In general, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, do not apply to the proceedings before tribunals and administrative authorities. The provisions of the above Act are meant to be applicable to proceedings before courts or judicial authorities; they are not meant to be applicable to proceedings before quasi-judicial authorities. However, by a specific provision contained in the law which creates such quasi-judicial authority, such as a tribunal or an executive authority, the provisions of the Limitation Act may be made applicable to proceedings before such bodies also. But, in the absence of any specific provision in the relevant statute, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not be automatically applied to the proceedings before quasi-judicial authorities such as tribunals and administrative authorities.
In the case of Sakuru v. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590, the Supreme Court held that it is well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court [in Town Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1969) 1 SCC 873 : (1970) 1 SCR 51; Nityananda M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1969) 2 SCC 199; and Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad, (1976) 1 SCC 361] that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, apply only to proceedings in “courts” and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than courts such as quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure.
The same legal principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court recently in the case of State of Jharkhand v. Shivam Coke Industries, (2011) 8 SCC 656.
Dr. Ashok Dhamija is a New Delhi based Supreme Court Advocate and author of law books. Read more about him by clicking here. List of his Forum Replies. List of his other articles. List of his Quora Answers. List of his YouTube Videos.
.
