The Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Rajender Kumar Sharma, 2026 INSC 1213 : Civil Appeal No. 14204 of 2026, upheld the release of gratuity, subject to an undertaking, to Government servants who had been acquitted by the Trial Court, holding that the mere pendency of the State’s leave petition against acquittal, with no stay, could not justify withholding the same under Rule 69(1)(c) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
Rule 69(1)(c) of the CCS (Pension) Rules is as follows:
“69. Provisional pension where departmental or judicial proceedings may be pending. –
(…)
(c) No gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental or judicial proceedings and issue of final orders thereon:
Provided that where departmental proceedings have been instituted under Rule 16 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, for imposing any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Rule 11 of the said rules, the payment of gratuity shall be authorized to be paid to the Government servant.”
A bare perusal of the abovementioned Rule makes it vividly clear that Rule 69(1)(c) lays down that in a case where the department or judicial proceedings are pending against a government servant, no gratuity shall be payable to him unless such proceedings are concluded.
In the instant case, in the year 2001, an FIR was registered by the Anti Corruption Branch of the Government of NCT of Delhi under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 r/w Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code against certain employees of the Delhi Development Authority and other Departments. In 2017, the Special Judge (PC Act / ACB), Delhi convicted 4 accused persons and acquitted the rest (including the two respondents in the abovementioned case). The State filed a Criminal Leave Petition under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C. seeking leave to appeal against the acquittal. During the pendency of the abovementioned Petition before the High Court, the Respondents superannuated from their service. While the Delhi High Court had issued notice, but no stay was granted against the order of the Special Judge.
Since the abovementioned Petition was pending before the Delhi High Court, the DDA invoked Rule 69(1)(c) and withheld the Respondents’ gratuity. The Respondents made representations seeking release of their gratuity and also relied upon a case of co-accused who was acquitted and whose gratuity was released subject to an undertaking.
They thereafter filed an Original Application before the Central Administrative Tribunal which held in their favour and directed the release of gratuity with applicable interest subject to an undertaking being executed by the Respondents. The Delhi Development Authority challenged the order of the CAT before the High Court which upheld the CAT’s order.
Eventually the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the orders passed by the Delhi High Court and the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the reliance of the Delhi High Court and CAT on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Kishan Lal Taneja v. Government of NCT Delhi, WP (C) No. 3016 of 2021 wherein a co-accused acquitted under the same judgment was granted relief on the same terms was correct.
The relevant portion of Kishan Lal Taneja is being reproduced hereunder:
“7. Having considered the submissions of the parties and perused the record, I am unable to accept the respondent’s plea. The petitioner has already reached the ripe age of 75 years, and is still to receive the fruits of his long service with the respondents, and that too, after he has been honourably acquitted by the Competent Court. In my considered opinion the mere pendency of an application seeking grant of leave to appeal against the judgment dated 28.02.2017 before this Court, cannot be a ground to deprive a senior citizen like the petitioner, of his rightful dues, for which he has been patiently waiting since 2007. However, in order to ensure that no prejudice is caused to the respondent, while allowing the writ petition with a direction to the respondent no.2 to release within four weeks, all the pending terminal dues of the petitioner, including the remaining 50% amount towards leave encashment and gratuity, it is directed that, the release of the said payment would be subject to the petitioner filing within one week, an affidavit of undertaking before this Court to refund the amount with interest, as may be directed by the Competent Court, in case the judgment of acquittal dated 28.02.2017 is set aside.”
The Supreme Court rejected the DDA’s reliance on the case of Bikram Chand Rana v. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, 2026 INSC 326 and observed that the reliance is totally misplaced since the case pertained to an employee against whom the departmental proceedings had concluded but the trial remained pending. The Supreme Court observed:
“12. Reliance on Bikram Chand Rana vs. Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation is totally misplaced given that the said case pertained to an employee against whom the departmental proceedings had concluded, but the trial remained pending. The relied upon observations qua ‘downstream’ recovery were also made in that context i.e., future possibility of recovery from the employee could not justify releasing an amount that could otherwise not be paid in view of the express statutory embargo in Rule 69(1)(c) of the CCS Pension Rules. In this case, however, the amount has become payable once the trial concluded and resulted in the issuance of final order of acquittal therein. An Appellate Court may or may not disturb the same, but until then, the acquittal continues to hold the field.
13. The requirement to furnish the undertaking has been imposed solely to balance the competing equities of safeguarding public funds with the right of a retired employee to receive and enjoy terminal benefits earned over decades of service. Practically speaking, if a superannuated employee (being necessarily of advanced age) were required to await the conclusion of even appellate proceedings against acquittal for an uncertain number of years, it is most probable the pensionary benefits would itself be rendered illusory. They should not have to suffer due to long pendency of such a challenge preferred by the State, particularly when the delay is not attributable to them.”
It is pertinent to mention herein that the Pension Rules of 1972 have been replaced by the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2021, and the same embargo on payment of gratuity during the pendency of departmental or judicial proceedings now finds place in Rule 8(4)(c) of the 2021 Rules. The object of the said provision, as noticed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, is to safeguard the financial interests of the State, so that the amount is not paid out to an employee who may ultimately be found guilty.
It may be mentioned that the Supreme Court has time and again held that pension and gratuity are not bounties but are in the nature of “property” which cannot be taken away save by authority of law as mandated under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. It is trite law that the State cannot deprive the Government Servants their pension and other monetary benefits on their whims and fancies.
It is interesting to note that while the Supreme Court in the instant case held that the gratuity became payable on conclusion of the trial in acquittal, notwithstanding the pendency of the State’s leave petition, the Delhi High Court in Union of India v. Jamuna Dass, W.P.(C) No. 2936 of 2021, has held that a criminal appeal pending against conviction is a “judicial proceeding” and the gratuity can be withheld till the same is decided. The judgment in Rajender Kumar Sharma does not refer to Jamuna Dass.

