as contemplated under Section 154 of the Code relating to commission of a cognizable offence…..” (emphasis supplied)
Although the Court clearly distinguished between information received under Section 174 and information received under Section 154, and thereby rejected the above contentions of the husband, the Court still quashed the FIR on other two grounds namely, that there was unexplainable delay in registration of an FIR, specially in the peculiar circumstances of the present case and that the Police Station where the FIR was registered had no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter, since no part of the alleged offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of that police station.
On the ground of delay in the FIR, the Supreme Court while referring to the case of Jai Prakash Singh vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2012) 4 SCC 379, held as follows:
“18) Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger also creeps in of the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. In our opinion, such extraordinary delay in lodging the FIR raises grave doubt about the truthfulness of allegations made by Respondent No. 2 herein against the appellants, which are, in any case, general in nature. We have no doubt that by making such reckless and vague allegations, Respondent No. 2 herein has tried to rope the appellants in criminal proceedings. We are of the confirmed opinion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellants pursuant to this FIR is an abuse of the process of law.”
Further, the Court also discussed the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. with respect to quashing of an FIR, and referred to landmark judgments of State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 and Rajiv Thapar and Others vs. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330, and reiterated the principles laid down therein. It held that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Section 482 in an arbitrary manner and that although it is not possible to give any precise, clearly defined guidelines or rigid formulae or an exhaustive list of cases wherein power under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of the FIR should be exercised, however there are circumstances where the Court may be justified in exercising such jurisdiction.
While quashing the FIR the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“22) Further, to invoke inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court must be fully satisfied that the material produced on record is based on sound, justifiable and reasonable fact. …. The High Court failed to apply the test whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie, establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution to continue. The High Court did not apply its mind judiciously and on an incorrect appreciation of record, ordered for continuance of the investigation on a petition under Section 482 of the Code. This power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results.”
The full judgment of Supreme Court is reproduced below:
